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My dissertation analyzes non-normative erotics on the seventeenth century stage. 
Changing norms and discourses around sex collide with an emerging chronobiopolitical 
governmentality, or a disciplining of the time of life. In this context, discourses, bodies and 
intimacies were increasingly choreographed to an emerging national temporality under a 
burgeoning centralized state.  My project traces the disjointed desires that fail to be properly 
attuned to this sovereign temporality. Inhabiting a middle ground between speech and silence, 
“inarticulate erotics” do not cohere under the dominant forms of discourse, yet are expressed 
through their difference- in a slowness or fastness relative to the normative pace of life.  Taking 
into account “temporal orientations” means considering the ways that slowness or haste can feel 
erotic or the ways that chrononormativity creates monolithic expectations of gender.  In their 
divergence from the exigencies of a chrono-normative pace, these inarticulate erotics diversify an 
approach to the history of sexuality and shine a new light on ways of thinking about theater in  
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I. Inarticulate Erotics 
 
 When seventeenth-century French theater experienced a peak in the output and aesthetic 
refinement of dramatic literature, within same period, the theater paradoxically,  was submitted 
to an overall tightening-up of rules of sexual expression on the stage. These limitations of 
expression marked a shift from the beginning half of the century, during which transgressive 
erotics were still permitted in dramatic literature. Reading this transition from early to late 
dramas reveals changing norms of  acceptable and unacceptable socio-sexual behavior and 
expression, a turn that opens up both possibilities and quandaries in terms of the ways we read 
sexuality of the past. For example, on the wedding night depicted in Isaac de Benserade’s 1634 
play, Iphis et Iante, Iphis wrings his hands, struggling to express something to his new bride:  
Hélas! Ne sauriez-vous lire dans ma pensée 
L’étrange mouvement de ma flamme insensée? 
Mon coeur par des soupirs peut-il s’expliquer mieux,  
Et le mal qui me tient n’est-il pas dans mes yeux? (IV, 1)1  
An “étrange mouvement” characterizes this mixture of burning desire and a hidden “mal” that 
seizes Iphis. Despite the hope that such strange movement will make legible the illegibile, to 
“lire dans [sa] pensée,” the inarticulable emotions Iphis experiences remain both unspoken and 
unspeakable. Seventeenth-century theatergoers familiar with Ovid’s Metamorphoses could guess 
that the secret that Iphis conceals is that he is actually female, having been raised by her mother 
under a male guise to protect her from Iphis’ father. The hymneal night, then, becomes nuptial 
                                                 
1
 “Alas, do you not know how to read in the depths of my thoughts/ the strange movement of my crazed desire/ 
Through sighs, could my heart explain itself better/ and the pain that grips me, is it not visible in my eyes?” 
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consummation, gender revelation as well as sexual transgression. Iphis delays the moment of 
revealing his/her body and engaging in the long-wished for act: 
L’hymen qui convertit le crime en innocence 
À mes jeunes désires donne toute licence,  
J’aime et si je possède, en ce retardement 
Ne vous doutez-vous pas de mon secret tourment? (IV, 1)
2
  
Iphis hopes that delay itself, the slowed tempo leading to the desired moment, will itself inscribe 
a certain legibility to her love and enable Iante to insinuate the secret of his/her sex. Since the 
nuptial night is sequenced in a predetermined temporal order of events (courtship, engagement, 
marriage, and consummation), the signaling delay remains obscured. The two spouses proceed to 
consummate the act, which effectively stands as one of the few female-female lovemaking 
scenes recounted in the French seventeenth-century theater.  
For Iphis, revealing the truth of her body enables a temporality of forgetting — a 
momentary, convenient erasure that diminishes the overarching weight of a binary sex 
(male/female) and allows her to approach Iante in a flurry of verbs describing intimate contact, 
caresses, and kisses. Iphis tells her mother the following day:  
J’oubliais quelque temps que j’étais une fille,  
Je ne reçus jamais tant de contentements,  
Je me laissais aller à mes ravissements… 
J’embrassais ce beau corps, dont la blancheur extrême 
M’excitent à lui faire une place en moi-même 
Je touchais, je baisais, j’avais le coeur content (V, 4).3  
                                                 
2
 “The marriage that transforms crime to innocence/ to my youthful desires gives full reign/ I love and if I possess, 
in this delay/ Do you not guess my secret torment?” 
3
  “I forgot for some time that I was a girl/ I have never received so much satisfaction/ I let myself go in my 
delights/ I kissed this beautiful body, whose extreme paleness/ Aroused me to make a place for her within 
 3 
By foregrounding touch, sensation and bodies, Iphis speaks of an erotic intimacy that leaves 
aside the question of gender identity or sexual orientation. And yet, her narration of the wedding 
night depicts an intimacy that exceeds norms of penetrator/ penetrated, lesbian/gay/straight, or 
more. Iphis takes the “passive” position, wishes to make “space” within herself for her lover, but 
also employs a variety of active verbs in regards to a mixture of hesitation and haste when 
approaching her beloved Iante.  
In the end, Iphis and Iante’s situation is easily rectified by the goddess Isis, who arrives to 
magically transform Iphis into a man. But before the hetero-sexed resolution can take place, 
Iante and Iphis both struggle to find a language to express their situation, wavering between 
innocence and crime, between masculine and feminine gender identities, between legitimate 
heterosexual nuptials and gender-transgressive sex. After Iphis enthuses to her mother about the 
delights of their wedding night, she admits that Iante's only response, far from shock or disgust, 
is “de ne nous point parler.”4 This command to be silenced acts a type of neutral and neutralizing 
response (neutre in French means both neutered and neutral), a reaction that Télétuze signals as 
odd: “C’est ce que mon esprit trouve le plus étrange” (V, 4).5  Of all of the “strange” sentiments 
circulating in this play— Iphis’s same sex desire for Iante, Iante’s lack of horror upon seeing 
Iphis’ non-male body, the years of maternally-imposed cross-dressing — out of all of these 
intimacies and gender dynamics, the thing that Télétuze finds most strange is Iante’s silence. And 
it is this silence as well as Iphis' and Iante's inarticulacies in the face of non-normative desires 
and intimacies that interests me the most, as they point to the limits of sexual expression. 
Such inarticulacies animate my project, one that endeavors to bring together two 
narratives, the story of changing norms and discourses around sex in the seventeenth century and 
the story of an emerging governmentality in the period that was specifically informed by a 
                                                                                                                                                             
myself/ I touched, I kissed, I had a contented heart”  
4
 “For us never to speak.” 
5
 “That is what my mind finds the most bizarre” 
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“chronobiopolitics,” or a disciplining of the time of life. My reading of the convergence of these 
two trajectories argues that bodies, intimacies and sexualities were choreographed by and 
conditioned to an emerging national tempo. In this movement that offers forth new discursive 
standards and (hetero)sexual norms under a burgeoning centralized state, there also emerges 
disjointed bodies and desires that fail to be properly attuned to this sovereign temporality. What 
intrigues me is that these divergent sexualitieslie in “plain sight” in their presentation, in a such a 
way that begs neither excoriation nor embrace. Rather, they make minimal claims on legibility 
and on action.  
One way of tracing these resistant erotics has been to analyze obscene literature, 
transgender memoirs, or early modern same-sex friendship in the period, an approach that is 
worthy in its recuperative effort. My project's point of departure from this precedent is the 
critique that such “recuperative” efforts do not go far enough, insofar as I see these 
“transgressive” emergences as part and parcel of Foucault's “explicit articulation and endlessly 
accumulated detail” (18), the corollary that contributes to the fiction of “liberation” from the so-
called repression of sexuality.
6
 This research hypothesizes that there are erotics that stand in 
excess of Foucault's repressive hypothesis, or desires that are neither suppressed nor made to 
speak their transgression. Inhabiting a middle ground between speech and silence, and differing 
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 The seventeenth century saw changing norms not only for acceptable and illicit sexuality, but also for the 
ways that sexuality could be rendered into discourse. Foucault has indicated the seventeenth century as a type of 
threshold turning point in the ways that sexuality could be discussed:  
XVIIeme siècle: ce serait le début d’un âge de répression, propre aux sociétés qu’on appelle 
bourgeoises, et dont nous ne serions peut être pas encore tout à fait affranchis. Nommer le sexe 
serait, de ce moment, devenu plus difficile et plus coûteaux. Comme si, pour le maîtriser dans le 
réel, il avait fallu d’abord le réduire au niveau du langage, contrôler sa libre circulation dans le 
discours, le chasser des choses dites et éteindre les mots qui le rendent trop sensiblement présent 
(25).  
 In a world in which discourse around sexuality was being monitored, regulated and controlled, instead of a 
top-down injunction to silence, it was during this period that sexuality was also being made to flourish in other 
controlled, surveyed domains— in religious confession, in legal discourse, and later in the scientia sexualis of 
psychoanalysis. And the injunction to verbal proliferation, far from freeing us from the repression, actually serves as 
a false “outlet” that is still complicit with the ways that sexuality was being disciplined, insofar as one sexuality 
finds concretization in language, it becomes seizable, analyzable. It also performatively iterates and contributes to a 
fixed domain of what “counts” as legible and illegible sexuality. Thus, discursive proliferation, far from being 
defiant, only serves to propagate the repression.  
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from language that outright signals itself as “marginal,” I term these queer desires “inarticulate 
erotics.” In their divergence from the exigencies of a chrono-normative pace, these erotics 
emerge in a disjointed temporality, a temporality whose slowness or fastness relative to the 
normative pace of life means that such queer desires lie in plain sight but do not register 
themselves as such. Inarticulate erotics appear in their relative slowness and haste that are 
“bizarre,” to borrow Télétuze’s word, and appear obliquely in relation to expectations and 
behaviors according to a normative tempo. In this sense, my work closely follows that of Anne-
Lise François's Open Secrets, in which she examines gestures, disclosures and announcements 
that often go unnoticed, unregistered, or even are released, toward no specific end. It is the 
absence of something that we would mark as absence:  
Rather than either dismiss this movement of recessive disclosure as a nonevent 
whose sole effect is defensive— to bar change and ensure that nothing happen— 
or, on the contrary (but this amounts to the same), recognize it as the magic act 
essential to the effective workings of social relations— [Open Secrets] focuses on 
the ways in which the open secret as a gesture of self-canceling revelation permits 
a release from the ethical imperative to act upon knowledge (3).  
If it is power that formalizes desire, that lays the terms under and grounds upon which desire 
(deviant or not) can even be made legible, even and especially under the conditions particular to 
seventeenth-century drama, inarticulate erotics decline participation in a discursive economy in 
which a (sexual) declaration, once announced, can be acted upon. Such an approach belies the 
“obvious” presentation of same-sex intimacy, insofar as Iphis et Iante, for example, is often read 
(and critiqued/celebrated) in terms of its proto-transgressive gender and sexual politics, an 
“obviousness” that accompanies certain imperatives to see, to act and to react. Such “openness” 
obscures the fact that there can be possibly other, more minimally present sexual dynamics 
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equally at hand.  
Certain kinds of gestures and moments appear as sexual in Iphis et Iante, or at least 
“sexual” according to our  contemporary standards of what desire looks like-- for example, 
consummating a wedding night, or Iphis' desire for Iante's “blancheur extrême,” or the repetition 
of “je touchais, je baisais.” What kind of intimacy is at play in repeating and divulging in great 
voyeuristic detail one’s sexual experiences to one’s mother, as Iphis does? Or what would make 
legible the erotic dynamics of forbidding one’s partner to speak, as Iante does, in her “de ne nous 
point parler?” How does one begin to define, or consider the mixture of anticipation and 
trepidation that Iphis experiences, dragging out time before “the act” while also longing to hasten 
toward tasting sexual pleasure with Iante?  
Inarticulate erotics minimize their claims on legibility, not out of paranoid concealment 
or defeated futility, but because they wish, in their very minimality, in their difference from and 
to norms of legibility, to challenge fixed ideologies of progress and discernability. Thus, these 
“uncounted” or “reticent” utterances contest “the normative bias in favor of the demonstrable, 
dramatic development and realization of human powers characteristic of, but not limited to, the 
capitalist investment in value and work and the Enlightenment allegiance to rationalism and 
unbounded progress” (François xvi). François's analytic of uncounted experience resists a type of 
normative temporality, one fashioned upon an unquestioned belief in “progress” and 
development. While her work centers on an epistemic shift in the Enlightenment, I turn to  the 
seventeenth century in this project as a means of considering the nascent stages of an emerging 
chronobiopolitics that would eventually be realized in Enlightenment rationalism. I ground my 
own analysis of these inarticulate erotics-- as minimal as François’s reticent and recessive 
claims-- in the historic flux and change of temporality itself that was underway in the 
seventeenth century, a shift that had larger implications not only economically, aesthetically and 
 7 
politically-- but also and most importantly, sexually. In this sense, “temporality” becomes an 
object of analysis while at the same time serving as a means of tracing such liminal desires.  
As I will analyze in a later section, certain trends in queer theory's turn to temporality 
addresses the normativizing force such investments in “rationalism and unbounded progress.” In 
my analysis of these queer approaches, however, I believe that previous queer early modern 
studies have taken the open secret, or the inarticulate erotics, too literally. By this I mean that the 
open secret is either understood to mark “secret of opennness” or the “fetish of nonclosure” (5) 
that promotes an ever-deeper investigation of the “true” sexuality, eroticism or desire at hand, or 
else the openness is taken as part of a false smoke-and-mirrors effect, a dazzling presentation of 
“openness” /legibility in the service of distracting from “other,” more invisible differences (6).7  
This queer turn to temporality, analyzing the ways that sexualities and intimacies are 
influenced by such normative chronobiopolitics, still lacks a critical attention paid to speeds that 
govern the quality and shape of life. Such varied and plural tempos of existence clash frictionally 
against each other and create entire zones of incomprehension and incompatibility (“c'est ce que 
mon ésprit trouve le plus étrange,”says Télétuze) but these are zones that have been simply 
dismissed as mere “nonsense” or outright resistances.  
Scholars such as Lewis Seifert, Gary Ferguson, and Joan DeJean, among others, have 
                                                 
7
 Anne-Lise François has put forth these dynamics more clearly than I can, but before I cite her, I would also 
mention that I believe that these two means of approaching the open secret can correspond to Sedgwick's 
“paranoid” hemeneutic (the paranoid position that fantasizes that “the secret is, there is always more to be 
known, it can be forever opened”) or her idea of “reparative” reading (paying close attention to the surpising 
dynamics and unexpected revelations that are present, and have always been present).  François writes: “On 
another level, as a figure of ellipsis- of the set that no determinate content can fill and whose ends trail off into 
the implicit and nonspecifiable— the open secret also corresponds to the secret of openness or the fetish of 
nonclosure to which Zizek repeatedly draws our attention in his numerous accounts of how the symbolic order of 
Western modernity turns out to be premised on a gap it posits as having to remain empty or unfilled, always 
capable of accommodating one more articulated content, whether in question are human rights or the reasons of 
desire” (5) 
“In other cases the figure of the open secret is understood as itself an instance of ideological mystification, and 
the critical work consists of unmasking one of the two antithesis— “open” or “secret” — as the illusion hiding 
the truth of the other. Thus the claim to openness, nondifferentiation, universality, or accessibility may be 
revealed as the illusion masking— either to protect or deny— the existence of the invisible minority and secret 
of unmarked difference” (6)  
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forged the way in thinking through the careful socio-historical analysis of modes of 
homoeroticism and same-sex desire in seventeenth century France. At the same time, my 
research takes up a different form of queerness: the erotics, intimacies, and desires that remain 
unsaid--that which struggles to take shape either on the stage or on the page, but in this struggle, 
intervenes in the available and dominant forms of sexual expression. In this project, Iask a 
different form of question of chronobiopolitics. Instead of paying attention to queered forms of 
desire that lie outside of kinship, reproduction, and intimacy, my question is: what are queer 
speeds? What are the normative paces and tempos of desire and sexuality and how does this 
normalcy produce its own set of exclusionary blinders?   My position is not to argue against 
abdicating either the anticipatory or agnostic approach
8
 – methods that treat the history of 
sexuality as either excavating the “proto-gay” identities or throwing up one's hands in a “we can't 
ever know” celebration of queer ambiguitites--- as I will argue later, both of these approaches 
have their benefits as well as their downfalls. The anticipatory, while trending toward the 
teleologic, also helps us understand and read larger trends in the shifts in sexuality throughout 
history. This history and historiography of sexuality, while written aslant to such a linear 
teleologic impulse, still took place in a certain form of sequence (if not progress). The openness 
that the “agnostic” approach affords can help broaden one's expectations and scope of what 
“counts” as sexuality, although the too-quick turn to the aporetic impasse may mean that we 
refuse to perform deeper work and instead resort to the “out” of ambiguity.  My approach, 
juggling both the agnostic and the anticipatory, the erotohistoriographic and antifuturic goes 
beyond examining the way one is oriented towards (for example, reaching out to or rejecting) an 
optimistic future or a mourned-for past. Instead of taking into account one's orientation to time 
(past/present/future), I instead examine the cultivation of divergent speeds and paces -- queer 
                                                 
8
 These categories are from Peter Coviello's Tomorrow's Parties, although as I mention in a later section of this 
introduction, I read these categories and trends in queer theory as symptomatic of certain attitudes and anxieties 
taken toward the problem of legibility/illegibility of sexualities of the past.  
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velocities of life.   
It is a commonplace that sexuality as we conceive of it today did not exist as such in the 
seventeenth century. Nevertheless, prior to undertaking deconstructive gestures to destabilize a 
discursive analysis of historical sexualities, it is important to establish the field of these multiple 
and competing axes of sexual knowledge. At the same time that the line demarcating permissible 
and impermissible speech was being drawn, the very idea of what constituted sexuality and 
deviance itself was changing. Historian Katherine Crawford notes that the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries saw changing and competing notions of non-normative intimacies, or 
sodomy: “A capital offense in early modern France (although not often prosecuted), sodomy was 
conceptualized as a sin against nature. It encompassed a range of nonreproductive sexual acts 
that included masturbation as well as acts involving two men, a person or a ban and a woman if 
performed in such a way as to prevent conception” (514). The problem with the declaration of 
sodomy as going “against nature” is that the very sense of what was “natural” was also 
ambiguous.
9
 Furthermore, the status of sexual acts between women occupies a vague gray zone: 
while “tribadism” did appear in the French dictionary of 1690, the dictionary gives a definition 
that avoids moral judgement and declines to give very many details regarding how the act took 
place and its distance from or proximity to the “natural”: “Tribade: Mot qui vient du Grec. C’est 
celle qui s’acouple avec une autre personne de son sexe & qui contrefait l’homme.”10 In the 
definition of the word, the same-sex act and the trans-gender posturing (“contrefait l'homme”) 
are twinned together, as one type of sexual deviance. In all of these emerging, changing and 
                                                 
9
 To give another example of this gray zone, theologian Jean Benedicti wrote in 1610 of sodomy:   
“This sin is against the natural order because it is committed against the sexual order, a sin that is more grievous 
than having relations with one’s sister, or even with one’s own mother. Now there is sodomy, and there is the 
sodomitical act, which are two different things. [marginal note in Latin: Sodomitical copulation is committed by a 
male by ejaculating semen inside the posterior pudenda. The sodomitical act is committed by polluting oneself with 
another person, and this is perhaps sodomy of women as much as it can also be of men]”(Merrick and Ragan, 3)  It 
is significant here that this discourse can only define sodomy in a comparatively negative term (what it is “worse 
than”)  
10
 “Tribade. Word that comes from Greek. It's she who couples with another person of her sex and who feigns to be 
a man” 
 10 
competing discourses around sexuality, the seventeenth century furnishes a particularly rich site 
of investigation for queer analysis.
11
  
Although removed from the concretizing grasp of such a fixed and nameable ontology, 
the queer sexuality in Iphis et Iante juggles multiple discourses around sexuality and 
transgression, fumbling around a nebulous dividing line between proper and perverted intimate 
contact. In a monologue the day following her wedding night, the deceived Iante indicates this 
flux point of different factors shaping her sexual speech— she admits that she really has nothing 
against the same-sex marriage between them, but it is it only social conventions and the fear of 
religious retribution that causes her to hesitate:  
Ce mariage est doux, j’y trouve asssez d’appâts 
Et si l’on n’en riat, je ne m’en plaindrais pas:  
Je n’aurais pas regret qu’on nous joignît ensemble,  
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To give one example, Dejean’s work focuses on the censorship and obscenity trials relating to Théophile de Viau; 
for the first time in French literary history, obscenity would be associated with the writer’s perceived sexual 
transgression (de Viau’s homosexuality played a major role in the scandal and in his trials) as opposed to being 
censored for heresy. Her careful historical work demonstrates how the seventeenth century was experiencing a 
dramatic shift in attitudes toward sexuality. For her, this moment marks  
 the most evident, and perhaps the most dramatic, shift in Western European standards for decency, 
as those standards applies to the representation of sexuality in literature. How else can we 
understand the fact that, in the late Middle Ages, Chaucer’s work was apparently acceptable to the 
full contemporary audience for literature, whereas by the end of the seventeenth century, parts of it 
were expurgated because of their alleged indecency? How else do we understand the dramatic shift 
from the sixteenth century, when Boccacio and Rabelais were censured for their anticlericalism, 
rather than for their lustiness, to the late seventeenth century, when their frank depictions of 
sexuality had become inconceivable? (18)  
This marked shift in attitudes is apparent in Le Père Garasse's writings against Théophile's scandalous sonnet. 
Dejean cites Garasse in order to analyze the heatedness of his rhetoric:  
 “In the past, the minute the word sodomy was mentioned, everyone began to talk about burning 
alive the person even suspected of it,” whereas now “a book is being sold publicly which open 
with a sonnet in which the author, who calls himself the sieur Théophile, repents because he has 
contracted an infamous disease from a prostitute, and swears to God to remain a SODOMITE all 
the rest of his days” (781). From this point on, whenever Garasse brings up Théophile, he 
invariably refers to him as a sodomite-- and, lest there be any doubt about what he means by this 
term, he never misses the chance to describe the poet in suspicious male company” (46)  
In many senses Garasse's diatribe marks several important shifts taking place in this period. The focus shifts from 
prosecuting those suspected of the act-- monitoring circulating gossip and rumors-- to a honed interested specifically 
in printed speech and acceptable language. The distance between lived experience, Théophile's “male company” and 
the author's literary representation becomes collapsed. Furthermore, we find here the nascent stages of the shift form 
sodomitical acts to an identity, a shift that Foucault describes in the History of Sexuality, that after 1870 “the 
sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species” (HS 43). 
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Si l’on ne profanait le noeud qui nous assemble” (V, 1) 12 
Iante lacks a means to express her desires or her situation— while she cannot affirm anything 
clear about their intimacy or their relationship, she can only express things in a double negative, 
in a plethora of “ne” phrases: no regrets and no complaints are possible only minus the threat of 
societal mockery or profaning their religious institutions. These latter represent two domains that 
Foucault claims that discourse around deviant intimacies were made to flourish, in order to be 
actively scrutinized, monitored and discussed. In this sense, Iante's monologue indicates a type 
of hinge point between sexual repression and discursive incitement.  
 However, relying on this solely “discursive” narrative means that we tend to exclude 
other presentations of desire— we see the history of sexuality as a dynamic between emergence 
and disappearance, between thriving and repression. Peter Coviello argues,  
The regime of sexuality, in other words, is one of implantation and investment: an 
intensification of zones of the body, a making-vulnerable or making-sensitized, a 
saturation of personhood with proddings and incitements and solicitations. Much 
of this goes missing when we think of sex as discourse, or when we under-read 
what Foucault means when he suggests sex is 'discursively constituted'” (17).  
Tracing all of these changing dynamics of institutional power and governmental censorship 
certainly can provide us a background for understanding the multiple ways that sexuality was 
being conditioned, brought to light, and disciplined in this time. At the same time as it is useful 
to find overarching trends of flourishing and repression around seventeenth century in France, I 
argue that the clear-cut division between a “before” and an ‘after” of sexual discursivity is a 
fantasy, or at least a fantasy-generating device, in which those who study sexualities in the past 
wish to posit a time prior, replete with possibilities, a “uchronia” akin to a utopia.  
                                                 
12
 “This marriage is sweet, in it I find plenty of delight/ And if one didn't mock it, I wouldn't complain/ I would 
have no regrets that we have been joined together/ if the binding marital knot were not profaned by others.” 
 12 
 In response to this desire of getting back to the past, or the charges of anachronism 
(applying queer theory to a past that may not have understood or wanted it), Freeman proposes 
another way of approaching studying sexualities of the past, saying:  
It’s not simple nostalgia, for it requires giving up the notion that a given form has 
a stable referent, a prior wholeness locatable in a time and place we ought to ‘get 
back to.’ It is more like what I think Sedgwick means by reparative criticism: that 
because we can’t know in advance— we can only know retrospectively, if even 
then— what is queer and what is not, we gather and combine eclectically and 
idiosyncratically, dragging a bunch of cultural debris “not necessarily like any 
preexisting whole” (“Still After,” 31, citing Sedgwick from Touching Feeling 
[128])   
In a similar vein, Coviello follows David Halperin in suggesting that “modern” sexuality is made 
up of an “unprecedented combination of…previously uncorrelated conceptual entities” (9) 
including a number of vectors (psychoanalytic, identitarian, political) that comprise the 
formation of modern same-sex sexuality.  It is for this reason that analysis of discourse alone is 
not sufficient, since examining “moments before this coordination is to look squarely at 
possibilities for the disaggregation, or staggered articulation, or differential emphasis, of one or 
more of these not-yet-coordinated vectors of being. It is to see something of the shape sex could 
take— errant, unlikely, not always legible as sex— before it quite became the sexuality we now 
know, or think we know” (Coviello, 10). Thus, following Freeman and Coviello, instead of 
looking at the story of sexuality, and seventeenth century sexuality as a simple story of before 
and after, repression and resistence, pre-gay and post-gay, I would contend that the focus on the 
repressive hypothesis as the dominant model for investigating sexuality in the seventeenth 
century fails to consider the “errant and unlikely” modes of intimacy that may not even cohere or 
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make sense. The question then becomes: how can we look for and look at that which is “not 
necessarily like any pre-existing whole”? “Ne sauriez-vous lire dans ma pensée?” Iphis asks us.  
 These “open secrets” of the minimal utterance that points to divergent erotics are not the 
hidden “there” of the text to be unearthed13. Rather, if early modern sexuality and temporality 
were undergoing such a period of contestation, change and flux, these early dramas that I analyze 
provide a type of “snapshot” of such dynamics. Against the charge that it is I (the critic) who is 
“putting” these queer erotics in the text, or against the suspicion that I am arguing that Corneille, 
Benserade and Racine “hid” or placed such queer erotics in the text, I would respond in two 
ways. First, there is a certain convergence of possibilities (and impossibilities) of sexual 
articulation in this period, some of which are familiar, legible and recognizable to us, and other 
“errant and unlikely” structures that condition what erotics can and can not be possible. These 
are “not like any pre-existing whole” but also unlike anything that would come to be. And thus, 
the “snapshot” quality of the dramas that I am alluding to means that such a weird nexus of 
structuring possibilities is captured, allowing us to re-imagine the very conditions of possibility 
available for sexual, textual, and dramatic representation in that time. The second response that I 
could make is that I/ Racine/Corneille did not “put” these deviant erotics there. Rather, these 
inarticulate erotics have already been present all along, yet obscured by our particular reading 
lenses that only makes apparent certain types of behavior and tempos that are properly aligned 
with  and in tune with a normative chronobiopolitical pace and sequence of life.  
These inarticulate erotics types of desires, embedded in temporalities, that are not 
necessarily forbidden or repressed, nor do they strain to take shape in speech. The experience of 
the temporality of sexuality, in its rushes and hesitations, creates its own set of affects, 
eroticisms, and desires. There still remains something in excess of the cut that divides outright 
                                                 
13
 See footnote #7 for a further discussion 
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subversion (of the female-female lovemaking scene) and sexual silence. What happens, for 
example, when the eroticism is the slowness itself, the announcement and the anticipation-- and 
not the actual act? What would it mean for time to feel erotic-- in this case a slowed time replete 
with possibilities for Iphis (of rejection, horror, transgression, delight, recognition, and more)?
14
 
The actual “act” itself (whatever a sexual act is, anyway) cannot comprise and condense these 
varied tempos of possibility-- time, here, becomes a mode of eroticism that seeks neither release 
nor affirmation. In this sense, following François, 
... whereas Sedgwick's early work tends to emphasize only this first direction, 
concentrating on the open secret's disciplinary effects in keeping knowledge 
impotent because never admitted, I want to pay closer attention to what the open 
secret enables, namely a strangely passive, all but agentless and guiltless, 
exchange between people […] The open secret is not simply a retractive mode of 
expression-- a way of making something about oneself unavailable, burying it in 
the very means of its revelation; it is also a way of letting oneself be known 
without even seeming to, calling into play the interpretative powers of one's 
auditors and engaging their moral freedom (81).  
What I call “inarticulate erotics” offers one way of addressing the history of sexuality that 
neither follows the narrative of the “repressive hypothesis,” nor clearly adheres to codes of 
legibility that seem clearly and obviously sexual. Examining inarticulate erotics takes as 
axiomatic that there are types of attachments that may not make sense in terms of what we 
understand to be the “logical” divisions between acceptable and obscene, inside and outside, 
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I would be interested in relating and expanding the losses inscribed in the open secret-- an unregistered and 
unregisterable loss, with Butler's work on ungrievable lives. See the “Introduction: Acting in Concert” in Undoing 
Gender for more. Francois writes: “this type of minimally inflected transition from the latency of unactualized, 
dormant possibility (with its attendant, residual temporality of suspended hope and quiet waiting) to “more” absolute 
privation- -a change difficult to show as such from the presence of something missed, left unrealized, to its actual 
disappearance”(38)  
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deviant and normative. Carla Mazzio’s book The Inarticulate Renaissance indicates such a 
middle ground of expression: “the inarticulate here… marks something between, but not 
reducible to either, speech and silence” (5). Between Foucault’s dynamics of outright repression 
and flourishing, or DeJean’s analysis of censorship and the literary obscene, there lies a middle 
territory of half-formed, partially understood utterances and expressions that are never fully 
flagged. Thus, it is by taking up this middle ground of inarticulacy between speech and silence 
and its concomitant affects we might better understand the breadth of a whole other range of 
possibilities of what Coviello has called the “not-yet coordinated vectors of being.” He analyzes 
the “earliness of the erotic being of these writers,” specifying that”what I mean to capture in the 
term ‘earliness’ is instead the experience of sexuality as something in the crosshairs of a number 
of forms of knowledge and regulation but not yet wholly captivated or made coordinate by them” 
(7). Lingering closely around such inarticulate utterances can illuminate the possibilities of queer 
desire in a way that eschews an overly romanticized fantasy of a “before,” in favor of situating 
such inarticulacies in their historical and discursive particularity.  
My approach might be thought of as akin to what Sedgwick has metaphorized as 
“gravestone rubbing.” She writes: “The dense back-and-forth touch of the crayon leaves a 
positive map not of excrescences but of lines of absence or excised matter. And the pressure of 
insistence that makes a continuous legibility called sexual knowledge emerge from and take the 
shape of the furrows of prohibition or of stupor is, most powerfully, the reader's energy of need, 
fear, repudiation projection” (T, 46). Inarticulate erotics considers the carved-out excised spaces 
while avoiding Sedgwick's critique of the “reader's energy of need.” This energy creates the 
insistence that is the (crayon) pressure of bringing something to light in a clearly legible manner. 
Instead of rallying around spectacularly transgressive obscene literature or hiding in repressed 
silence, these inarticulate erotics find recourse to expression in ways that may not even seem 
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sexual or may not even appear as means of coding or gesturing toward the erotic or intimate.  
Expanding upon earlier work on early modern sexualities and same-sex desires, this 
project asks different questions of the “uncaptivated” or “un-coordinated” types of desires, taking 
seriously Sedgwick's definition of queer as the “open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, 
dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of 
anyone's gender, of anyone's sexuality aren't made (or can't be made) to signify monolithically” 
(T, 8). One of these entities, or axes of capture, ought to include temporality, and more 
specifically, velocity. Iphis summons up the ‘étrange mouvement’ and ‘retardements’ to speak of 
a type of longing and intermixed affects that remain not quite clear— a position of loving one’s 
legitimate wife, while dreading revealing one’s true gender all the while delighting in such a 
trans-gendered disguise that permits proximity and touch— all of these dynamics of privilege 
and exclusion, legibility and hiddenness intermix to produce an eroticism that is not quite 
lesbian, nor straight, nor trans, but can be thought of as generally queer. At the same time, such 
dragging is a way to mark a departure from a certain tempo of expectation. If it is through 
movement, slowness and speed that Iphis attempts to articulate her desire, we like Iante, are 
unable to see such speeds and movements as signaling the inarticulable. There are certain 
normative temporalities that are associated with gender that create times of expectations— the 
speed of decision making, the sequence of what “should” follow (e.g. nuptials after engagement, 
consummation after marriage, the proper speed of courtship).  
My research on inarticulate erotics does take a cue from Mazzio’s work.  However, her 
approach endeavors to shine a light on the “history and dramatic representation of verbal 
sparagmos or outright unintelligibility” as well as “mumbling, babbling, and rhyming without 
reason […], confused or unintelligible elocution” or the “sighs, groans, and vivid inarticulacy of 
lovers” (7-8).  And yet all of these stammerings and stutterings, in Mazzio’s analysis, still signal 
 17 
language in distress, or at least moments when inarticulacy “vividly” flags itself as such, as 
pressing against the limits of intelligible and unintellgible speech.  
In contrast to this notion of language in distress, what interests me most about Iphis’ case 
and in the other plays that I analyze are the moments of serious inarticulacy, moments that do not 
dramatically falter but rather “hide in plain sight.” Deleuze writes of this linguistic faltering and 
the generative torsions it can produce:  
Stammering, in general, is a speech problem.  But to make language stammer is a 
different matter.  It is to impose the work of continuous variation on language, on 
all interior elements of language, phonological, syntactical, and semantic…To be 
a stranger, then, in one’s own language… It is to impose on language, as it is 
spoken perfectly and soberly, this line of variation that will make you a foreigner 
in your own language or make a foreign language your own or make your 
language a bilingualism immanent to your foreignness (247). 
In the plays that I analyze, I trace this kind of speech that appears to adhere to the conventions of 
discourse but nevertheless creates “friction” against the norms and expected pace of 
representation by dragging against or rushing forward in strange and unexpected ways.  
Given such a weight placed on legible speech and societal acceptance, Mazzio 
hypothesizes that “being inarticulate is often conditioned by social contexts that, if undetected or 
unexamined, can lead to injurious forms of internalization; to the pathos of ‘feeling inarticulate’ 
rather than a condition of knowing that one is unacknowledged or uninterpolated into a 
community of legitimate speakers” (3).  And extending on this sentiment of pathos, perhaps it is 
not coincidental that the plays that I analyze in the following chapters are all tragedies, insofar as 
the tragic allows a specific interrogation of pathos of loss. This loss, according to Benjamin, is 
one that stems from a fallen “non-messianic” temporality, and thus establishes theater as a 
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particularly apt means to consider the representation of the time of life.
15
 In other words, the 
question becomes what happens when we leave aside the promised fixity and fulfillment of a 
messianic temporality in favor of an openness to the contingencies and fault lines of the 
emerging early modern chronobiopolitics? Samuel Weber argues that theater provides one 
answer to this quandary:  
Precisely this capacity of theater to offer a possible way out of the dilemmas 
resulting from a failing religious and cosmic order will guide Benjamin in his 
approach to the German Trauerspiel and to modernity in general. Theater, it 
should be remembered, is here defined as a space that is riven, spatially and 
temporally, and that therefore can offer a possible escape from the circular orbit 
of a closed but discredited cosmos (161).  
It is the “rivenness” of the theater space and time that interests my study. I follow Mazzio's and 
Patricia Parker's interest in drama insofar as it is “particular medium through which cultural 
formations of the inarticulate became most audible and subject to public scrutiny, [a genre that] 
always involves communal situations of interaction and interlocution. Tensions constituting 
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 One could equally argue, however, that the German Trauerspiel and French classical drama are far from 
being analogous art forms, even though written in the same “historical” timeframe. This difference is the subject of 
Christopher Braider's article, “Talking Like a Book,” in which he imagines what Benjamin might have written about 
French classical drama if he had included Racine and Corneille along with his counterexamples of Calderon and 
Shakespeare.  
What grants [these plays] the contemporary afterlife they enjoy is precisely the sophistication that 
distinguishes them from the German baroque. For this sophistication implies the critical self-
consciousness required to conceal the condition French tragedy shares with German Trauerspiel: 
the lack of eschatological promise. By granting the action a perfected dramatic immanence, 
French poets create an artful surrogate whose warrant is the convincing facsimile of real life they 
bring to the stage. The procedure needed to read them in their historical (as opposed to dramatic) 
truth thus anticipates a Foucaldian archeology designed to uncover the hidden ideological 
grammar the glamorous surface of theatrical performance occludes. Benjamin would likely have 
explored, from within the forms destined to conceal it, the self-censoring awareness of the 
condition French tragedy appears to escape. The plays would thereby become allegories of the sort 
Trauerspiel presents with such earnest literal-mindedness, ...French classical tragedy cashes out 
baroque Trauerspiel without remainder; [...] the artful concealment that German dramatists failed 
to achieve sustains the make-believe required to keep the faith the historical moment destroys. 
Where German drama abjectly confesses the historical impasse reached, the French converts it 
into the public theater of redemptive Cornelian will or the private chamber of Racinian 
lamentation” (385-386).  
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dramatic affect typically reflect the fault lines of communication, rifts in the production of shared 
meanings and imagined communities” (Parker, SM, 2). The archive of drama, and especially 
tragic drama is the most useful for this analysis insofar as these three plays that comprise my 
study-- Corneille's Polyeucte and Racine's Andromaque and Bérénice are all plays about 
pronouncements and announcements appearing in the “fault lines” of such a “riven space”: the 
announcement of a conversion, the declaration of a marriage promise and the decision to save a 
son's life. The main “action” of such clear pronouncements is haunted byother inarticulate erotics 
which are obscured by an over-attention to the tempo of expectation and waiting that the dramas 
create. As such, these inarticulate erotics mark the pathos and the “earliness” in ways that don't 
rail against “uninterpollation” but don't disavow their distance from and divergence from the 
normative and expected pace of action. 
  
II. Chronobiopolitics, Temporality and the Sun King 
 
Slowness or movement may seem like strange rhetorical strategies to signal one’s 
desireor to indicate the oddness of a particular sexed/gendered/queered intimacy. At the same 
time, Iphis’ manipulation of temporality both signals and resists what Elizabeth Freeman calls 
“chrononormativity” by dragging against the expected pace of marital consummation, which is a 
dominant tempo or speed that structures lived intimacies and relations:  
Chrononormativity is a mode of implantation, a technique by which institutional 
forces come to seem like somatic facts. Schedules, calendars, time zones, and 
even wristwatches inculcate what the sociologist Evitar Zerubavel calls “hidden 
rhythms forms of temporal experience that seem natural to those whom they 
privilege.” Manipulations of time convert historically specific regimes of 
asymmetrical power into seemingly ordinary bodily tempos and routines, which in 
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turn organize the value and meaning of time. The advent of wage work, for 
example, entailed a violent retemporalization of bodies once tuned to the seasonal 
rhythms of agricultural labor (TB 3).  
This notion of chronormativity may seem more fitting to a Taylorist management of the modern 
working body or a Marxist attention to the temporality waged labor. At the same time, it is 
important to remember that the seventeenth century saw the advent of technologies of temporal 
measurement and scientific advancements that reflected specific political ideologies and 
economies in flux.  
 Chronobiopolitics figures in this study insofar as the seventeenth century, under the reign 
of Louis XIII, saw a proliferation of practices, spectacles and traditions all carefully designed to 
“invest life through and through” (Foucault, HS 139). No longer was the sovereign the dealer of 
death, but rather he became the condensation and source of a “calculated management of life” 
(140). The harnessing of temporality to adhere to absolutist rhythms became a key component of 
both managing and proliferating such control. Mitchell Greenberg argues that in France 
“something portentously revolutionary occurred during the period 1580-1680.”  He continues::  
to some, the major transformation was economic: seventeenth century-
mercantilism is seen to negotiate the passage from an essentially agrarian to a 
market economy, thus serving as the intermediary in the economic evolution from 
a pre-capitalist to a capitalist society. To others, of whom Foucault is the leading 
figure, the change presented a fundamental break in epistemology, shifting Europe 
out of the sphere of analogical reason and into the realm of (Classical) 
representation [...the] period sees a general reorganization of affective familial and 
sexual ties. The reoganization radically altered the way human beings reflected 
their own lived experience and relate it to the socio-political structures in which 
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they are born and evolve (SS 12).  
Sovereign power shifted from a spectacular power adjudicating a clear life-or-death division, 
cleaving friends from enemies to a biopolitical regime. In this governance paradigm, the 
sovereign then becomes source of myriad and multiple micro-mechanisms of power. Most of 
these regimes of control and disciplining are temporally related, but offer themselves in the 
service of life-- of appearing to cultivate a certain quality and longevity of life, in life’s fullest 
rhythms, paces, and “fulfillment”. A by-product of this shift of power was a move from the slow, 
cyclical time of agrarian culture to the haste of the mercantile system.  
For Greenberg, this temporal evolution is one that can be seen in particular in the 
changing family unit. He draws upon social historians who  
see the seventeenth century as precisely the period that witnessed the ‘actual’ 
transformation of the family… the family gradually shifted away from that large, 
inchoate unit for which the term ‘household’ (’maison,’’maisonnée’ in French) 
would be more appropriate and towards the ‘family’ as that smaller, affective 
bourgeois unit the eighteenth century was to cherish. This family comprised, and 
was usually limited to, the biological unit of mother, father, and their offspring. It 
is during the seventeenth century that the more archaic ‘economic’ definition of 
family gradually gave way to the newer ‘affective’ one (SS 13).  
Not only does temporality structure relations, moving from economically-influenced ties to 
affective relations of kinship, but alsotemporality conditions the family unit itself produces, in 
terms of the notions of generational progress, reproduction, and futurity. The seventeenth century 
emerges as a prime site of inquiry to consider these changing dynamics and temporalities of 
kinship and attachment.  
An interest in chronobiopolitics, according to Freeman and Dana Luciano, merges 
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together these concepts of chrononormativity and biopolitics. It signals not only the ways that the 
sovereign could control subjects, but also indicates the temporal conditions upon which the very 
grounds for subjectivity itself are created-- through a proliferation of practices that generated, 
monitored, and encouraged the condition and quality of life. Freeman argues:  
In chronobiopolitics, this process extends beyond individual anatomies to 
encompass the management of entire populations: people whose individual bodies 
are synchronized not only with one another but also with larger temporal schemae 
experience belonging itself as natural. In a chronobiological society, the state and 
other institutions, including representational apparatuses, link properly 
temporalized bodies to narratives of movement and change. These are teleological 
schemes of events or strategies for living such as marriage, accumulation of health 
and wealth for the future, reproduction, childrearing, and death and its attendant 
rituals (4).  
And for Luciano, this arrangement and organization reflects “the sexual arrangement of the time 
of life” (9). The ways that these seventeenth century bodies were being marshalled into “properly 
temporalized” rhythms occurred not through a “top-down” injunction, but rather through 
multiple micro-pathways of control, conditioning and measurement. Freeman takes up Luciano’s 
suggestion that “following Walter Benjamin, aesthetic objects— especially outdated ones— 
“make time appear” in ways that contest dominant modes of writing and feeling properly 
historical: they demand that we read, and they themselves write, historiographically aslant” (31). 
In the interest of approaching these desires that appear through the aslant or non-normative, we 
might pause and consider the interwoven network of structures that  created such an emerging 
chronobiopolitics. 
Temporal dynamics are multiply an extension of sovereign power. On a 
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“microdiachronic” level, these temporal conditionings of the rhythms of life, from the 
minuteness of post-office letter mail pickups to literary debates over the acceptable duration of a 
play seem to be nothing more than social niceties and conventions. However, such conditioning 
reflects the far-flung (and indeed totally hidden) ways that Absolutism disciplined and cultivated 
the temporality of the social and sexual spheres. Whether in the spectacles of Louis XIV or in the 
tiniest affairs of everyday life, time was being “straightened” in two different ways-- it was being 
regularized and standardized along a national (absolutist) logic, but it was also being straight-
ened in its increasing adherence to sexually coherent and permissible constellations that 
contributed to a favorable chronobiopolitical monitoring.
16
  
Even after the death of the Roi Soleil, his reign of artistic, literary, and scientific glory 
continued to shine. This flourishing was not merely an after-effect of a glorious reign, but rather 
a product of well-oiled and minutely regulated state machinery built explicitly to impress with 
glory and power. But this was a machine that fed on the cultivation of information, measurement, 
and the production of a standardized, precise time. Historian Charles Frostin describes:  
Dix-huit mois après la mort du ministre de Louis XIV (1683), le samedi 3 mars 
1685, le vaisseau de guerre l’Oiseau appareillait de Brest à destination du Siam 
[…] Parmi les passagers du navire figurait aussi, en transit, une petite équipe de 
six jésuites porteurs de lettres patentes de ‘mathématiciens du Roi’ et munis d’un 
imposant matériel: “machines de Römer”, horloge sur plan incliné, pendules 
                                                 
16
 In a longer version of this project it would be useful to compare the structuring of temporality in the ever-
centralized French state to the conditioning of temporality in the French colonies, and the encounter with 
different and varied rhythms of life. Carolyn Dinshaw, in a “Theorizing QueerTemporalities” roundtable 
published by GLQ points out that critical attention paid to such plural temporalities is not limited to a certain 
period in the past “This refusal of linear historicism has freed me to think further about multiple temporalities in 
the present. Postcolonial historians have been most influential in this process, and the turn toward temporality 
has been thrilling: it opens the way for other modes of consciousness to be considered seriously-- those of 
ghosts, for example, and mystics. But the condition of heterogeneous temporalities can be exploited for 
deconstruction as well as expansion: Ernst Bloch recounts chillingly the Nazi's deployment of temporal 
asynchony in recruiting Germans who felt backward in the face of an alien modernity. So we must take seriously 
temporality's tremendous social and political force” ( 178). 
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diverses, “quadran équinoxial’, quarts de nonates’, miroirs ardents’, microscopes, 
thermomètres, baromètres, etc. En qualité de ‘mathématiciens du Roi’, les pères 
devaient ‘se transporter aux Indes et à la Chine pour y faire toutes les observations 
nécesssaries pour la perfection des Arts et des Sciences, l’exactitude de la 
Géographie et établir de plus en plus la sûreté de la navigation’ (325).17  
The boat bound for Siam was not just coincidentally filled to the brim with clocks and pendula, 
but had amassed such instruments as necessary and integral players in a spectacle of sovereign 
knowledge and wealth. The drama being staged was one of scientific acquisitiveness — an ever-
precise combing of the natural world in order to tame, know, and control it. The intensified 
epistemo-critical function in regards to temporality, I argue, served to concretize and to give the 
appearance of masterable time units and a governable quality of life. Foucault remarks that there 
are twin effects of this turn to biopolitics: 
D’un côté il relève des disciplines du corps: dressage, intensification et 
distribution des forces, a justement et économie des énergies.  De l’autre, il relève 
de la regulation des populations, par tous les effets globaux qu’il induit. Il s’insère 
simultanément sur les deux registres; il donne lieu à des surveillances 
infinitesimales, à des contrôles de tous les instants, à des aménagements spatiaux 
d’une extrême méticulosité, à des examens médicaux ou psychologiques 
indéfinis, à tout un micro-pouvoir sur le corps ; mais il donne lieu aussi à des 
mesures massives, à des estimations statistiques, à des interventions qui visent le 
corps social tout entier ou des groupes pris dans leur ensemble. Le sexe est accès 
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 “Eighteen months after the death of the minister of Louis XIV, Saturday March 3, 1685, the war ship l'Oiseau, 
was rigged out from Brest, headed for Siam […] among the passengers of the boat, a small group of six Jesuits 
were also included, carrying letters from the “mathematiciens of the King” and bearing significant materials: 
“Romer machines,” “clocks on an inclined plane,” diverse pendula, “equinoxial quadrants,” “quarts de nonantes” 
silvered mirrors, microscopes, thermometers, barometers, etc. As the “mathematicians of the King,” the Jesuits 
were supposed to “travel to the Indies and to China to undertake there all of the necessary observatios for the 
perfection of Arts and Sciences, the exactitude of Geography and to establish navigation with greater and greater 
precision.” 
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à la fois à la vie du corps et à la vie de l’espèce (191-192).18  
Looking at the sun’s angle in the sky, whether from Paris or from the sea or from Siam, the 
instruments indicated a faith in an ability to measure universally. The more that this knowledge 
was harnessed and cultivated, the more extensive the influence of the sovereign's grasp on 
dynamics of life, movement, circulation, and sociality.  
The value of this knowledge was emphasized by an anecdote from the visit of the 
Ottoman ambassador Mehmed Efendi: 
s’émerveillant devant le matériel qui y était accumulé [à l’Observatoire, il] […] 
interroge des Français de son escorte, et ceux-ci d’insister sur l’héritage laissé par 
Louis XIV. ‘Ils me dirent que ce prince, qui connaissait par lui-même le prix de la 
science, comblait de bienfaits ceux qui inventaient quelque nouvelle machine et 
que, lorsque l’on lui en présentait, il les faisait mettre dans l’Observatoire pour 
l’usage des étudiants. Véritablement, j’y vis tant de choses admirables qu’un 
trésor même ne suffirait pas pour en faire l’acquisition’ (329). 19 
Particularly in the ambassador’s use of the words “treasure” and “acquisition” we see a 
conflation of the actual material value of tools themselves and the inherent (ideological) value of 
such scientific investigation. The instrument laden ship and the dazzling Observatoire space 
participated in a spectacle of ostentation.These technological instruments were treasured as 
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 On the one hand it was tied to the disciplines of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of 
forces, the adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of 
populations, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity. It fitted in both categories at once, giving rise to 
infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, extremely meticulous orderings of space, indeterminate medical 
or psychological examinations, to an entire micro-power concerned with the body.  But it gave rise as well to 
comprehensive measure, statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at groups 
taken as a whole. Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. (Foucault, HS 
145-146) 
19
 “Marveling before the amount of accumulated material in the Observatory [he] asked the Frenchmen escorting 
him, and they emphasized the legacy left by Louis XIV. ‘They told me that this prince, who understood himself 
the value of science, showered rewards on those who invented some new machine, and would, as soon as the 
invention was revealed to him, would have them put it in the Observatory for students' use. Truly, I saw so many 
remarkable things that even a treasure would not suffice to purchase these things.”  
 26 
costlyideologically as well as monetarily.
20
   
 More than mere spectacle and bedazzlement, however, the ship laden with these tools 
emblematized a crucially changing mindset of the period, one that undergirded overall social 
relations. Time itself, under Louis XIV, was becoming more precise than ever. One of Colbert’s 
protégés, Christiaan Huygens, performed most of his research and engineering in Paris, and thus 
left a trace back to the reign and realm of the Sun King. I follow the approach of Roland 
Racevskis here in tracing certain socio-cultural shifts that were directly or indirectly derived 
from these scientific advancements. He summarizes: 
Huygens ushered in a new era of precision in time-measurement when he 
successfully applied Galileo Galilei's (1564-1642) invention of the pendulum as a 
regulator to a clock mechanism in 1657. This advance permitted a new degree of 
accuracy for clocks and a new way of audibly tracking the passage of time [...] 
Instead of being conceived as a continuous movement, the measure of time 
becomes an experience of steady discontinuity, the breaking-up of the passing of 
time by the alternating gears of the clock mechanism coming into contact with the 
teeth of the escapement. The resulting experience is one of time analyzed, or 
broken down, an experience henceforth to be reinforced aurally by the ticking of 
the pendulum (TWK 13).  
Racevskis takes this temporal fragmentation as the basis for a formation of a fragmented 
subjective experience and an attunement to the tiniest “microdiachronics” of life. The tick of an 
ever-precise timepiece became integrated in the rhythms and dynamics of society— and, most 
importantly, such a tick was made invisible in the moment that it emerged as most naturalized 
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As Greenberg notes, “Louis was, in his self-representation, the most ‘theoretical’ of monarchs: his persona was 
both a theory and a theater of kingship. Having perceived that the essence of political power resided in the images 
and imaginary of the majesty, he proceeded to project these images into the world in a way that had never been seen 
before” (SS 1).  
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and the most controlling. It is in this sense that the metaphor of the sun for the Roi Soleil 
becomes even more pertinent. Both the sun, the Roi Soleil's “power” and the temporality of the 
sun/ Sun King infused and permeated daily life. Instead of the minutest rhythms of everyday life 
being rendered analogous to sovereign control and his own daily rhythms, the tempo of life 
becomes only possible thanks to the King. Just as we notice “light” and “heat” as their own 
entities without tracing it back metonymically to its source, normative temporality structures 
meeting times, postal services, theater spectacles, and tempos of relationality without marking 
itself as being constructed or artificially generated, governed by Absolutist ideologies. “This kind 
of temporal self-awareness required a specific focus on small time increments. Restricted 
temporal units framed within microdiachronies of daily experience constituted a new domain of 
consciousness. Fragmented into constitutive components, time was conceived in a new 
complexity by early modern subjects” (Racevskis,19).  
Temporality shifted from a state concern (regarding the timing of military battles, 
scientific investigations and more) to become an increasingly populartrend with ideological 
implications.  Initially, the numerous clocks and personal timepieces were “rare in the initial 
stages of their development, and their distribution early in the Sun King's reign was thus limited 
to the most privileged sectors of society” (Racevskis 41-42). In this sense, while a critical 
difference can be carved out between “personal” time and “clock” time, with the proliferation 
and the commodification of these timepieces, personal time became national time. Although 
watches were first treated a status piece – often gilded, enameled, or jewel-encrusted-- by the 
mid eighteenth century personal timekeeping devices were more and more common. Thus the 
seventeenth century saw a transition from a moment when the novelty of time (and time-keeping 
devices) literalized the intellectual and cultural value in its ostentatious presentation to a period 
when such “commodity” was ubiquitous and naturalized. 
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 This culture of ostentation intended to dazzle, distract and pacify the French nobles, an 
early modern “society of the spectacle” in the service of establishing and putting forth a specific 
form of society choreographed to a national rhythm. Through specific rituals and practices, 
chronobiopolitics was harnessed to the body of the king. Racevskis writes, 
The ‘premier gentilhomme’ of the king’s chambers would open the bed’s curtains 
at a quarter past eight. After fifteen minutes of prayer, Louis XIV arose from his 
bed and put on his slippers and robe and, while being combed by the head barber, 
began to be clothed […] Every gesture involved in the process of dressing Louis 
XIV was measured and repeated in the same way from day to day. A specific 
rhythm of daily experience structured mornings at Versailles, as anxious court 
members observed the proceedings and remained constantly aware of the 
moments at which they might speak to the king (68-69).   
These twinned movements of centralizing unifying power and a temporal fragmentation 
that also shattered the body were two sides of the same coin, and can be thought of as 
corresponding to a national rhythm.Emerging here is a practice that broke down temporality into 
units specifically designed for the purpose of conditioning the rhythms of the body, a national 
and ever-precise tempo that lays the grounds for what paces and speeds of life are normative and 
possible. Temporality, and the temporality of the (King's) body itself became the stuff of the 
main “dramas” of such theatrical spectacle. Racevskis writes of the anxieties and anticipations 
surrounding the haste and rush to execute the “Plaisirs de l’île enchantée” to inaugurate 
Versailles as the locus and center of royal prestige and control in France: “One of the purposes of 
this festival of 1664 was thus the accomplishment of a temporal subterfuge, executed through a 
rhetoric of anticipation and projection. Time became a privileged object of manipulation in the 
structure and spectacle of the kingly magnificence” (58). Seventeenth century cultural studies 
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have remarked on the clear relationship between the performing arts as cultivated carefully under 
Louis XIII and Louis XIV (including ballets, festivals, music, and theater) and Absolutist 
authority. But this was not a proliferation of theater merely meant to dazzle. Rather, as Timothy 
Murray suggests, the very act of authorizing theatrical production, starting with Louis XIII’s  Act 
of April 1641, staged a performance of sovereign authority.  Murray writes,  
For such a declaration of theatre as a legitimate means of entertainment is 
synonymous with the speaker’s assertion of sovereign authority to make decrees.  
Legitimation of theatre is in this sense performative. It is a royal speech act that 
legalizes theatre for the participants through decrees or public expressions of 
patronage… In the seventeenth century, the enactment of the king’s office 
depended partially on the public’s acknowledgement (legitimation) of his 
declarative authority (Theatrical, 112).  
Since both an emerging chronobiopolitical temporality as well as ways of seeing were directly 
related to a fast-developing centralized absolutism, the stakes of the sexual language of dramatic 
literature, far from being a merely aesthetic and stylistic convention, had far-reaching socio-
cultural as well as political implications. Dramatic language on stage adjudicated and dictated, in 
a sense, what the dominant forms of sexual expression could and could not look like. And 
significantly, in this period, sexual language on stage was being more and more erased.
21
 Unlike 
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 Schérer writes of this shift, “ Le comportement proprement sexuel des personnages est également une matière 
interdite à partir de 1650 environ…. Il faut d’ailleurs, même dans les oeuvres qui, en apparence, respectent 
scrupuleusement les bienséances les plus exigeantes, faire la part de la convention. Bayle en 1684 [Nouvelles de la 
république des lettres] nous donne une indication précieuse sur l’état de l’esprit du public à ce sujet. “On est 
persuadé plus loin que le livre ne dit” (4) Ce qui est vrai du roman l’est aussi du théâtre: les ‘feux’, les ‘soupirs’ des 
héros les plus respectueux et des jeunes filles les plus modestes ne paraissaient sans doute pas toujours au public 
classique aussi éthérés que les auteurs voulaient bien le dire” (406)   
Schérer focuses on language, or rather the disallowed language of sexuality on the stage, and the ways that any 
indication of desire had to be reduced to the “ethereal” or faintly delineated by sighs. He presents examples from 
dramatic literature prior to 1650 to demonstrate, in contrast, the range of sexual expressions that had been be 
banished after this “divide.” Suffice it to note that in Iphis et Iante the staged wedding-night scene and the explicit 
recounting of the moment of intimacy between the two women would be unthinkable in the latter half of the 
seventeenth century. 
 30 
English or Spanish tragedy in the period, French classical drama was unique in its strict 
adherence to the unity of time. The limit was not just an arbitrary stylistic convention, but an 
actual part of the construction of the action. Schérer writes: “Si le noeud est action, et si toute 
action se déroule nécessairement dans le temps, la quantité de temps que se donne l’auteur 
dramatique est bien l’un des éléments premiers du problème qui se pose, un élément inhérent à la 
conception de l’oeuvre et non à son exécution”(110). 22 If the temporal limit became the origin 
and genesis (la conception) of the work itself, then the very establishment of such a fixed 
temporal frame in some ways allegorizes and redoubles the authority of absolutism: not only was 
the sovereign the chronobiopolitical regulator of time, but even in the theatrical/dramatic 
extension of his spectacular glory, temporality becomes the hidden generator and source.  
Theatrical time itself was linked to the sun, and the ways that the sun's measurement, 
movement and speed in its revolution created a “day.” Fittingly enough, the root of the word 
ephemeral, in Greek, we recall, means “lasting only one day.” Pierre Corneille famously 
struggled against the “règle tyrannique” of temporal constraint, while his younger contemporary 
Jean Racine flourished under the same delimited time span. Corneille, in his Trois discours sur le 
poème dramatique, cites Aristotle in regard to this constraint : “La règle de l'unité de jour a son 
fondament sur ce mot d'Aristote, que la tragédie doit renfermer la durée de son action dans un 
tour de soleil, ou tâcher de ne le passer pas de beaucoup”(137).23 Try as he might, however, 
Corneille can offer little to no justification for this rule himself. The best he can do is to attribute 
it to the authority of tradition and something vague which he calls “natural reason”: “Beaucoup 
déclament contre cette règle, qu'ils nomment tyrannique, et auraient raison, si elle n'était fondée 
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 “If the dramatic knot is action, and if all actions take place necessarily in time, the quantity of time that the 
author gives to his drama is actually one of the first elements of the problem that presents itself, an element that 
is inherent to the origin of the work, rather than to its execution.” 
23
 “The rule of the unity of time is founded upon Aristotle's sayings: “that the action of tragedy should be enclosed 
within one turn of the sun, or to take care not to exceed it by much.” (all translations without pagination my 
own)  
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que sur l'autorité d'Aristote; mais ce qui la doit faire accepter, c'est la raison naturelle qui lui sert 
d'appui” (139).24The sun, here, figures and condenses two absolutes: as the favored symbol of 
the sovereign and as the sun's movement that governed and generated the time of the play. At the 
same time, resisting this temporal limit meant struggling against the seamless naturalization of 
the chronobiological straightening that was underway. 
Given the importance of such temporalityas a valuable and viable tool for the cultivation 
of an emerging chronobiopolitics, it is clear why such “velocities” that challenged an emerging 
national temporality could not outright announce its divergence or challenge the artificiality of 
sovereign power (artificial in the very scientific pursuit that “constructed' and standardized time, 
or the theatrical treatises that fixed the unity of time as the essential core of the drama). 
Deviances from such norms could only present themselves, minimally, in the type of recessive 
claim that bore no threatening or competing stakes. 
One key turning point in the representation of temporality in the theater took place over 
Corneille’s Le Cid, a literary scandal that showed the magnitude of a reaction against temporal 
deviances. Exceeding this this unity, as Corneille did, manifests not merely an author's struggles 
with creative constraint but symptomatizes a subjectivity straining under the new demands of the 
emerging chronobiopolitics. Corneille's popularly successful play was lambasted by pamphlet 
writers and critics, those jealous of his success and those zealous to show that he had exceeded 
his poetic license in the composition of his pieceThe play, set in medieval Spain, tells the story of 
woebegotten lovers Chimène and Rodrigue. When Chimène's father insults Rodrigue's father, 
Rodrigue is asked to either duel to defend his father's honor or let the slight go unpunished. In 
the duel, he kills the father of his beloved Chimène who, horrified, calls for Rodrigue to be 
excuted in retribution. The King, Don Fernand, summons valorous Rodrigue to fight against the 
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 “Many rail against this rule, calling it tyrannical, and would be correct, if it were only founded on Aristotle's 
authority; but what should make them accept the rule is the natural reason upon which the rule relies.” 
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Moorish invasion, giving him a chance to win back his lost honor and the hand of Chimène. 
Chimène finds herself being ordered to do exactly what she both longs for and fears: being 
commanded by Don Fernand to marry Rodrigue. Don Fernand mediates the conflict by 
mandating an odd end. He prescribes time as a balm to the past wounds as well as uses the 
temporal command for Chimène to wait as an example and extension of his own power. Such a 
dual employment of temporality underscores the ways that a sovereign’s savvy use of 
temporality could be deployed to secure the order of society. He says, “Le temps assez souvent a 
rendu légitime/ Ce qui semblait d'abord ne se pouvoir sans crime […] Cet hymen différé ne 
rompt point une loi/ Qui sans marquer de temps, lui destine ta foi” (V, 7, 1813-1814; 1819-1820). 
In this sense, the imposed waiting becomes a temporality that normalizes, that assuages the pain 
of loss and establishes a palliative of forgiveness.  
The pamphlet wars attacked Corneille's so-called plagiarism, launching debates about the 
nature of authorial creativity and invention; others critiqued the lack of vraisemblance, and still 
others mocked Corneille's own vain character-- and, most significantly, the inability for Corneille 
to adhere to the unity of time.  When the Académie Francaise intervened in the matter, publishing 
the “official” judgment on the piece, the rhetoric condemning Corneille's divergence from the 
unity of time is strong:  
Objection que fait l’Observateur en suitte nous semble tres-considerable. Car un 
des principaux preceptes de la Poesie imitatrice, est de ne se point charger de tant 
de matieres qu’elles ne laissent pas le moyen d’employer les ornemens qui luy 
son necessaires, & de donner à l’action qu’elle se propose d’imiter toute 
l’estendüe qu’elle doit avoir. Et certes l’Autheur ne peut nier icy que l’Art luy ait 
manqué, lors qu’il a compris tant d’actions remarquables dans l’espace de vingt-
quatre heures, & qu’il n’a peu autrement fournir les cinq Actes de sa Piece qu’en 
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entassant tant de choses l’une sur l’autre en si peu de temps… en cecy, il ne s’agit 
pas simplement d’assembler plusieurs aventures diverses & grandes en un si petit 
espace de temps, mais de faire entrer dans un mesme esprit. & dans moins de 
vingt-quatre heures, deux pensées si opposées l’une à l’autre, comme sont pour la 




On the one hand it seems that Corneille was being censured merely for overstuffing his drama 
with too many events. But one could equally ask the question, was it really so terrible to exceed 
the twenty-four hour time limit?  Or could it be that violating the limit symbolized another kind 
of affront to power? The rules themselves, it seems, were not merely arbitrary constraints. 
Katherine Ibbett notes that “From the 1630s on, when Chapelain, who was one of Richelieu’s 
favorites at the new Académie, began to insist that rules were necessary in order to gain 
theatrical perfection, the body of work on the règles had gathered pace… La Mesnardière’s 
Poëtique of 1640, commissioned by Richelieu, furthered the political import of the Sentiments by 
promoting the new and regular French tragedy as a vehicle for the newly regular French state” 
(141). The necessity to adhere to such (politicized) rules became more and more crucial.  
The extent that this quarrel gripped the country is impressive, but perhaps what is more 
significant is, as Murray notes, the ways that Richelieu deftly mastered and orchestrated the 
national attention to representation, power, and legitimation, all behind-the-scenes.  The main 
“actors” of the Le Cid quarrel were extremely vehement and prolific in their attacks and 
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 “The objection of the observer seems quite serious. For one of the principle precepts of imitative poetry is not to 
overburden the work with so many subjects that there is not a way to use modes of expression that are necessary, 
and to give to the action that the play depicts sufficient time to be fully expressed. And certainly the Author here 
can no deny that he lacks Art (artistry), for he has compressed far too many exceptional actions in the space of 
twenty-four hours, and that he can not otherwise give enough time to the five Acts of his play unless he crams in 
too many things one after another in so short a time. In this, it is not merely a matter of bringing together so 
many diverse and dramatic adventures in such a short amount of time, but rather to juxtapose, in one mind, and 
in less than twenty four hours, two thoughts that are so opposed to one another, such as the aftermath of a death 
of a Father, and the consent to wed the murderer.” 
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defenses.  Indeed, Jean-Marc Civardi’s tome collecting all of the letters, documents and 
pamphlets related to the quarrel (La Querelle du Cid: édition critique intégrale) stands at an 
impressive 1200 pages. Murray argues, however, that the quarrellers’ main goal was not to “win” 
the debate, but rather to gain Richelieu’s favor or to defer to his opinion.  Murray writes,  
The extent of Richelieu’s influence over the poetic conventions of the public stage 
is well documented by the dispute concerning Le Cid.  Although Richelieu did not 
openly express his exact position in the debate regarding Le Cid’s verisimilitude 
and unity of time, the texts documenting the controversy consistently display 
wide-spread deference to the cardinal’s judgment. Lancaster reports that Corneille 
cooperated with the Académie Française’s review of Le Cid only after learning the 
Richelieu wished the matter to be handled by the Académie (115).  
This situation of political deference and control is replicated in the play itself, insofar as the 
characters continually defer to the sovereign, seeking to restore order and to receive glory 
through Don Fernand alone. Chimène begs him for vengeance and Don Diegue and Le Comte 
(the two fathers) quarrel and insult each other because they each seek favoritism in the eyes of 
the king.  Thus both meta-theatrically and intradiegetically, what appeared to be interpersonal 
relations and disputes were actually indebted to and directed toward the gaze of a higher 
authority.  
The seventeenth century sense and need for such an aesthetic constraint (the unity of 
time) might be linked to temporality's relationship to rite. Kantorowicz's The King's Two Bodies 
advanced the relation between the King's body and the analogies that propagate the Body of 
Christ-- in the idea that the king's body mortal, as a translation of the material “corpus naturale” 
of the Eucharist, had to be “sacrificed” in order to attain the transcendence of the emergence of 
the body politic (itself a translation of the corpus mysticum). Whether in Henry III's vision of 
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himself as appointed by God or even Louis XIV's nickname (Louis-Dieudonné), the relationship 
between royalty and the sacred was not merely a political instrument, but an integral part of 
seventeenth century governance. Jean Marie Apostolidès reads the theatrical unities as an 
integral part of the ways that theater replaced (and displaced) originary sacrificial and sacred-
making kingly rites.
26
 Apostolidès argues that it is tragedy in particular that becomes the site of 
such “sacrifice” in the seventeenth century political theater:  
Elle [la tragédie] est le spectacle du sacrifice originel que le monarque n'accomplit 
plus parce que les institutions ont pris la place des rites et que le roi est devenu un 
gestionnaire qui agit dans la longue durée. En la personne du prince, le roi 
machiniste, c'est-à-dire organisateur de l'État et metteur en scène des fêtes de cour, 
s'oppose au roi sacrifié, victime originellement désignée dans les sociétés ne 
possédant pas de système judiciaire. A cause de ses caractéristiques esthétiques, 
de son essence, le théâtre est simulacre d'action, mais il reste action, drama. En ce 
sens, nous ne devons pas interpréter les règles d'unité du poème dramatique 
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 The ritual-sacred aspect of theater also emerged as a site of producing sexual ideologies and norms. While 
Henry III's 'mignons' were more or less tolerated in his youth, as he took on the kingship, Katherine Crawford 
argues, his enemies were bent on painting him as an unvirile, and therefore emasculated, unfit to rule because 
incapable of producing an heir:  
 As Henry wended his way home in the company of the gentlemen companions who had shared his 
‘exile’ (as he called it), Henry’s brother, Alençon, agitated for a larger role in governance […] One 
strategy adopted by the Malcontents was to cast aspersions on Henry’s masculinity. To counter 
their charges, Henry chose to combine his cornoation (sacre) with his marriage. In the eyes of 
contemporaries, both the sacre and the marriage ceremonies conferred special sorts of masculine 
authority. The sacre made Henry “the father of his people,” and marriage gave him (as it did other 
men) a wide range of legal and social powers as husband and father. Combining both ceremonies 
enabled Henry to assert his virility. (517) 
 While the ceremony of the sacre was neither precisely theater nor religious sacrifice, what is underlined 
here is the importance of spectacle in securing both normative gender and sexual identity as well as royal authority. 
The performance of virility (in the marriage ceremony) affirms and enables the confirmation of Henry as King. At 
the same time, what Crawford does not underscore is that there is a type of sacrifice happening here: the sacrifice of 
Henry's former life, among his “gentlemen companions,” in exchange for aligning himself with expectations of 
marriage and heir-producing. Whether or not these “mignons” could be considered proto-queer in some sense, 
Henry's attachment to them was seen as detrimental. And therefore the loss of these companions, who had shared 
time with him out of the country (and therefore off the “grid” of national/royal time), stands as what Butler might 
call an ungrievable loss-- a loss that does not get to be properly marked.  
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comme une contrainte arbitraire imposée aux auteurs par quelques pédants mais 
bien plutôt comme un ensemble de recettes, connues et admises de tous, qui visent 
à renforcer l'aspect “acte” du cérémonial. Ce qui se passe sur scène ne se déroule 
pas seulement au présent, mais en présence des spectateurs : le temps du spectacle 
vise à recouvrir le temps intime du spectateur. (47) 
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In this sense, the theatrical unities, including and especially the unity of time, makes possible the 
performative conditions that constitute an “act,” be it the performative effect of an allegorized 
sacrifice or the act of the Eucharist. Such a conflation of the sacred and political may partially 
explain why tempers flared in reaction to the careful structures that were in place that enabled 
such an “act” and rites to happen.  
 The theatrical unities also altered a certain sense of temporality and history. Anne 
Ubersfeld considers the unity of time to be a “coupe nécessaire et brutale dans le temps 
historique, prive les rapports humains (socio-historiques) de tout développement, de tout 
processus. Le théâtre classique devient, par le biais de l'unité de temps, un acte instantané, 
excluant la durée indéfinie des conflits, comme la récurrence et le retour des déterminations 
psychiques” (Ubersfeld 153).28 In this interpretation, the unity of time is not just a critical 
foundation enabling the act/ event of sacrifice. It is, itself, the act at hand--if Apostolides 
associates the rite of the theater as a type of re-interpretation of the sacrifice of the sovereign, we 
also have the theater here as an allegory of the sacrifice of time, the movement from a nebulous 
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 “Tragedy is the original spectacle of sacrifice that the monarch no longer enacts because institutions have taken 
the place of rites and the king has become an administrator who oversees over time. The person of the price, the 
machinist king, that is to say the organizer of the State and the director of the festivities in the court, can be 
counteropposed to the sacrificed king, the victim originally marked in societies which lacked judiciary systems. 
Because of its aesthetic characteristics, its essence, theatre is the simulacrum of action, but it remains action, 
drama. In this sense, we shouldn't interpret the rules of the unities of dramatic writing as an arbitrary constraint 
imposed on authors by a few pedants, but rather as an ensemble of formulae, accepted and known by all, which 
aim to reinforce the “act” quality of the ceremony.” 
28
 “a necessary and brutal cut in historical time, stripping human relations (socio historical) of all development, of all 
process.  Classical theatre becomes, through the unity of time, an instantaneous act, excluding the indefinite 
duration of conflicts, like the recurrence and the return of psychic determination” (128)  
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(agrarian, unmeasured and unmeasureable) temporality to one that became “ceaselessly 
impelled” by a proliferation of timekeeping devices, temporally-linked priorities and 
chronobiopoltical conditioning and monitoring. Thus, the unity of time is itself a sacrificial cut, 
marking a division from a historical time that could progress normally in coherent narrative 
sense.  In the separation enabled by the unity of time, it puts forth another type of unified 
temporality, or a microcosm world in which the temporality could deviate (in slownesses and 
fastnesses) that allow the possibility of inarticulate erotics.  
 Going back to the outrage over Le Cid's exceeding the limits of the temporal unity, we 
see now why the Académie reacted so strongly to the violations of laws. “Le Poëte voulant que 
ce Poëme finist heureusement, pour suivre les regles de la Tragicomedie, fait encore en cet 
endroit que Chimene foule aux pieds celles que la Nature a establies, & dont le mespris & la 
transgression doivent donner de l'horreur aux ignorants & aux habiles”(997).29 What is equally 
surprising, though is that the main source of this vitriol is directed against Chimène, and the 
ways that she dashes the so-called laws of Nature to the ground. At the same time, it is not clear 
if the transgression is Corneille's error (for “forcing” too many things into a small window of 
time) or if “le mespris et la transgression” refers instead of Chimène's decision to remarry. And 
here I think that the Académie is accusing Chimène of an unseemly velocity-- a haste that 
appears vulgar and inappropriate, a readiness to marry the murder of her father. At the same 
time, Chimène's velocity, chooosing to marry Rodrigue, but only after a year's delay, performs a 
strange admixture of rushing (forgiving/loving her father's murderer “too soon”) and slowness 
(normally a play that ends in marriage would culminate in the happy occasion, not the deferred 
promise of the nuptials). Her choice creates both an aberrant rush and an unsatisfying stalling.  
 I would argue that what has been read as disgust-inducing (“doivent donner de l'horreur”) 
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 “The poet wants this Poem to finish happily, to follow the rules of the Tragicomedy, here makes Chimène 
trample on all of the rules that Nature has established, and whose disdain and transgression ought to shock the 
ignorant as well as the skilled.” 
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actually does adequately map the mixed emotions that Chimène might feel: the revulsion to be 
wedded to her father's murderer, the still-lingering sentiments of love, the erotics of Rodrigue's 
valorous exploits and display of virility, and the temporality of mourning and loss. Such a 
combination of “fastnesses” and “slownesses” could well produce this hybrid time that Chimène 
enacts, a personal time that is flagged as aberrant from the expectations and norms of the unity of 
time and its ideological import.  
 A similar rhetoric about violating the laws of nature is used by Claude LeBrun de La 
Rochette, a lawyer from Lyon, when he writes on sodomy. We recall that in the seventeenth 
century sodomy comprised a wide range of nonreproductive sexual acts. Le Brun writes, “And, 
in truth, it is rightly called the sin against nature, considering that other iniquities, such as 
fornication, adultery, rape are either in conformity with nature or derived from natural (albeit 
contrary to reason) instinct. But this one, trampling the laws of nature underfoot, going madly 
beyond its bounds, attacks it, confounds it, and violates it completely”(15). Going outside the 
bounds of nature, here, is depicted as a far worse crime than pushing natural 
logic/instincts/desires to their breaking point. Curiously, many of the same words that the laywer 
uses to denigrate sodomy are the same terms that the Académie Française draws upon to attack 
Chimène's haste to agree to marry her father's murderer: throwing the laws of Nature to the 
ground, trampling them, and going beyond (transgressing) reason. Whether or not the Académie 
sensed the “sodomitical” implications for these frictional velocities, what is clear is that Le Cid 
depicts erotic temporalities that challenge and defy the emerging chronobiopolitics and the rules 
that subtended it.  
 




Far from being solely a recent “turn” in queer theory, the relationship between gender or 
sexual identity and temporality has roots in feminist theory. In Julia Kristeva's 1979 “Woman's 
Time” she argues that “woman” has typically come to be associated with cyclical, non-
progressive time, a temporality that stands in contrast to “masculine” forms of progress, 
production, nation-building and history (192). This gendered characterization of temporality, 
according to Kristeva, has served as the justification for female discrimination (reducing 
women's voices to “merely” hysterical or biologically/primitively rooted) as well as the 
galvanizing point of feminist struggle (the desire to “enter” into history).  Kristeva's seminal 
essay illuminated the ways that temporal ideologies could influence gender and sexual dynamics.  
Extending this notion that temporality, far from being a mere form of measurement, or 
even a tool in the promulgation of a national culture, the so-called temporal turn in queer theory 
emphasizes the ways that orientations toward the past or toward the future are never neutral, but 
are instead conditioned by certain socio-cultural norms. The queer temporal turn can be roughly 
divided into two camps: one, invested in contesting future-driven ideologies and another 
celebrating the unexpected pleasures of the past. I will quickly delineate these two perspectives 
before demonstrating how I believe an analytic of “velocity” can intervene in the blind spots of 
some of these queer temporal theories as well as advance an alternate methodology for 
considering the “chronobiopolitics” of the seventeenth century.  
 The temporal turn away from futurity has been largely galvanized by Lee Edelman’s 
2004 polemic No Future. taking a stand against “reproductive futurity,” which he defines as an 
unquestioned privileging of the future as a marker of social good, and the site of the fantasy of 
“meaning's eventual realization” (4). Elsewhere, Edelman has critiqued a sense of “normative” 
temporality as defined, conditioned by, and predicated on the trope of the child: 
This compulsion to produce the ‘after’ of sex through the naturalization of history 
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expresses itself in two very different, though not unrelated, ways: first, in the 
privileging of reproduction as the after-event of sex — an after-event whose 
potential, implicit in the ideal, if not always in the reality, of heterogenital 
coupling, imbues straight sex with its meaning as the agent of historical 
continuity; second, in the conflation of meaning itself with those forms of 
historical knowing whose authority depends on the fetishistic prestige of origin, 
genealogy, telos (“Ever After,” 470).  
As Edelman maintains, this fantasy of the “after” is precisely that — a fantasy— but it is a 
fantasy so attractive that it purchases our libidinal investment in the (never-ending) pursuit of the 
illusion of Symbolic fulfillment at the cost of the strict disavowal of any type of negativity, 
especially the negativity which would reveal the Symbolic's promissory note of l'avenir to 
always be à venir. In this similar vein, Heather Love’s Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics 
of Queer History also moves against affects of positive progress by lingering over the 
“backward” affects: “messy, uncomfortable realities of identity... looking to the feelings of pain, 
shame, self-hatred and loss” (“Queers”185). Similarly, Judith Jack Halberstam's The Queer Art 
of Failure proposes that failure gives us the opportunity “to use these negative affects to poke 
holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life” (3). Such “toxic positivity,” the price of the 
investment in what Edelman terms “reproductive futurity” means that negative feelings are 
overlooked, dismissed, and erased by a societal injunction to “look ahead” or “think of the 
future.”  
If we continue to nuance an unquestioned investment in ideologies of the future 
(generated by a chronobiopolitics that privileges reproduction and norms of intimacies), might 
we also need to question whether triumphant teleology necessarily has to take up the negative? 
Consider an apophatically inclined polemic that defines itself by what it is not-- not-positive, 
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not-futural, what space does such rejection leave to pay attention to myriad other components of 
Love's “uncomfortable realities of identity” that may not even announce themselves as rallying 
against normative future-invested affects. What about the inarticulate erotics that cannot even 
cohere to announce the “not”? A second problem with the antifutural turn in queer studies is that 
it slides between two economies of sequence: the sequence of reproduction is conflated with the 
sequence of normativized temporalities, the two held together by nothing more than an 
analogizing link to secure the chain. Even though Edelman clearly maps out two kinds of 
normativities invested in the “after,” he does not demonstrate how one gets from the 
reproductive “after-event of sex” to the “fetishistic prestige of...telos” other than through what 
Valerie Traub has critiqued as weak associative logic.
30
  
In contrast to the antifuturity movement, the second form of this temporal turn in queer 
theory is one generated from “queer touches of time” as advanced by Carolyn Dinshaw as well 
as Beth Freeman, Carla Freccero and others. Here, instead of recovering and recuperating the 
negative affects such as failure, shame or miserly greed in order to be used as ammunition 
against a saccharine-sweet (optimistic) future being force-fed to us, these other theorists argue 
instead for a turn to the past. This involves an attention to bodily sensations, unexpected 
pleasures, and wayward fantasies in the service of valorizing nostalgia and outdatedness as a 
critical means of engaging with the study of past sexualities. 
31
 In this sense, the queer temporal 
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 Traub's article “The New Unhistoricism” argues that “Goldberg, Menon, Freccero’s “rejection of ‘straight 
temporality’ forges a tight metonymic chain among the alleged operations of sex, time and history. They link these 
operations through rhetorical maneuvers whereby difference and sameness are constellated with concepts that stand 
in as near cognates: not only hetero and homo but also difference and similitude, distance and proximity, 
multiplicity and self-identity, change and stasis, disidentification and mimesis. These close cognates allude to both 
abstract theoretical principles and specific material realities. Yet drawn as they are from different epistemological 
registers— psychic, social, temporal, formal, historiographic— and abstracted from contexts of space or time, they 
are rhetorically deployed to cross seamlessly from one conceptual domain to another” (30). I agree with Traub’s 
analysis and I would also add that while formal qualities of a text can extend and reflect underlying queer and 
affective dynamics—and I do use these in my own approach-- it can be both risky and sloppy to use the shortcut of a 
one-to-one correspondence between textual samenesses and same-sex love, for example.  
31
 Dinshaw writes: “A desire for some kind of contact with the past, for a touch across time, across death, turns out 
to have been a constant preoccupation, variously formulated, in the long and varied career of Barthes […] But just to 
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engagement shifts from the rallying cry to “poke holes” into overinvestment in futurity 
(destabilizing the neutral linear temporal trajectory), and becomes more of a reading analytic. 
One does not need to apologize for the temporal distance between the past and the present by 
overly excusing an “anachronistic” application of queer theory. Rather, engaging with this 
temporal distance itself produces and generates its own range of affects. Coviello summarizes:  
One might think instead of the overlapping of historical frames more in the terms 
suggested by Freeman’s erotohistoriography—that is, as a kind of friction, an 
always-erotic rubbing together of similarities and differences. Such an approach 
neither ontologizes difference—there is in it no refusal of what Carolyn Dinshaw 
calls the “touch across time” that queer work can enable—nor elides the fact of 
specific differences, themselves only loosely grasped in their abstraction as 
différance (14).  
This pleasure-infused methodology seems to (over)correct for a historicist approach that would 
apply what Sedgwick terms a “paranoid” hermeneutic to rescue queer bodies, selves and 
identities from the prison of a repressive past.  
 What Freeman has coined “erotohistoriography” also responds to the charge that queer 
theory has forgotten actual sex, with actual bodies. In this sense, what is queer 
(sexual/sensual/erotic) becomes reaching out to other bodies, selves, and identities, even and 
especially if they are embedded in the past. Freeman writes:  
Erotohistoriography is distinct from the desire for a fully present past, a 
restoration of bygone times. Erotohistoriography does not write the lost object 
                                                                                                                                                             
imagine bodies extending across boundaries of space and time, as both Barthes and Foucault do (explicitly or 
implicitly here), is to imagine bodes that undo conventional or ordinary historical conceptions. To imaging such 
bodies making contact is to put a new spin on the notion of contingent history: think of the etymology of 
‘contingent,’ from the Latin to touch […] Such deep imagining is crucial for thinking sex and sexuality different. It 
suggests a use of history for unraveling assumptions about the ways bodies exist in place and time, assumptions 
about how they are produced and constrained” (“Touching on the Past” 70)  
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into the present so much as encounter it already in the present, by treating the 
present itself as hybrid. And it uses the body as a tool to effect, figure, or perform 
that encounter. Erotohistoriography admits that contact with historical materials 
can be precipitated by particular bodily dispositions, and that these connections 
may elicit bodily responses, even pleasurable ones, that are themselves a form of 
understanding. It sees the body as a method, and historical consciousness as 
something intimately involved with corporeal sensations (TB 95) 
This “forgetting” of sex is one concern of the editors of the volume After Sex: that queer theory 
is, in a sense, “post” sex, and sexual acts, and sexed bodies, and has moved to an understanding 
of queer that is expansively encompassing. Freccero suggests that “theoretically anything can 
queer something, and anything, given a certain odd twist, can become queer” (“Queer Times,” 
485).
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While such an expansive sense of “queer” allows for an opening up of what could count 
as “erotic,” outside of a purely identitiarian approach, it also risks naming anything and 
everything as “queer” and thus diluting queer's critical capacities. While my research is invested 
in paying close attention to the possibilities of desire that are “unlike any pre-existing whole,” 
this focus on openness pays close attention to the historical situatedness of these “unlike” 
possibilities rather than overeagerly giving “anything... a certain odd twist” (Freccero, “Queer 
Times, 485). Just as the antifuturity theories connect via a sliding analogy the sequence and 
chronology of heteronormative reproduction and temporality at large, in erotohistoriography, that 
which is considered erotic, or pleasurable, might be critiqued as being equally loosely analogized 
and linked, from the pleasures of sex to the pleasures of the historian. Such a broad notion of 
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 Freccero writes, “My work has been mostly about advocating for queer’s verbally and adjectivally unsettling 
force against claims for this definition stability, so theoretically anything can queer something, and anything, 
given a certain odd twist, can become queer [...]Queer, to me, is the name of a certain unsettling in relation to 
heteronormativity. It can be thought of as, and is akin to, the ʽtraceʼ in the field of sexuality. Thus créolité, 
hybridity, mestizaje, métissage, spectrality, the trace and the uncanny all find themselves in certain ways allied 
with queer as terms that do the work of différence in relation to the identitarian inflections they carry” (“Queer 
Times” 485).  
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pleasure risks forgetting the specificity of sexual acts and identities in the pursuit of an ever-
expanding vision of what “queer” can be. While I believe this elaboration of queer’s 
destabilizing potential is exciting, I also choose to follow a more critical, narrow definition of 
queer in my project.  I am most interested in considering queer as that which intervenes in the 
normativizing disciplining of chronobiopolitics. 
 Although there are many ways that this “temporal turn” in queer theory has generated 
varied approaches and methodologies, I would contend that both of these approaches (the 
antifutural and the erotohistoriograpic) are attempting to respond to a challenge raised by Eve 
Sedgwick in Touching Feeling: how to get away from the dualistic thinking occasioned by 
Foucault's repressive hypothesis? And how to consider the temporality of sexuality in ways other 
than the “supercession” model predicated on what she calls the Great Paradigm Shift? This 
supposed epistemic and ontological break is attributed to the famous quotation by Foucault, that 
after 1870 “Le sodomite était un relaps, l’homosexuel est maintenant une espèce” (56).33 This 
shift both enables and erases: it anchors a modern (minoritized) aberrance in an evolving 
continuum, giving the impression of a modern homosexuality “as we know it today” (44) to 
stand as a teleologic end point of this paradigm shift. What such a narrative erases are all of the 
contingent, intervening and unknown other possible modes of sexual and gender expression. The 
tendency of supercession that Sedgwick critiques is a paradigm in which one model of sexuality 
“replaces” the previous one, which “drops out” or disappears. These modes of analysis only 
serve to reinforce a “shift” or a turning point as a main structuring device of an overarching 
episteme. The “shift” occasions a range of attitudes and affects toward the future (liberatory) or 
the past (prohibition and repression) that allow or disallow certain types of intimacies and desires 
to flourish or falter.  
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 “The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species” (48)  
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 As long as we hold onto to this concept of a paradigm shift and cling to a fantasy moment 
of a keystone moment of legibility and coherence, we continue to erase alternate possibilities of 
sexual articulation. And I will risk a brief digression here to consider the interplay between 
erasure and forced legibility that “inarticulacy” can negotiate. Leaving aside the question of 
when or how “sexual identity” emerges, the term, or concept of “sexual identity” itself is 
predicated on a sense of cohesiveness that is only figurative, or false, or what Judith Butler 
would term “catachrestic.”  And here I would extend Butler's assertions about the “feminine” to 
“sexual identity” as a false-figuration for something that really is a “nothing”-- the term groups 
together an inchoate mass of fantasized oppositions, forms only possible diferentially, and a 
network of affective, gendered, erotic, emotional, corporeal possibilities under a unified term that 
erases the internal heterogeneities.  
But what work does the gesture of “grouping together” perform? What desires for 
legibility and coherence does it manifest? Butler takes up Irigaray's argument that feminist 
philosophers who argue against woman as mere “matter” (lumpen clay to be “shaped” by the 
reason of man, or else the feminine linked to the mere matter of bodily rhythms and procreation) 
are actually missing the point. Once “woman” has been conscripted into the binary of matter vs 
metaphysics, the game has already been lost, since the very terms of the binary (the word, 
concept and category of “matter”) has already been predetermined by a phallogocentric 
economy. Because of this predetermined foreclosure, “No wonder then that the feminine appears 
for Irigaray only in catachresis, that is, in those figures that function improperly, as an improper 
transfer of sense, the use of a proper name to describe that which does not properly belong to it, 
and that return to haunt and coopt the very language from which the feminine is excluded” 
(Butler 37).  
 To turn back to the play Iphis et Iante, the terms under which Iphis would have to declare 
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herself as really a “woman” or “actually not a man” are already predetermined for her. But even 
when one can diagnose her as truly a “woman” that gendered term already inadequately marks a 
network of varied experiences – social position, childhood history and spousehood-- that does 
not, and can never, fully add up to “woman” for Iphis. And in the act of grouping, that Butler 
terms “catechrestic,” this term is made to be made intelligible, without having any say in the very 
conditions (the “phallogocentricism”) that constitute the ground of intelligibility.34  
The repressive hypothesis too has the effect of creating a temporal shift, between a before 
of repression and an after of liberation. Although she does not specifically root it in a 
temporalized narrative, the either/or binary is also what Sedgwick has to critique about the 
repressive hypothesis:  
I knew what I wanted from it: some ways of understanding human desire that 
might be quite to the side of prohibition and repression, that might hence be 
structured quite differently from the heroic, ‘liberatory,’ inescapably dualistic 
righteousness of hunting down and attacking prohibition/repression in all its 
chameleonic guises. If the critical analysis of repression is itself inseparable from 
repression, then surely to think with any efficacy has to be to think in some 
distinctly different way (TF, 10). 
In this manner, although the “temporal turn” in queer theory is concerned with “poking holes” in 
a contemporary “toxic positivity” or else the erotohistoriographic immerses itself in unforseen 
and often forgettable pleasures of reaching to the past, both advance approaches to thinking 
about queer sexuality in time, or across time, still ring of some “liberatory” gesture.  
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 Butler continues, “The feminine, to use a catachresis, is domesticated and rendered unintelligible within a 
phallogocentrism that claims to be self-constituting. Disavowed, the remnant of the feminine survives as the 
inscriptional space of that phallogocentrism, the specular surface which receives the marks of a masculine 
signifying act only to give back a (false) reflection and guarantee of phallogocentric self-sufficienty, without 
making any contribution of its own” (39) This position of being limited to the “non-contribution” and 
“unintelligibile”also points to the stakes of inarticulate erotics insofar as it offers a critical stance on the very 
domain of the intelligible.  
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 The pre- and post- shift marking a galvanizing point of “origin” structures time in such a 
way that a linear notion of progression and sequence is generated, lining up “protogay” 
sentiments as precedents to modern “queer” identities. Such sequence creates a present-day 
(catachrestic) perspective of a modern gay identity that is anachronistically put into similitude 
with or in contrast to the earlier “protogay” sentiments, or else scholarly anxieties accompanying 
any definitive declaration of what “they” felt/experienced/desired “back then.” Coviello draws 
upon a useful shorthand analysis of these gestures: “Depending on the critic’s inclination this 
‘knowledge’ tends to cause the moments in quest to be regarded in one of two ways: either with 
pleased certainty (“This is what’s really happening here”) or committed epistemological 
skepticism (“It is impossible now to say what, if anything, is happening here”). We can term 
these two options, for the sake of brevity, the anticipatory and the agnostic approach” (Coviello 
13). The “anticipatory” would diagnose something like Iphis and Iante's intimacy as pre-lesbian, 
reading their intimacy as the nascent stages of what “would become” lesbianism, even though 
such an identity and even a sexual act did not necessarily exist in the seventeenth century. 
Coviello writes of the downfalls of the anticipatory:  
But what if the sexual possibilities dreamed into being in the era before sexology 
proved not to be amenable to the forms of sexual subjectivity and sexual 
specificity that would, in fact, arrive? What if the queerness any of these authors 
proposed, or yearned after, or otherwise intuited, fell somehow aslant of the 
languages of sexual specificity that were to come, with a newly legible 
homosexual identity in tow? What if what we find are not uncanny foretellings 
but, as Molly McGarry has it, ghosts of futures past? (15) 
This is to say that even our expectations of what “sexuality” should look like (alloerotic, 
monogamous, contingent on the other person's gender and biological sex) can not even begin to 
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account for the types of eroticisms that might have been anticipated or yearned-for in that time.  
 The agnostic method would be something like teasing out the ambiguities of not being 
able to know if the wedding night act could be considered lesbian, the impossibility of knowing 
if Iphis could be even understood as transgender. Here this concept of agnosticism adds one 
more aspects of inarticulacy that I draw upon to enrich my concept of inarticulate erotics. We 
have previously mentioned that the inarticulate, as per Mazzio's analysis, signals both a departure 
from dominant modes of discourse as well as marks an affective “outsider” position that has 
failed to be or resists being properly inscripted in certain communities. Coviello writes that 
agnostic readings “emphasize the intractable illegibility of the past—those that, we might say, 
side with James’s point about the unspeakability of the dynamics of intimate life from across the 
divide of modern sexual categories—have the virtue of a certain refusal. They resist, in the first 
instance, the impulse to erode the distinctiveness of the past by rendering it in the terms and 
taxonomies of the present” (13). At the same time, overly valorizing the unspeakability, or the 
inarticulacy as an unbreachable barrier behind which the past's sexualities hide beyond our grasp 
also has its weaknesses. 
Treating the past agnostically risks “understress[ing] movements toward a consolidation 
of sexual ideology that were already afoot, and that could be felt in their encroachment from a 
number of vantages […] To regard the presexological past too strictly as a site of Jamesian 
unspeakability and illegibility, in other words, is to miss the degree to which the emergence of 
modern sexuality was a movement, a slowly unfolding process, rather than an event, (Coviello 
14).  The erotohistoriographic is not the solution to the agnostic. The approach of embracing and 
reaching out to the “queer touches” of the past and embracing the “beautiful and weird” 
(Freeman, TB, 61) possibilities means that one could risk overlooking the specific structures and 
movements that were beginning to shape and nudge such nebulous desires into form.  
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Likewise, the antifutural project is not the solution to the teleologic pitfalls of the 
anticipatory approach. It might seem that rallying against the future, poking holes in the 
smoothness of linear progress, or disrupting the sequence of the supercessional model might be 
the answer to the question of how to rectify an approach overeager to find nascent incarnations 
of modernity in the past. So between anticipatory and agnostic, antifutural and 
erotohistoriographic, the dualisms of the Great Paradigm Shift and the Repressive Hypothesis-- 
what ways do we have out of this binary approach, juggling multiple risks and downfalls of one 
queer approach over another?  
 
IV. Velocity and Ephemerality: A New Approach to Queer Studies 
 
My methodology is to treat chronobiopolitics as a sieve. In other words, it acts as an 
apparatus akin to blinkers that makes certain sexualities and intimacies legible and others not 
possible.  The dividing line between articulable and inarticulable is fashioned by gender and 
sexual norms, norms that elicit certain paces, speeds and sequences. For example there is a 
forward-moving temporal direction, as well as a speed, that follows from the marriage vows in 
Iphis et Iante. After the ceremony, it is expected that the vows will be consummated, and going 
“backwards” or retracting, would be unthinkable. Delay, as well, is inconceivable, or goes 
undernoticed—no one expects that delay would inscribe or signal a type of gender or sexual 
intimacy in and of itself. Instead, delay stands as a sticking point, or a hurdle to be surmounted. 
Its insignificance, or the annoyance it causes, cloaks its enunciative properties. One anticipates 
and hopes that the marriage night will rush along, to fulfill the contract bringing together the two 
lovers, and delay is the mere snag in the forward thrust of the action, and can rarely point to, or 
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even “be” the “real” eroticism at hand.35  
This project contends that speed itself has gone undernoticed as a component of the 
temporal disciplining of queer sexualities. According to Annamarie Jagose, queer temporality is 
“a mode of inhabiting time that is attentive to the recursive eddies and back-to-the-future loops 
that often pass undetected or uncherished beneath the official narrations of the linear sequence 
that is taken to structure normative life” (158). Jagose's assertion here is that time can be folded 
upon itself, but such a consideration of queer temporality only takes into account the 
directionality (orientation to the past or future) and not necessarily the pace at which events take 
place. Clocks, sovereign daily rhythms, or the timing of a spectacle all shape and measure the 
rate, or pace at which lives can and “ought” to be lived. Speed itself is one under-noticed means 
of disciplining certain vectors of sexual experience and intimacy. Jasbir Puar writes in Terrorist 
Assemblages:  
Oliver Sacks, who has brilliantly written on the “wild range of speeds” 
experienced by the human brain. In his exposition he details other ways of 
measuring time outside of the past-present-future triad and their scrambling, as an 
intensification or de-intensification of the experience of time, as one of 
“registering larger or smaller numbers of events in a given time.” Relationships 
between speed (how fast or slow time feels), pace (the tempo, rate, or intervals of 
registering events within time), and duration (the length of time within which 
these events are registered) alter and are altered (xxi). 
Sacks has researched and examined the effects of drugs on those with Alzheimer’s disease. 
                                                 
35
This legibility of temporality and its relation to non-normative erotics might also be located in masochism, insofar 
as Deleuze asserts that waiting and suspense are the key characteristics of masochism. However, arguably, 
everything about masochism, from the future-oriented nature of the contract component to the incitement of desire 
enabled by such waiting, is in fact related to temporality. Where masochism diverges from the inarticulable erotics at 
hand here is that such temporality is dramatized and set center stage. While this would furnish more than enough 
material for another study, what interests me here are the ephemeral moments of temporal control, drag, and haste, 
moments that exist only fleetingly so as to challenge the hegemony of the given, graspable and dramatized.  
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Although the medications that these patients take exaggerate and dramatize the heterogeneity of 
velocities possible in the present, Sacks’s temporally diverse model nevertheless illustrates the 
ways that the diversity of lived experiences, the tempo of decision making, reacting, speaking, or 
moving tends to be sharply divided along a normalized or non-normalized axis. To give one 
example, Sacks writes: 
William Gooddy, a neurologist in England, remarks at the beginning of his 
book Time and the Nervous System. An observer may note, he says, how slowed a 
Parkinsonian's movements are, but "the patient will say, 'My own movements . . . 
seem normal unless I see how long they take by looking at a clock. The clock on 
the wall of the ward seems to be going exceptionally fast.'" 
Gooddy refers here to "personal" time, as contrasted with "clock" time, 
and the extent to which personal time departs from clock time may become 
almost unbridgeable with the extreme bradykinesia common in post-encephalitic 
Parkinsonism. I would often see my patient Miron V. sitting in the hallway 
outside my office. He would appear motionless, with his right arm often lifted, 
sometimes an inch or two above his knee, sometimes near his face. When I 
questioned him about these frozen poses, he asked indignantly, “What do you 
mean, 'frozen poses'? I was just wiping my nose.” (62) 
Although the mundane example of “wiping one's nose” is chortle-worthy, the anecdote illustrates 
the illegibilities and inarticulacies engendered from the unbreachable division between personal 
time and clock time. I would argue that analogously there are occasionally certain kinds of 
inarticulate erotics that take place according to “personal time” and that fail to register within 
clock time. Just as Miron V is deeply committed to a gesture that takes place within his own 
“personal” time, these “other” queer erotics are embedded in another temporal speed. And this 
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“other” temporal pace, its particular slowness or fastness, need not be diagnosed along the 
anticipatory or the agnostic-- the queered time is not one that will eventually (anticipatorially) 
become the tempo of the present, nor is it a situation that we just can't know about or ever read. 
Such differences between personal and clock time does not mark a departure or deviance that 
signals distress. Miron's reality is not twisted or damaged in any way, it is just his own normal, 
mundane tempo and gesture, just as the inarticulate erotics are not inarticulate because there are 
deviant erotics-- they do not signal themselves through stammering, faltering, etc. What is at 
play is an intentionality that we cannot see or understand given the assumed universality of clock 
time. 
 While many queer theorists have focused on the ethics and critical importance of one's 
orientation to the future or to the past, some also neglect that there are multiple and plural speeds 
or paces of life at hand. This is what the contribution of velocity can add to queer methodology: 
to loosen the exclusivity of thinking of queer temporality only through an “orientation” to the 
past or to the future and to pay closer attention to the varied velocities of life. Such a challenge to 
temporal orientation helps us re-consider the nature of “orientation” more broadly, including, I 
would suggest, the nature of sexual orientation. Sara Ahmed suggests, “Emotions involve such 
affective forms of (re)orientation. It is not just that bodies are moved by the orientations they 
have; rather, the orientations we have toward others shape the contours of space by affecting 
relations of proximity and distance between bodies[...] Orientations, then, are about the intimacy 
of bodies and their dwelling places” (8). Then, to take velocity as a prime means of investigation 
means letting go of certain assumptions we have about the fixity (and anchoring/homing 
possibilities) of orientation and to think of the ways that speeds and divergent paces of life also 
affect emotions and intimacy. Sacks emphasizes that there is an affective dimension to these 
plural speeds:  
 53 
Not just the speed but the quality of movement and thought is altered in tourettism 
and parkinsonism. The accelerated state tends to be exuberant in invention and 
fancy, leaping rapidly from one association to the next, carried along by the force 
of its own impetus. Slowness, in contrast, tends to go with care and caution, a 
sober and critical stance, which has its uses no less than the "go" of effusion (64). 
We tend to denigrate those other (personal) speeds as being recklessly fast or slowly dimwitted, 
in contrast to the “normal” speeds and tempo of expectations, and especially expectations, 
sequences and speeds that we associate with certain gender and sexed identities, with certain 
stereotypes accompanying the tempo of decision making, seduction, and more. Chimène's 
“haste” in agreeing to wed Rodrigue has previously only been read as “violating” the law of 
nature. However, it is by letting go of both senses of orientation that the queered velocity comes 
to light: we have to let go of our expectations that accompany sexual orientation (Chimène's 
“straightness”) or temporal orientation (refusal to proceed toward the future or forget the past in 
a certain way). Once “orientation” ceases to be the prime hermeneutic, such “haste” can be 
viewed differently, signaling and merging together a variety of affects (revulsion, mourning, 
desire) that have no real recourse to proper expression, but also mark a different type of desire.  
 I would also clarify that I don't mean to bring an exclusively anticipatory or agnostic 
reading approach to these erotics-- in other words, my argument is not that Iphis is “actually 
trans” (anticipatory) and that her eroticism takes place in a “slower” time. The point I am making 
is actually that the speed itself, in the difference between personal time and clock time, can 
engender its own (secondary) set of enjoyments, pleasures, and affects. Just as the tempos that 
Sacks describes are accompanied by sentiments “exuberance” or “caution,” I am interested in 
exploring the ways that such speeds engender their own set of affects that can be experienced 
along the lines of something queer.  
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 As mentioned before, the fixed metricality of temporality was an integral part in Louis 
XIV's chronobiopolitical manipulation and proliferation. If the seventeenth century saw the 
advent and the development of the first reliable, personal timepieces, it also stands at a threshold 
point between metric and nonmetric time-- between the cloaked neutrality of a universalizable 
hour of a day and the arbitrary and nebulous ways that the temporal units were segmented and 
experienced. Puar writes:  
In proposing what Elizabeth Freeman calls a “deviant chronopolitics,” one that 
envisions “relations across time and between times” that upturn developmentalist 
narratives of history, I would add that time must be conjured not only as 
nonlinear, but also as nonmetric. Manuel De Landa describes metric temporality 
as that which “take[s] for granted the flow of time already divided into identical 
instants bearing such close resemblance to one another that the flow may regarded 
as essentially homogenous.” Nonmetric time deconstructs the naturalization of the 
administrative units of measurement of the “familiar, divisible, and measurable 
time of everyday experience” and challenges the assumption that the repetition of 
these units, these “stable oscillators” at different scales, is “composed of identical 
instants” (xxi). 
Thus what I will consider “queer temporality” as that which stages a critical intervention in the 
hegemony of metric temporality and the normalized “neutral” clock time that is its byproduct, by 
putting forth a velocity that may not “make sense” according to normal temporality, much like 
Miron's extremely slow-motion hand-to-nose gesture. Queer temporality, in my reading, points 
to ruptures where the personal time intrudes on the seamless “naturalness” of clock and metric 
time.  
 The ephemeral quality that I trace is significant because it relieves the pressure to 
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participate in the world “as is,” an empiric world in which such affection and intimacies, once 
phenomenally mapped, marked, or monitored, can be appropriated or shut aside.  Fleetingness 
shines a light on the ways non-normative intimacies, attachments, or longings fail to get purchase 
on any type of enduring discursive structure. The analytic of “ephemeral velocity” in this case 
underscores the doubled ways (directional and temporal) that such non-normative desire resists 
the hegemonies of phenomenology
36
.   
 I borrow this concept of ephemerality from Rei Terada's Looking Away.  In analysis of 
Coleridge's notebooks “as a case study of the mind that feels guilty about its discomfort with the 
coercion of the given and becomes a connoisseur of ephemeral phenomenality in order to 
manage a discomfort that remains unspeakable” (22), she summarizes and condenses many of 
the questions that animate the project as a whole: How to trace such “unspeakable” moments, if 
they are indeed left unsaid?  And how are certain emotions (shame/guilt/discomfort) produced by 
an injunction to adhere to the “given?”  This is a “given” world that, I would argue, is aided and 
made visible by the clear “metrics” of clock time and chrononormativity. If there is a certain 
unspeakability or inarticulability wrought from these discomforts, it is possible that velocity 
marks the very site of splitting divergence (from norms of speech as well as from norms of time) 
in whose cicatrice the very “question of identity” arises, to use Sedgwick’s phrase?   
Put in another, more dramatized way, Judith Butler writes in “What is Critique?”: “Power 
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 Terada does not explicitly carry the queer connection throughout her book, but does make the link between the 
two fields (of ephemeral phenomenology and queer theory)  in her introduction.  In a sense, my own work is 
seeking to fill the gap that she hints at but does not bring center stage: “Finally, by reading features of the texts in 
this book that have often been understood as queer-for instance, the recurrent fear that alienation is caused by 
bodily difference, and the justifiable intuition that alienation is grounded in some difference-I would like, 
throughout, to show that the phenomenality/dissatisfaction connection reflects a momentous collision between 
enlightenment epistemology and queer thought. Reread through this idea, Kant may be seen to observe the 
collision and arrange terms for its assimilation by philosophy. Attention to the queer strands of the discourse of 
mere appearance helps to explain the conflict between accepters and dissenters from the given. Historically, it's 
queer consciousness that has sensed most keenly the moments when fact is ambiguously social or natural, and 
has had motive and energy to examine and reexamine even those pervasive conditions that seem most natural. In 
the persistence of the queer mind and body, dissatisfaction "against nature" discerns its own durability and 
legitimacy. This is a point I won't make in any one place, but neither will it ever be far away” (12).  
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sets the limits to what a subject can ‘be,’ beyond which it no longer ‘is,’ or it dwells in a domain 
of suspended ontology. But power seeks to constrain the subject through the force of coercion, 
and the resistance to coercion consists in the stylization of the self at the limits of established 
being” (107). So while the force of coercion of phenomenality is minimal, even seamlessly 
(apparently) neutral, Terada would argue that the expectation of assenting to, or endorsing the 
phenomenal can be still sensed as a type of coercion. And this opens up the possibility for a 
divergent subjectivity in the space hollowed out by the shame of not being able to accept the 
world “as is,” a gap to be sutured by the hijacking potential of inarticulate erotics. This 
inarticulacy is not one that struggles to take shape but rather plays at the limits of Butler’s 
“established being” in and through the ‘stylization of the self.” In the frictions, torsions and 
detours of discourse that can be made possible, and in the mere content that the minimal 
utterance of inarticulate erotics can produce, we find a possibility akin to Deleuze’s championing 
of stammering: “to make language stammer… to impose the work of continuous variation on 
language, on all interior elements of language” (247).   
 It is for this reason that I take up these ephemeral velocities. Against the standards of 
“clock time,” the minimalness of ephemeral velocities points away from the field of 
intelligibility by refusing to endure in a matter that could be cited and re-cited.  And since 
velocity is also defined by its direction, this ephemerality, or what Terada calls “looking away”, 
also points “away” (directionally) from the field of norms of legibility, or the domain of the “as 
is.” This “awayness,” I would clarify, is not an awayness of marginalization, or outsiderness.  
Rather, it might be thought of as more closely linked to Deleuze’s  notion of “becoming 
minority,” which is a position of potential, disruption and change, by extension of which the 
minority becomes more powerful than the “majority” or the status quo accepted.  He writes,  
….minority here denotes the strength of a becoming while majority designates the 
 57 
power or weakness of a state, of a situation.  Here is where theater or art can surge 
forward with a specific, political function…Theater will surge forward as 
something representing nothing but what presents and creates a minority 
consciousness as a universal-becoming.  It forges alliances here and there 
according to the circumstances, following the lines of transformation that exceed 
theater and take on another form, or else that transform themselves back into 
theater for another leap (255-256).  
Whether we notice it or not, our orientation to the past, present and future is conditioned 
by a whole set of affects that “naturally” accompany those temporal focal points.  For example, 
when we think about the past, the past as a concept tends to be associated with archive, memory, 
nostalgia, moving forward, looking back, and more.  As a result, the “past” becomes more than 
just a moment in chronological (historical) time.  Instead, it demands and commands a range of 
behaviors that properly cohere to these accompanying affective expectations. Overall, we can 
imagine that each temporal “orientation” is likewise accompanied by a whole host of additional 
emotions and expectations that serve to establish what is considered a “normal” relation to the 
past, present and future. In this increasingly frozen chrono-normative milieu of the seventeenth 
century, I argue that ephemeral velocities intervene to relieve the pressure of such affective 
norms, to allow alternative, even if fleeting, slowing and speeding of intimacies, erotics, and 
desires. 
 The three plays I take up in the following three chapters each complicate such “normal” 
ties to each temporal orientation (the past, the present, and the future), through the multiple and 
surprising emergences of inarticulate erotics. My dissertation begins with an analysis of  Pierre 
Corneille's Polyeucte (1642), a play in which the eponymous martyr is “seduced” into the 
Christian faith by his dear friend Néarque.  The pair's “coming out” as Christians shatters pre-
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existing anchorings of subjective identity; the normative moorings of blood, lineage, marriage, 
and kinship are completely undone in favor of an identity that is affectively determined.  While 
literary scholars have typically read this Polyeucte’s martyrdom as allegorical of a type of brash 
heroism that claims a revolutionary future, such an investment in looking toward the future 
ignores the fleeting affective ties that the men forge between them en route to the conversion.  
The relationship between the two men wavers between fiercely faithful Christian brotherhood 
and something more intensely intimate. This detouring desire hinges on the trope of metalepsis: a 
rushed, sliding chain of similitudes (metonyms) in which the analogies of loving God and loving 
one another become pleasurably confused.  Polyeucte and Néarque employ this figure to flee 
prying gazes while confirming each others' sentiments in surprising ways. 
 If Polyeucte and Néarque’s queered relationality allows for another kind of motor to 
speed along the plot, moving toward a different kind of futurity, Racine’s Andromaque (1667), in 
contrast, illustrates another kind of velocity: one of stasis.  Two kinds of inarticulacies collide: 
one wrought from trauma, in the aftermath of the Trojan war, and one wrought from non-
normative desires that lack recourse to expression.  In the play, the eponymous widow of Hector 
is forced to choose between marrying her captor, Pyrrhus, or allowing her son to be executed. 
Andromaque's hesitation to make a decision has often (mis)read as a “bad” relation to the past, 
mired in obsessive widowhood or poor motherhood.  Instead of understanding her behavior as 
diverging from the (temporally defined) expectations of her gender, I notice the ways that both 
the traumatic temporality and queer inarticulate erotics actually mutually engender and enable 
one another.  Andromaque engages with the “cendres” of her dead husband in an active 
relationship (dialoguing with him, calling out to the ashes), which points to a divergence from 
merely being melancholic about her loss.  She valorizes ash qua ash, in its double status as ruin 
(testament to the loss) and remainder (the persistent, material remains which enables memory to 
 59 
endure). The “zero velocity” means that she refuses to “move on” according to normative rubrics 
of temporality, but also that she insists on pointing directionally “away” to other types of 
inarticulate desires, touched by trauma, that cannot be fully expressed according to the dominant 
forms of discourse.   
 While Andromaque’s delay to accept or decline Pyrrhus’potentially lifesaving marriage 
proposal is called “criminelle” by others, delay in Racine’s Bérénice (1670) actually opens us an 
erotic space of a continually-deferred present. Titus, the emperor of Rome, must repudiate his 
beloved Bérénice because Roman law will not permit an emperor to marry a foreign-born queen. 
At the same time, Titus’s best friend Antiochus decides to confess a long-smoldering and long-
silenced love to Bérénice.  Until the moment of Bérénice’s departure, the undecidability of the 
situation enables strange substitutions and amorous triangulations. Titus’s delays in making the 
declaration troubles the status of the deictic “now” or the present.  Norms as developed by 
political and sovereignty theories would dictate that the “now” stands as the defining temporal 
moment of sovereign decision.  Titus’s inability to decide and to repudiate his love opens up a 
temporality that I call “dilatory.” This is a velocity of circularity and a rejection of sovereign 
progress and change, one that spirals open with possibility.  
 Ultimately, in these plays’ presentations of velocities diverging from certain paces and 
codes of gender behavior as mandated by chronobiopolitics, we can see how such splitting away 
from temporal expectations allows inarticulate erotics to emerge.  These inarticular erotics—of a 
close male friendship, of an attachment to an object, or of a triangulated indeterminability, are 
perhaps not clearly or not fully condensed according to traditional expectations of how desire 
“ought” to be presented.  Nevertheless, these erotics linger and haunt the text according to a 
“personal” temporality and the particular slownesses and fastnesses of ephemeral velocities. 
Each play that I take up presents a certain web of “queer velocities” that are at odds with 
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chrononormative temporality. As such, paying close attention to the plurality of speeds of 
intimacy shatters a monolithic, unified picture that we might have of a standardized, articulable 
sexuality. These ephemeral, fleetingly enacted velocities shed light on the ways that such queer 





SEX, SECTS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL CUT IN CORNEILLE’S POLYECUTE  
 
I. Representing a Radical Break 
 
Pierre Corneille’s Polyeucte (1642) can be thought of as a play about a shattering an old 
system of identity and heralding a new one—not via a bloody revolution, but rather through one 
person’s self-declared assertion.  This is a declaration that makes a radical break with the past—
indeed, Néarque tells his friend that he must “Négliger, pour lui plaire, et femme, et biens et 
rang.”  In so doing, the two men gesture toward a different type of futurity, one not founded 
upon rank or blood, but rather upon desire.  
 In Polyeucte’s conversion to Christianity, the aftereffects of such a reversal are so radical 
that the other characters begin questioning the nature of origins: how could one person be 
convinced to give up a comfortable place in society, as the son-in-law of the governor, as a 
newly married husband, in favor of actively longing for a martyred death?  Probing this question 
begins to unearth the ways that deep and strange queer attachments color such a radical shift.   
 In the play, Pauline, Polyeucte’s wife, has been troubled by dreams foretelling his 
demise. When Sévère, her former beloved, returns from war, she wavers between adhering to her 
social and filial obligations as a married woman and the longings she still harbors for Sévère.  
Polyeucte is “seduced” into the Christian faith by his friend Néarque, and they decide to reveal 
themselves to be Christian by rushing into the temple and publicly declaring their faith, breaking 
the idols of the pagan religion. Pauline is torn between her marriage vow to the doomed 
Polyeucte and the fact that her father Félix, a political governor, is strategically urging her to see 
Sévère, now a political favorite and military hero.  Ultimately, when Félix has Néarque and 
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Polyeucte executed for the crime of their conversion, the others are so moved by the faith of the 
two martyred men that Félix and Pauline convert as well. 
Polyeucte repeatedly declares the unsuturing of the legal and sexual ties that had bound 
him to his previous subjective position, and gestures, however broadly and illegibly, toward a 
type of subject-position founded on affinity, attunement, and desire. To convert, here, is not 
necessarily a “religious” gesture, but rather it inscribes a specific type of political upheaval.  
Serge Doubrovsky has argued that   
On n’a pas assez souligné, en effet, que Polyeucte était non seulement une 
tragédie religieuse, mais un drame politique, qui se joue autour d’une question 
d’État ou, plus exactement, d’une mise en question de l’État. Le ‘crime’ de 
Polyeucte n’est nullement un délit privé. Chef de la noblesse arménienne, issu du 
sang des rois, par son adhésion au christianisme, il renverse l’ordre et la 
hiérarchie, détruit l’Empire annoncé par Tulle et fondé par Auguste. La révolte 
contre les dieux est aussi rébellion contre la source légitime du pouvoir et les 
décrets de Décie (241). 
Such a dramatic gesture of a conversion from a man who was integrated into the heart of the 
Armenian nobility and married to the Roman governor’s daughter might seem unexpected—if 
Polyeucte occupied such a comfortable place in society, what would compel him to break the 
social bonds that favored him so?  
 It is clear that Polyeucte converts to Christianity only thanks to the insistence of his 
friend Nearque. Stratonice, Pauline's friend, underscores the sexual underpinnings of this 
conversion, describing to Pauline the cause of her husband's conversion explicitly as seduction,   
Néarque l’a séduit : 
De leur vieille amitié c’est là l’indigne fruit.  
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Ce perfide tantôt, en dépit de lui-même,  
L’arrachant de vos bras, le traînait au baptême.  
Voilà ce grand secret et si mystérieux 
  Que n’en pouvait tirer votre amour curieux. (III, ii, 807-812)37   
In Stratonice's discourse, she seems to directly counteroppose the love that Pauline can provide 
(“de vos bras”) with another type of generative love (amitié) that Néarque's seduction is founded 
upon. Painted as such, the conversion does not merely enact a change in religious comportment 
or social status, but explicitly swaps out marital love for the strange fruit begotten of same-sex 
friendships.  Thus, the “fruit” that is produced from such intimacy between men marks its 
deviance from the norms and closeness expected of marriage.  The emergence of this “fruit” 
raises another question: how does “amitié” between two men shift to “séduit” and what happens 
in the aftermath of such a break? 
 In order to fully investigate my understanding of Polyeucte’s reversals, I will first 
consider what exactly he is rebelling against—how are these norms of governmentality and 
representation constructed, specifically related to temporality and sexuality? The second section 
features a close analysis of the language that Polyeucte and Néarque use between them, 
illuminating how this break is effected, and what is produced in its aftermath. The employment 
of particular rhetorical devices produce odd temporal effects and forge unexpected pathways of 
intimacy and connection.  Finally, in a third section, I will consider the ways that Polyeucte’s 
break with norms of identification in favor of an affectively defined self has greater implications 
for thinking of gender and sexual difference at large.  
 
                                                 
37 “Néarque seduced him/ this disgraceful fruit is begotten of their old friendship/ this traitor, rather, in despite of 
himself/ tearing Polyeucte from your arms, drove him to baptism./ Behold this secret, so mysterious/ that even 
your inquiring love could not draw from him.” 
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Rebelling Against Representational Norms 
Considering that which Polyeucte rebels against means taking into account the pre-
existing political system.  The play is one that hinges on the use of proxies and representatives 
and thus is set in a relatively contingent and fragile system of governance. Imperial Rome is 
represented by a stand-in governor, Félix, in Armenia, a borderland that represents both a 
geographically liminal space as well as a social terrain in flux. Greenberg writes:  
As the play begins, at the far corners of the Empire, in Armenia, the Christians are 
an ever more present menace to the internal stability of the Roman world.  On the 
borders of that world, the Persians, although contained for the moment, are a 
threat to its geographic integrity… the moment of passage from one order to 
another is a sacred one; it is a moment of agony, the agony of an entire system of 
legal, social and sexual codes, and of the birth pains of a new society (CC 118).   
Throughout the play, Félix himself sends his daughter Pauline to convince and coerce on his 
behalf, creating layers of representatives and representations of power.  In such a tenuous locale, 
fragilely secured both politically and ideologically, Polyeucte’s gesture of overturning the old 
hierarchies of power becomes all the more dramatic. 
Décie, the emperor, never actually appears in this drama, although it is for Polyeucte’s 
and Néarque’s treasonous crimes against him, the State and the state religion that they are 
executed.  Pauline begs her father for Polyeucte’s life, impoloring clemency “Au nom de 
l’Empereur dont vous tenez la place” (III, 3, 918), to which Félix replies : “J’ai son pouvoir en 
main; mais, s’il me l’a commis, / C’est pour le déployer contre ses ennemis” (III, 3, 919-920). In 
this sense, the play’s staging of a conversion is one that not only threatens but also questions the 
security of a represented government. Félix can only speak in the “name” of the emperor, as 
merely the placeholder, occupying an otherwise empty seat of power.  And yet he admits that he 
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requires “ses ennemis” as a precondition for such a power to be transferred to him and deployed 
in the first place.  
It is for this reason that the doubled status of representation that Louis Marin describes in 
Le Portrait du roi becomes all the more significant.  Marin reveals the absolute sovereign to be 
an effect of, and contingent on, the power to represent: as both the presentation of the royal 
power’s plenitude itself and as the meta-representation of such power to present.  However, what 
representation itself covers over is the originary lack or absence, ignoring that that which is 
represented is not (and can not be) actually present.  Thus, every representation, while dazzling, 
also marks and conceals its own internal lacks:  
Premier effet du dispositif représentatif, premier pouvoir de la représentation: 
effet et pouvoir de présence au lieu de l’absence et de la mort; deuxième effet, 
deuxième pouvoir: effet de sujet, c’est-à-dire pouvoir d’institution, d’autorisation 
et de légitimation comme résultante du fonctionnement réfléchi du dispositif sur 
lui-même. Si donc la représentation en général a en effet un double pouvoir: celui 
de rendre à nouveau et imaginairement présent, voire vivant, l’absent et le mort, et 
celui de constituer son propre sujet légitime et autorisé en exhibant qualifications, 
justifications et titres du présent et du vivant à l’être, autrement dit, si la 
représentation non seulement reproduit en fait mais encore en droit les conditions 
qui rendent possibles sa reproduction alors on comprend l’intérêt du pouvoir à se 
l’approprier. Représentation et pouvoir sont de même nature (10-11).38 
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 The first effect of the representation framework and the first power of representation are the effect and power of 
presence instead of absence and death; the second effect and second power are the effect of subject, that is, the 
power of institution, authorization, and legitimation as resulting from the functioning of the framework reflected 
onto itself. If, then, representation in general as indeed a double power— that of rendering anew and imaginarily 
present, not to say living, the absent and the dead and that of constituting its own legitimate and authorized 
subject by exhibiting qualifications, justification, and titles of the present and living to being— in other words if 
representation reproduces not only de fact but also de jure the conditions that make its reproduction possible, 
then we understand that it is in the interests of power to appropriate it for itself. Representation and power share 
the same nature (6). 
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In this sense, there is an inter-dependent relationship between the two kinds of representation: 
power’s manifestation and the theatrical representation.  By extension, Katherine Ibbett notes 
that the play hinges on the doubled meaning of execute, both in the sense of carrying out 
another’s orders (to execute a plan) as well as the more obvious deadly execution.  So in this 
respect, Félix, the man named to execute the Emperor’s governance of Armenia, who holds the 
sovereign place (“dont vous tenez la place”) has the power to represent authority, but hesitates in 
terms of the actual execution of Polyeucte and the spectacular representation of power that such 
an execution would entail.
39
  
Analyzing Corneille’s play in light of these concerns regarding the authority of a 
representative and represented government offers a means of investigating the relationship 
between sovereign power, temporality and temporal deviances more closely. For example, Félix 
tries to feign conversion to Christianity in order to soften Polyeucte’s obstinate resolve to seek 
his martyred death. Félix ultimately admits that the ruse was only a trick in order to gain time: 
“Je voulais gagner temps pour ménager ta vie” (V, 2, 1575).  Ibbett reads this “ménager” as an 
extension of the ruler’s chronobiopolitical investment: “The attempt to gain time in order to 
manage a life is a succinct explanation of the task of the colonial governor, who must succeed in 
the proper management of the bodies under his control” (79).  At the same time, translating 
“ménager” as merely management also ignores the temporal sense of “ménager” insofar as it 
could indicate, in an economic sense, to save/spare or to set aside—in which case, “ménager” 
would indicate the shoring up of life, and the time of life
40
, in order to extend the powers of 
governmentality.  The stakes of claiming a mortal finitude against a sovereign-managed life span 
becomes the key terrain on which Polyeucte and Félix struggle—the former striving to cast off 
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 See Ellen McClure’s  Sunspots and the Sun King (University of Illinois Press, 2006)for a further discussion of 
divine-right sovereignty and the perfected (spotless) image that Louis XIV wished to present, in relation to 
diplomacy and representational authority.  
40
 See also Martin Hagglund’s Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. Stanford University Press, 2008 for 
more on the notion of the cultivation of the time of life against the infinite temporality of différance.  
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the managerial control and to hasten the end his life on his own martyred terms, and the latter 
using strategies ranging from deception to pleading in order to extend (or execute).  
If temporality is contested intradiegetically, it also informs the dramatic work as a whole, 
insofar as the play fails to adhere to the conventions of the unity of time. Corneille even admits 
in his Examen of his play Polyeucte that the pacing of the events of the drama does not quite fit 
with the conventions of the unity of time: “Il est hors de doute que si nous appliquons ce poème 
à nos coutumes, le sacrifice se fait trop tôt après la venue de Sévère, et cette précipitation sortira 
du vraisembable par la nécessité d’'obéir à la règle”(50).41  Jacques Schérer notes, “La solution 
de Corneille… consiste à escamoter le problème: il suffira de ne pas préciser la durée assignée à 
l'action”(116).42   
It is perhaps not coincidental that my reading of the play is informed by Corneille’s Trois 
discours sur le poème dramatique, because there is a strain of heroic vanity in Polyeucte that 
also appears in the Corneille of the Discours. Katherine Ibbett writes:  
Hélène Merlin-Kajman has described the heroes of Corneille’s early plays such as 
Le Cid and La place royale  as libertine figures who define themselves without 
recourse to the father figure, and whose self-mastery points both to the Sadian 
hero and the Kantian subject, the solipsistic being who is both self and sovereign.  
The Corneille of the Discours traces a quasi-autobiographical account of a similar 
kind of literary libertinage that takes pains to show its rejection of paternal 
authorities and that makes the writer the hero of his own work, in a similar vein to 
his 1637 “Excuse à Ariste” in which he insisted his success was won through his 
own efforts and owe nothing to a larger network of supporters (148-149)  
                                                 
41 “Doubtlessly, if we hold the poem up to our standards, the sacrifice takes place too soon after the arrival of 
Sévère, and consequently this event diverges from verisimilitude due to the necessity of obeying the rule” 
42 “Corneille's solution was simply to evade the problem itself: it sufficed simply not to mention the length of time 
assigned to the action.” 
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Corneille, in his Trois discours, discusses the unity but seems to only thinly veil his complaints 
against it.  “La règle de l'unité de jour a son fondament sur ce mot d'Aristote” (137), and “ils 
nomment [cette règle] tyrannique, et auraient raison, si elle n'était fondée que sur l'autorité 
d'Aristote” (emphasis mine, 139).43  Corneille implies a refusal to embrace the rule of the unity 
of time himself, which he implies is “tyrannique” and whenever structural logic requires him to 
defend it, he instead passes over his disavowal of the rule in favor of deferring to the 
“fondament” and the authority of Aristotle. What do we make of Corneille’s temporal failings, 
especially in regards to this play that centers the gaze on temporality itself: the dreamed-for 
future that the martyrs rush towards, the regretted past that haunts Pauline? In a sense, it may not 
be fair to relegate Corneille’s struggles with the temporal unity to “failure.”  
  This particular word emphasized frequently in Corneille's Trois discours sur le poème 
dramatique, “fondament”, played a curious role in early modern language.  One meaning proper 
to the seventeenth century usage of the word, lost in the modern usage (both in French and 
English) is a synonym for anus.
44
  A close examination of the word French fondement in early 
modern French dictionaries reveals a similarly sexualized definition which will prove useful for 
                                                 
43
 “The rule of the unity of time has for its fundament (foundation) the word of Aristotle” and “Certain people would 
call this rule tyrannical, and would be right, if it weren’t founded upon the authority of Aristotle”  
44
 This reading is inspired by Jeffrey Masten’s work on the fundament.  In his chapter, “Is the Fundament a Grave?” 
he points out:   
One of fundament's meanings, in fact, is '[t]he foundation or base of a wall, building, etc.'  Indeed, 
the word fundament, in its three primary meanings of 'foundation,'' 'buttocks,' and 'anus,' seems to 
exist [in English] for a century before foundation, the word that, after several centuries of overlap, 
eventually takes its place... through the end of the seventeenth century, fundament means 
'foundation' and foundation  is used to refer to the body part.  Not only can we not give fundament 
and foundment distinct histories... but the fundament seems always to be inseparably foundational 
(133).   
For Masten, the multiplicity of these many fundaments generates a new paradigm for thinking about queer sexuality 
to enrich other analytics proposed by Parker's  “preposterous” (hysteron proteron, or taking back for front, posterior 
for prior) and Goldberg “sodometric” (the “void” of confusion generated by a non-procreative sexual relation).  In 
tension with these other models which can be read as horizontally-organized, Masten proposes: “The fundament lies 
productively in a strangely active-passive position: it is the ground but also the groundwork; the seat but also the 
offspring; the founding and the foundation.  The fundamental is that which 'hath or is ground or foundation'” (135).  
Masten’s analysis elaborates the doubled notion of “base” (another synonym for fundament, in the architectural 
sense), to mean both “origin, basis” in addition to its other connotations of being depraved or devoid of morals.  




an analysis of unconventional desires in Polyeucte. The Richelet dictionary (1680) to give one 
example among a few period dictionaries,
45
 provides the idea of an architectural fondement (“ce 
mot se dit entre quelques Architectes, & signifie fondation d'un edifice qu'on achève)
46
 as well as 
a grounding fondement, in a sense akin to the modern one (“Principe. Base.”).  We also, 
however, have fondement in the anal sense, actually listed first as a primary definition in the list: 
“partie du corps par où sortent les excréments du ventre”.47    
Of the six definitions of fondement provided here, only two are marked as “sens non-
figuré”: the architectural fundament and the anal, which underscores the fact that it was not taken 
as a euphemism but rather as a proper marker of the material body part.  The anal fundament is 
illustrated by an example phrase: “Avoir le fondement tout écorché”.48  This example seems 
totally out of character with the rest of the sample sentences given, but its fundamentality is even 
further underscored when one takes into account that it begs the question as to what one could 
possibly have been doing to “écorcher” one's fundament. The fact that the given usage aligns the 
fondement with violence (as opposed to, say, furnishing a more quotidian sentence which 
described excrementality or something medical) seems to allude to the fact that the fondement, at 
least in the French early modern context, was a site not only of exiting and excrement, but also of 
potential (sexualized?) violence.  
While it may risk an overly simplistic analogous relationship between Corneille’s self-
styling against the authority of Aristotle and Polyeucte’s “heroism,” the hinge point between the 
two is the fundament.  The “fondement” that Corneille most struggles against, the spectacle of 
regulated temporality as mandated by the unité de temps and Aristotle’s authority, strings 
                                                 
45
While the 1680 dictionary’s publication date postdates Polyeucte by a few decades, the dictionary had been 
commissioned much earlier and still provides a general representative snapshot of language and vocabulary 
usage in the period.  Other definitions include “Intrigue pour quelque entreprise. Moien pour faire une chose”,  
“Fonds”, and “Raison, cause, sujet” 
46“This word is used between some architects, and signifies “foundation” of an edifice that one is constructing.” 
47“Part of the body through which the stomach's excrements exit”  
48“To have the fundament completely flayed/ripped”  
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together certain types of normative logics: an economy of teleological progress within a frame of 
finitude that, in tragedy, enables anxieties about gloire (glory) and the lastingness of one's mortal 
imprint on both social and sexual spheres. The fundament is a trope that is linked to both 
beginnings (and a type of historical time) as well as perversions.  These multiple definitions of 
the term furnish an apt perspective on Polyeucte’s conversion to Christianity insofar as the act 
incites disgust in other characters while at the same time launching (and indeed founding) a 
dramatic shift in the religious and political structures by the end of the play. Jeffrey Masten 
suggests, “This is what is perhaps most striking about the rhetoric of the fundament, especially 
when juxtaposed with the more familiar Bakhtinian model of the bottom, the lower bodily strata; 
while the fundament, as foundation and seat, may participate in the rhetoric of the low, this is a 
lowliness with a positive valence” (134).  Although Masten cautions against over-eagerly 
reading for fundamentality in literature, the figural and functional work that the fundament 
performs in relation to this chapter's treatment of Corneille's Polyeucte can reorient our reading 
of the queer intimacies which undergird and engender desire in the text.   
Where I would depart from both Doubrovsky and Merlin-Kajman is that instead of 
reading Polyeucte’s radical break as that with the emperor/father figure, I would contend that 
Polyeucte is instead staging a break with the gender and sexuality norms of the society that 
condition and structure the very existence of such hierarchies of power.
49
 In other words, he 
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 Doubrovsky himself writes that the play can be understood as an allegory of Cornelian heroism. “De même qu’il 
y a un sens ‘racinien’ d’Athalie, où les attributs de Dieu sont choisis et sa présence manifestée en fonction d’une 
optique de d’une dramaturgie raciniennes, il y a un sens cornélien de Polyeucte, qui récupère Dieu, pour ainsi dire, 
au profit de Corneille”(251), and this particular Christianity is one of heroic competition, in Doubrovsky’s eyes. 
Polyeucte a besoin de Dieu pour assurer, en son lieu et place, l’authenticité de l’acte héroïque. Par une double 
contradiction, au moment où le héros se soumet à Dieu, il en est le secret rival; mais, au moment où il pose son désir 
d’indépendance absolue, il suppose sa dépendance totale. La cohabitation de l’ “héroïsme’ et de la ‘sainteté’ dont 
parlait Péguy, se résout donc par leur destruction mutelle” (260). The looseness of this “sens cornélien” has invited 
“other” readings of Polyeucte’s conversion and interest in overturning society than the Christian reading. Paul Scott 
sees it as a tale of heterosexualization of the main character, while Greenberg reads the play as the emergence of a 
powerful female voice/eroticism in the figure of Pauline.  
 
Whatever it is in the text that invites such allegorical or figurative readings (always “other” than Christianity) I do 
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might be thougth of as establishing a new fondement (foundation, or foundational authority) on 
the bases of the fundament (the anal/ the base, low and forgotten Christians). Here I take a cue 
from Greenberg’s analysis of the play, in which he says:  
As we know, after Polyeucte, something radically changes in the Cornelian 
universe. An inversion occurs in the roles that have, in the canonical plays, 
divided the Cornelian world in the fixed camps of masculinity and femininity. 
After Polyeucte, those roles are inverted: women… become the standard bearers 
of an almost Nietzchean will to power, while the men are reduced to an 
effeminization that effectively signals their political demise (“Review” 115-116).  
While acknowledging Polyeucte’s reversal of the gender binary, I would take inversion a step 
further and argue that Polyeucte’s “break” destabilizes the very notion of “fixed camps” of 
masculinity and femininity itself.  
In fact, I would hazard that while the play is a type of martyr tragedy, it tells the story of 
another type of sacrifice, other than Polyeucte’s life. The play depicts a chronobiopolitics that 
founds and feeds upon the power relations of gender dichotomy or such “fixed camps” of 
masculine and feminine. Against this societal structure stands the martyrdom of non-normative 
(queer) affective relations in the name of letting emerge another type of sexual-temporal 
governance. These affective relations and “personal” temporalities, forged between Polyeucte 
and Néarque, can not last and must be sacrificed in this society that privileges certain types of 
temporal governance. 
As I noted in the Introduction, the relationship between representation and temporality 
installs a certain sense of authority, one that establishes the royal subject as the anchor of 
temporality and history and standing as history’s origin.  Marin writes: 
                                                                                                                                                             
follow in this strong trend in literary criticism of re-interpreting the radical break  
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D’où cet autre paradoxe: que la réflexion de présence accuse toujours plus 
intensément, dans le sujet de représentation qui en est l’effet, le désire d’absolu 
comme un manque à remplir, comme ce lieu vide dont parle Pascal précisément à 
propos du roi: accomplissement toujours différé. Le roi est d’abord le mouvement 
d’une volonté, d’un désir, dans le divertissement de la guerre, de la chasse, du 
ballet. Le désir absolu du pouvoir, de la gloire incomparable du monarque, 
prendra la forme du temps. Le sujet de représentation, pour se réaliser sujet 
d’absolu pouvoir— le monarque absolu— sera produit comme effet de la 
représentation narrative, effet de récit, effet de récit d’histoire où est construit, 
dans le présent même de l’acte extraordinaire du prince, le mémoriale de la 




The royal manifestation of power is linked to a perfected completion of temporality, a fulfillment 
of history and narrative, but such power is also always already marked by this striving for 
temporal mastery, a desire that only serves to produce such “glory” as an aftereffect. This royal 
desire to “fill” time with its accomplished plenitude means that the action of this filling (“le 
mouvement d’une volonté”) is that which must take place on stage.  Therefore the temporality of 
the theater is one that has to foreground “ce lieu vide” waiting to be inscribed by sovereign 
fulfillment.  
 This notion of incompleteness as integral to authority and representation was even 
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 Hence this other paradox: that the reflection of presence always accuses more intensely, in the subject of 
representation that is its effect, the desire for the absolute of being a lack to fill, of being that empty place Pascal 
speaks of precisely with respect to the king, which is satisfaction always deferred. The king is first of all the 
movement of will or desire in the diversions of war, hunting, and ballet. The desire for the absolute of power, 
for the incomparable glory of the monarch, will take the form of time. The subject of representation, to realize 
itself as the subject of absolute power— the absolute monarch— will be produced as the effect of narrative 
representation, of narrative, and of the narrative of history, where is constructed, in the present of the prince’s 
extraordinary act itself, the memorial of the memory of the king, a memorial that completes time in a past that is 
an eternalized present (8) 
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underscored in theater treatises of the time. Timothy Murray draws upon the Abbé d’Aubignac’s 
treatise La Pratique du théâtre in order to emphasize the necessity of the incomplete dramatic 
representation. He writes:  
A finished dramatic product best represents the picture of its incongruities and 
imperfectsions: 'Le Poëme Dramtique est comme une quinte essence de toutes les 
preceptes qui se lisent dans les Autheurs, qui nous ont enseigné l’art de bien dire 
en prose et en vers ; parce qu’il les y faut employer avec tant de jugement et de 
délicatese, que bien souvent il paroisse qu’on en soit fort éloigné, et que méme on 
les ait entierment abandonnez ; et le genie du Theatre est tel, que d’ordinaire, ce 
qui ne paroist point, en est le plus grand art ; un Sentiment qu’on aura presque 
imperceptiblement jetté dans l’esprit des Auditeurs, une Avanture commencée en 
apparence sans dessein…’ The genius of an effective poem, ‘le genie du Theatre,’ 
is said by d’Aubignac to portray the illusionary inadequacy and deficiency of its 
visible parts, rather than the visible potency of either author or patron… 
d’Aubignac aligns this presentation of the genius of incomplete imagery with the 
art of rhetoric (181).  
The theater then is a “riven space” as Weber calls it, but the particular presentation of such 
rivenness is unique to Corneille’s work, and as Murray would underscore, the seventeenth 
century notion of “rivenness” particular to the socio-political function that theater held.  
Far from being a mere extension of Arstotelian tyranny, the unity of time allows for the 
conditions to create within and, more importantly—against—such perfected images. Ubersfeld 
adds:  
Il y a ainsi un réseau idéologique solide dans lequel s'inscrivent à la fois le mode 
de référence historique de la tragédie, l'unité de temps, unité spéculaire autour 
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d'un personnage, et la 'fatalité' (la permanence) qui détermine actions et 
sentiments.  Ce n'est pas un hasard si Corneille, dont on sait les démêlés avec 
l'unité de temps... ne parvient pas à constituer totalement ce réseau signifiant.  Et 
le côté fascinant de son théâtre vient de cette bataille entre deux vues de temps, 
celle où une créativité du héros et de l'histoire contraint le spectateur à construire 
le rapport entre le temps référentiel et le temps théâtral... et une vue 'classique' où 
rien ne se passe qui ne soit déjà passé, où la représentation est comme la 
reproduction d'un passé perpétuellement déjà là (155).
51
  
Thus, the temporality in Corneille’s theater is neither perfected plenitude nor total eschewal of 
“history” (le temps référentiel).  It is the divergence from a perfect presentation that creates both 
the possibility for heroic representation (the authorial power to create) as well as that 
representation’s failure.  
Corneille's struggles with the unity of time manifests not only a struggle with a 
burdensome stylistic constraint but also one that grapples with tensions in the subject's and 
spectator's relation to history.  It has become commonplace to consider that Racine was able to 
adhere effortlessly to this unity of time, in contrast to Corneille’s fudging of the boundary lines. 
Greenberg takes up a schism which is formalized in the unity of time-- the division between the 
productive/possible and the pre-fixed-- and maps it internally in the early modern subject, noting 
the specific sexual resonances undergirding such a tension:  “What Corneille first radically 
figures in his dramatic conflict is the contradiction? between a protagonist who wishes to be 
                                                 
51 “There is thus a solid ideological network that combines the mode of historical reference in tragedy, the unity of 
time, the specular unity surrounding a given character, and the fatality (permanence) that determines actions and 
sentiments.  It is no accident that Corneille, whose problems with the unity of time are well known (see his three 
Discours on the dramatic poem), never succeeds in totally reconstructing this signifying network.  The 
fascination of his theatre stems from that very conflict between the two views of time: one in which the 
creativity of the hero and of history call upon the spectator to construct the relation between referential time and 
theatrical time […]  and the other classical view that nothing happens that has not already happened, that 
performance is like a reproduction of a past that is perpetually already there” (130) 
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absolute-- that is, in conformity to an ambient ideological drive... and at the same time the 
contradictory 'split within,' the internal fracture that makes Corneille's characters 'dramatis 
personae' as they struggle with what inheres in them that is irreconcilable with the exigencies of 
the absolute monarchy, their amorous and mortiferous desire” (CS, 91-92).   
Thus, this fragmented temporality to which Ubersfeld alludes, the tension between 
perfected past and the possibilities of a “creative” hero to fill empty time in his (or her) own 
manner can also be viewed to correspond to the split that Greenberg diagnoses—the 
incompatibilities between absolute mastery and the “mortiferous desire.”  Corneille’s temporal 
struggles are precisely adequate representations of this “split” rather than stylistic or aesthetic 
failures.  And despite D’Aubignac and Corneille’s quarrels and rivalries, D’Aubignac’s intuition 
about an authorial feint is highly pertinent to Corneille’s situation-- that although authors may 
appear to have “entirement abandonnez” the rules of the theatre, the true genius is the one who in 
this perceived failure actually lays the groundwork for a far more potent form of representation.  
Given the stakes that Polyeucte offers for both temporality and representation, it is the 
nature of this “cut” (or Greenberg’s “split within”) that I take up in this chapter.  If the nature of 
the unity of time is a “coupe nécessaire et brutale,” according to Ubsersfeld, the unity of time 
severs the time of theatrical representation from its historical embeddedness, illuminating the 
theatre's power to represent, or to engender forth. The forced splitting-off from chronological 
norms that is staged by the temporal unity claims a new, strange etiology, pointing to an origin 
bereft of the types of normative productivity, process, and progress in historical time.  And thus, 
breaking away from the fixity of etiological norms allows for the open possibility of a different 
kind of future.  At the same time, this foundational cut is one that intradiegetically undergirds 
most of the plot. When materialized and analogized in the play, physical cuts, from the 
executioner’s cut to the “circumcisive” one, echo the rupturing cut that Polyeucte hopes to 
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stage—the radical break with the previous forms of citizenship, belonging and identity. 
 
II. Speeds of Seduction 
 
 As Schérer rightly notes, Corneille doesn't mention the time that passes, he also uses 
rhetorical tropes that condense many meanings into a short space.  The impression, then, is one 
of rushing-- a speed that jolts against the regular tempo that we would expect in a classical play.  
The opening scene of Polyeucte's seduction to Christian conversion is characterized by a 
rushed intensity.  Scene 1 of Act I, as Polyecute is on the brink of converting, closes with a 
staccato rapid-fire of short syllables which fracture the alexandrine line, as Néarque urges his 
friend to flee  from his wife Pauline:  
 Polyeucte: Elle revient. 
 Néarque:   Fuyez.  
 Polyeucte:    Je ne puis. 
 Néarque:     Il le faut. (I.1.103). 
52
 
Polyeucte and Néarque's repeated running and fleeing coheres intradiegetically with the notion 
that such a conversion necessarily had to take place in secret.  Yet, in the excessive 
overperformance of speed, in the references to the need for rushing, the very velocity itself 
seems to accrue supplementary meaning, one which not only echoes the intensity of Néarque's 
desire to have Polyeucte converted, but also their awareness of the conditions of expression 
which limit the full articulation of their desires and rhetorical persuasions.  
This perceived rushing has not gone unnoticed by subsequent critics, but has been 
                                                 
52 P: She returns.  
N: Flee.  
P: I can not 
N: You must.  
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interpreted differently. Paul Claudel notes in his Journal, “On voit une espèce d’énergumène qui 
se rue au baptême, puis à des actes ostentatoires que l’Eglise a toujours condamnés” (294), the 
haste of the “se ruer” in this sense only adds to Claudel’s evaluation of the illogical nature of 
Polyeucte’s temporality. In a similar vein, Voltaire famously criticized the eponymous character 
for being a fanatic:  
Le fanatisme est à la superstition ce que le transport est à la fièvre, ce que la rage 
est à la colère. Celui qui a des extases, des visions, qui prend des songes pour des 
réalités, et ses imaginations pour des prophéties, est un enthousiaste; celui qui 
soutient sa folie par le meurtre est un fanatique... Polyeucte qui va au temple, dans 
un jour de solennité, renverser et casser les statues et les ornements, est un 
fanatique moins horrible que Diaz, mais non moins sot (176).
53
 
Voltaire's denigration of Polyeucte for his excess of enthusiasm seems odd when taking into 
consideration any number of Corneillian heros who are overwhelmed by their passion-- why not 
snub Horace's patriotic fanaticism and his murder of his sister, as well, for that matter? Is it 
possible that what Voltaire had sensed, and decried in this “maladie presque incurable” (177) 
was not the oblivious overcommitment to a cause, but the nature of “transports,”or the role that 
excesses of passion and emotion can actually produce motion and movement?   Do the affective 
attachments that sway Polyeucte's conversion and subsequent martyrdrom render him a more 
likely candidate for idiotic (“sot”) fanaticism, instead of laudable revolutionariness? What is 
dismissed as the haste of an idiot, a fanatic, or a nutcase may actually be gesturing toward other 
types of intimacies and attachments.  
What is most interesting to my analysis is that these moments of rushing—to convert and 
                                                 
53“Fanaticism is to superstition what hysterics are to fever, what rage is to anger.  He who has ecstasies, visions, who 
takes dreams to be reality and his imagination for prophecy, is an overly enthusiastic person; he who holds firmly 
to his insanity through murder is a fanatic.  Polyeucte who goes to the temple, on a religious day, to overturn and 
break the statues and the ornements, is a fanatic, less horrible than Diaz, but no less idiotic” 
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to destroy the idols of the temple-- are usually aligned with moments when the play treats 
affective alliances and intimacies that can be considered queer, or at least non-normative and out 
of sync with a reproduction-driven temporalization of sexuality. I would argue that the play, in 
grasping for a language adequate to inarticulate desires, builds on such bursts of speed to put 
forth alternate means of expressing certain kinds of desire and intimacy.  And here, I wish to 
consider “build” in both its figurative sense as well as its relation to the fondement -- re-thinking 
the nature of the fundamentals upon which deviance can be generated. Ultimately, in its 
divergence from the classical/Absolutist ideals of unified time, the play stages an intervention 
into the nature of a progress-oriented temporality, by problematizing norms of generation and 
reproduction (etiologies) through the overturning of diachronic, biologic filiation in favor of a 
synchronically swerving identity founded upon desire and seduction.  
 It is unsurprising that for historian John Boswell, the Polyeuct-Nearchos couple stand as 
one of three key early Christian queer martyr pairs. Drawing upon B. Aubé's account in 
Polyeucte dans l'histoire (Paris, 1882), Boswell reminds us that “St. Polyeuct and Nearchos, 
Roman soldiers of Greek ancestry in the Armenian city of Meitene, were described in their 
fourth-century biography as “brothers, not by birth, but by affection.” They enjoyed “the closest 
possible friendship, being both comrades and fellow-soldiers” (141).  More than merely a 
fraternal affection, however, Boswell (citing Aubé) recounts an episode in which Nearchos and 
Polyeuct learn that all Christians are to be executed for their faith.  While Polyeuct originally 
comforts his friend in the face of imminent death,  
Nearchos replied, “But this, dearest [φίλτατε] is precisely what weighs on my 
soul.  There is something worse than the death of humans: the separation that I 
fear might take place […] for I had feared that I would lose you from my love 
[φιλίας] and that we would lose the unity of our soul [συνειδήσεως] […] 
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Polyeucte then roused within himself the organ of his soul, and reaching for 
Nearchos with his bodily eyes, took his hand and asked, 'Is this then what you 
feared, Nearchos, and was this your suspicion about us from the beginning?  Did 
you realize this about the bodily part of our love? (143).  
According to Aubé, it is the strength of this love and the fear of being separated from one 
another that propels Polyeucte to convert. Corneille’s version of the story foregrounds this 
notion.  After Félix has Néarque executed, he asks, “Et notre Polyeucte a vu trancher sa vie?” 
ensuring (sadistically) that Polyeucte is made to watch his friend die. Albin responds, ‘Il l’a vu, 
mais hélas! Avec un oeil d’envie. / Il brûle de le suivre au lieu de reculer” (III, 4, 958-959).  And 
thus Polyeucte’s response of “burning desire” to seeing his friend’s execution echoes the 
sentiment of the anecdote that Boswell emphasizes.  The martyrizing cut that enacts “trancher sa 
vie” is not one that is resented or feared by Polyeucte; rather, Polyeucte’s main concern is being 
separated from Néarque (not being allowed to “suivre” his dearest). 
 Although it is not my intention to “prove” Polyeucte and Néarque's queerness, or their 
same sex love, I will point out here that many other scholars have completely ignored or outright 
downplayed this relationship.  For example, I would contest Paul Scott’s characterization of the 
couple, in his article “The Heterosexualization of Polyeucte”: 
 The passionate friendship shared by Polyeuct and Nearchos in Metaphrastes and 
other sources is diluted in the tragedy. While Néarque does encourage Polyeucte 
towards his conversion, it is his wife’s dream that propels him to make the final, 
irrevocable commitment to faith. Polyeucte emerges as the dominant force of the 
pair, a portrayal that destroys any notion of equality, the essential cement of 
perfect friendship (329).   
Scott's assertion is only thinly supported by the text.  While Pauline’s fears do drive the plot, I 
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would contend that “blinders” produced by a certain heteronormative perspective ignores the rich 
set of transformations, rhetorical pleadings and negotiations that take place between the two 
men.  Such blindness to their relationship reflects the heternormative privilege granted to 
relationships that are clearly articulable and cited. Furthermore, that the counterbalanced equality 
of the two men dissolves the “perfect friendship” is directly refuted by Boswell's observation that 
the inequality is what has historically enabled the relationship between the two: “In all three of 
the cases discussed here in detail there was some social inequity that might have been essential to 
same-sex pairings […] Polyeuct was of grander social standing than Nearchos...” (Boswell, 158).   
This having been said, this chapter will leave aside the question of whether or not the two can be 
considered proto-gay (avoiding the “anticipatory” approach).  While the play's resonances with 
historical (premodern) same-sex love as analyzed by Boswell and others seem to point to ways 
that the intensity of the relationship between Polyeucte and Néarque are more than a mere 
extension of their shared Christian love, what most interests me about their relationship is the 
ways that it opens up a larger questioning of the relationship between legibility, identity and 
sexualized desire.  
This play produces its own set of slippages due to the precarious nature of 
“representation” (in terms of the represented governor as well as the imperfectly represented 
unity of time).  In fact, the very nature of the word “seduction” in the seventeenth century reveals 
an indecidability about the term—the Richelet dictionary of 1680 scene defines “séduction” 
along the lines of a representational falseness or deception: “Tromperie dans des choses qui 
regardent la Religion, ou les moeurs.” In the definition of the verb “séduire,” however, the term 
contains a certain ambivalence with regard to a religious deception or a pleasurable (sexual?) 
one.  The Furetière of 1690 notes this divide more clearly, “Séduire. Abuser quelqu’un, luy 
persuader de faire le mal, on luy mettre dans l’esprit quelque mauvaise doctrine. La femme 
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d’Adame dit pour excuse au Seigneur, que le Serpent l’avoit seduites… Les plaisirs nous 
seduisent & nous empeschent de songer à notre salut.”  Thus, when Stratonice complains that 
Néarque has seduced Polyeucte, in this sense, he could be thought of an agent of “tromperie” in 
which case the stakes of truthful representation are raised even higher in this already-precarious 
governance situation. Or, Néarque could have “seduced” Polyeucte not through lies and 
deception, but rather by planting the seeds of interest toward a competing set of values (“quelque 
mauvaise doctrine”).  
In the play, Félix is the only character in the play who actually does resort to deception 
and trickery.  Néarque’s “seduction” scene is far from the temptations of the serpent and Eve.  
Rather, he tries to convince Polyeucte to love God and only God, saying: 
  Nous pouvons tout aimer: il le souffre, il l'ordonne    
  Mais à vous dire tout, ce seigneur des seigneurs 
  Veut le premier amour et les premiers honneurs. 
Comme rien n'est égal à sa grandeur suprême 
Il faut ne rien aimer qu'après lui, qu'en lui-même,  
Négliger, pour lui plaire, et femme, et biens et rang. 
Exposer pour sa gloire et verser tout son sang. 
Mais que vous êtes loin de cette ardeur parfaite 
Qui vous est nécessaire, et que je vous souhaite (I, i, 70-79) 
In this sliding discourse, we travel from generalities of loving all to a strange entreaty in which 
Néarque presses Polyeucte to accept a specific kind of “perfect ardor.” Clearly there is some kind 
of desire animating the intensity with which Néarque exhorts Polyeucte to accept Christianity, 
but this “ardeur parfaite” that Néarque wishes for his friend goes unmentioned explicitly.  At the 
same time, we can’t help but wonder how we get from “we can love all things” to “you can only 
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have a specific kind of love and it's one that I wish for you ardently.”54  
 Néarque's line “Il faut ne rien aimer qu'après lui, qu'en lui-même” analeptically points 
back to the “seigneur” three verses prior, but the ambiguity wrought by the distance (the 
drawing-together of the far-fetched that the pronoun enacts) allows for the ambiguity that it is 
perhaps Néarque himself towards whom Polyeucte's attention and love ought to be directed. The 
singularity of this attachment is underscored in the following line:  “Négliger, pour lui plaire, et 
femme, et biens et rang” which is an apophatic position clearly purged of normative attachments.  
While the rejection of “biens et rang” could feasibly fit with Biblical maxims of stoic refusal of 
worldly goods, the rejection of his wife seems to be out of place, and it is a rejection which could 
feasibly open up the space for substitution. Just as Néarque could ambiguously hold the place of 
the referent to whom the “lui” refers, it could also be imagined that Néarque is suggesting 
himself to take the place of “femme,” insofar as Polyeucte must undertake all of these things 
“pour lui plaire.”  Additionally, refusing the normative marital attachment is put in the service of 
“plaire” or pleasing God, which seems to be a pale gesture, more resonant on the quotidian 
human social plane than on the schema of “sa grandeur suprême” of an omnipotent God who 
would “souffre” or “ordonne” an all-encompassing affection.  If the expansiveness of the “tout 
aimer” is punctured by the one sticking negation of loving one's wife, then the singular rejection 
of the marital role seems fairly curious. It seems, however, that when Néarque criticizes 
Polyeucte, saying “que vous êtes loin de cette ardeur parfaite,” it is Polyeucte's attachment to the 
bridal chamber that distances him not only from God but also from Néarque's love.  The logic of 
loving so often clichéd in Biblical terms slips wildly-- from an all-encompassing universality to a 
                                                 
54
 Greenberg also notes that Néarque’s seduction speech is one that opposes a binary sexual system: “The new creed 
that Polyeucte ardently desires to embrace is just as ardently held beyond his grasp by his own sexual pleasure.  
Christianity, as it is represented by Néarque, takes on the coloration of an exclusively male community, or at 
least of a community which, must, in essence, oppose the contamination of heterosexual indulgence” (122).   
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specificity of singular love, to the apophatic (negatively defined love) that can only be based on 
exclusion, to a parallel type of love between Néarque and Polyeucte.  
 The figure at work in this speech is called “metalepsis:” a sliding chain of similitudes. 
Metalepsis was (and still is) less popular that its cousins, metonym and metaphor, and its status 
in early modern rhetoric was a confused one: many people did not know whether to laud or 
loathe this term for his destabilizing possibilities. For example, the phrase “angel wings on the 
mountain's back,” to signify a snow-covered mountain, requires a slippage of metonym to 
metonym: the snow is white and soft as like angel feathers, the mountain is covered with snow, 
the side of the mountain looks like a back.  In the phrase “angel wings on the mountain's back,” 
however, “snow” as the prime animating figure, actually drops out. In Quintilian’s rhetorical 
treatise, he calls metalepsis “an intermediate step [… ] signifying nothing in itself, but affording 
a passage to something. It is a trope that we give the impression of being acquainted with rather 
than one that we actually ever need” and later says “we need not waste any more time over it” 
(Institutio Viii.vi,37). We should note Quintilian's particular emphasis on rushing over (and 
effectively effacing) that trope which is, itself, self-effacing.  Is the metalepsis insignificant 
because of its status as a less lofty and less refined rhetorical device? Or does Quintilian’s 
dismissal reveal the trope’s potential?  This sudden propelling-forth happens invisibly: we are 
aware of the thrust of movement, but we don't necessarily see the linkages itself.  Metalepsis ties 
together tropically, through links of likeness: the metonym of a metonym is a strange kinship 
indeed. 
Metalepsis is the generating figure that knits together, but must also necessarily 
disappear, as the agent of the linking. “The peculiar power of metalepsis in Renaissance theory is 
precisely that it leaves certain steps in the exchange invisible,” notes Brian Cummings, an 
invisibility which, I argue, is animated by a type of speed.  This trope “makes space for 
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imagination, for language as fiction or fantasy.  In this figure we do not know how we have got 
to where we are, as if we have been transported by an unseen mechanism” (Cummings, 230).  
This sudden propelling-forth happens invisibly: we are aware of the thrust of movement, but we 
don't necessarily see the intermediary linkages itself.  Metalepsis generates queer ties, enabling A 
and C to adjoin together, two terms which “ought not” normally be naturally twinned, but are 
able to be linked tropically, grammatically through ties that rush meaning’s connections.55  
 Although metaphor is a rather conventional trope trading in likeness, in metalepsis, 
meaning is stretched beyond its clearly linked significance, possibly to the point of failure. If 
metaphor “transfers a name to something unlike but not so unlike itself” metalepsis is the trope 
that “stretches metaphor a little further than we want to go, perhaps even to the breaking point” 
(Cummings 222).  In a sense, metalepsis itself figures the movement of the play’s events, 
compressing too many things together under the unity of time. The drama slides over too many 
things, quickly, juxtaposing Pauline’s two-week old marriage to Polyeucte with Sévère’s return 
from being thought “dead.” This rapid cramming-together of events stretches the unity to its 
breaking point in order to express something that could not have been articulated, visualized on 
the stage. Through metalepsis as well, meaning is expressed through unpredictable and collapsed 
pathways of liaison and exchange.  
 We see this sliding chain of resemblances at work in Néarque's speech. Néarque spends a 
                                                 
55
 I am deploying this sense of metalepsis carefully taking into consideration Valerie Traub’s very solid argument 
against an overconflation of metalepsis’ movements and erasures with “queer analysis.” She writes: “Metalepsis 
occurs when a present effect is attributed to a remote cause; it links A to D but only by eliding B and C…. 
Metalepsis can be rhetorically powerful, but it is vulnerable to critique as fuzzy logic… More interested in the 
status of metalepsis as a repressed or failed rhetorical device, Menon uses it to read absent sex scenes in 
Shakespearean drama, scenes of implied consummation that, despite their failure to be staged nonetheless link 
social cause to tragic effect… [yet] fails to translate into a cogent defense of metalepsis as a mode of queer 
argument”(31).  However, what Traub critiques in the “fuzzy logic” of Menon’s and Freccero’s usage of the 
trope is the over-analogized generalization, extending metaleptic usage as “embody[ing]  the spirit of queer 
analysis” (Freccero, Queer/Early/Modern, 2), as if queer analysis (as an entity) could be embodied in a single 
trope.  What I wish to emphasize here is that metalepsis’ rejection of order and sequence does not in and of itself 
defy a heteronormative teleology.  However, what metalepsis does enact, especially and specifically in this 
instance in the play, is a type of rushing that cannot be merely dismissed as “fanaticism” or “fuzzy logic,” but is 
actively employed by the two characters to express that which lies outside of representation and the 
representable. 
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lot of time emphasizing the intensity and singularity of love required by God:  “Il faut ne rien 
aimer qu'après lui, qu'en lui-même.”  This is a singularity that slides into a rejection of marital 
love and norms of social identification:  “Négliger, pour lui plaire, et femme, et biens et rang.” 
While the rejection of “biens et rang” could feasibly fit with Biblical maxims, the rejection of his 
wife seems to be out of place, and it is a refusal which could feasibly open up the space for 
substitution-- a reason why Stratonice's first complaint is that Néarque has torn Polyeucte from 
Pauline's arms. In fact, Néarque's primary insistance in the first scene of the play is dissolving 
the heteronormative ties that bind Polyeucte to his wife: he urges his friend to ignore his wife's 
tears and pleas. Left out of his speech is an invisible linking mechanism: the fact that for 
Néarque to urge Polyeucte to accept this “ardeur parfaite […] que je vous souhaite,” there has to 
be a fundamental affection and intimacy propelling Néarque to urge Polyeucte to know, 
approach and explore Godly love.  This is the affection born from “leur vielle amitié.” All of 
these descriptions of perfected love, the denigration of worldly love--all of his exhortations to 
Polyeucte are generated from an equivalently similar love between the two men.  
 Metalepsis introduces into the play an invisible motor, hurrying the action along.  It 
deliberately leaves out the crucial linking term, asking the reader or auditor to infer or provide 
the missing pieces, joining far-stretched concepts together themselves in order to articulate the 
pulsing energy which can only been seen by the traces it leaves behind. Metaleptic movement 
happens through not naming or not presenting it. In a sense, this is a hidden trope, the movement 
of an invisible “turn” that turns absence into sequence. The invisible motor competes against the 
visible propulsion, the temporal forward progress enabled by Absolutist authorization.  And 
possibly, implicit in this Quintilian's denigration of the trope is an uneasiness in relation to 
metalepsis' subversive potential, a generative source of movement and action.  
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 Such metaleptic collapses also create strangely gendered ties, frequent in the opening 
scene in which Néarque “seduces” Polyeucte to the Christian faith.  Néarque mentions “Dieu qui 
tient votre âme et vos jours dans sa main” (I, i, 27),56  insinuating a subtly eroticized “cupping” 
or “cradling ” of Polyeucte’s self, and perhaps, by extension, proposing a cradling embrace from 
his friend.  This “Dieu,” however, is rapidly switched out with “sa grace,” which enables 
Néarque to substitute the feminine “elle” for “sa grace” in the subsequent phrases.  This subtle 
metonymic linkage coats the descriptions of God’s interactions with a feminine patina:  
Il est toujours tout juste et tout bon, mais sa grâce 
Ne descend pas toujours avec même efficace 
Elle quitte ces traits qui pénètrent les cœurs,  
Le nôtre s’endurci, la repousse, l’égare,  
Le bras qui la versait en devient plus avare 
Et cette sainte ardeur qui doit porter au bien  
Tombe plus rarement ou n’opère plus rien (I, i, 29-35).57 
Néarque’s iterations of God “queer” the gender of God.  Not only do the feminine “grâce” and 
“ardeur” substitute themselves for the godly judgment, but this femininity is also imagined to 
have “penetrating” possibilities at the same time; once “sa grace” is pronomially referred to as 
“elle”, the line (31) is peppered with the puntcuating rhythm of a repeated “t” sound. Néarque's 
positing of the false grammatical hetero-relationality in religion may stem from his wager that 
Polyeucte would be likely to accept this sexualized caress from the cradling “hand” if it were 
                                                 
56 “God, who holds your soul and your days in his hand” 
57 “He is always ever good and righteous, but his grace 
Is not always bestowed with the same efficacy 
She (grace) that penetrated men's hearts, now turns her back. 
Our heart, grown hardened, pushes her away and strays, 
The generous arms which once gave her (grace) to us become more avaricious 
And this holy zeal which should lead us to good 
Comes more and more rarely, or fails to move at all.” 
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dressed up in feminine accoutrements: “sa grace” or “sainte ardeur.” In response to this, 
however, Polyeucte responds: “Vous me connaissez mal: la meme ardeur me brûle/ Et le désir 
accroît quand l’effet se recule” (I, i, 41-42),58 he is on one level responding to Néarque’s 
accusations of weak Christian faith, but on a more deeper level, he casts aside the false veil of 
feminine difference with which Néarque has cloaked his/God’s love, and insists upon the 
sameness of their passionate experiences.   
 
III. Queer Etiologies 
 
In a sense, the play's plot, as outlined above, is also rather simple. Jacques Schérer speaks of 
the relatively straightforward nature of the play, noting that it lacks peripeteia, or sudden tragic 
reversals: “Même indéfference aux péripéties dans Polyeucte: une fois que le héros s'est 
proclamé chrétien, la tragédie ne résulte que des heurts de volontés naturelles des 
personnages”(89).59  In Schérer's view, the main “change” or reversal is the declaration of the 
Christian conversion; everything else unfolds “naturally” from this main revelation. However, 
what animates the play, I believe, are not necessarily the “natural” reactions and gestures in 
response to the conversion. Rather, the action, instead of being propelled by a series of 
dilemmas, decisions, or complications, is generated by characters' reactions to the staged 
spectacle of an event: a loved one revealing himself to be swayed by forbidden desires, as a 
person entirely different from how they had presumed him to be. Thus the “tragic” stems not 
from plot complications typical to tragedy (being made to marry the murderer of one’s father, 
say) but rather the more ephemeral sentiments deriving from confusion and loss the face of an 
                                                 
58 “You don't understand me: the very same ardor burns within me/ And desire only increases when the effect 
disappears” 
59 “The same indifference of peripetetic reversals in Polyeucte: as soon as the hero announces himself as Christian, 
the tragedy is merely comprised of natural clashes between the characters.” 
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unstable system of intimacy and social identity. 
 The play interrogates the fixedness of desire-based identity due to the fact that Polyeucte 
must constantly “montrer qui nous sommes” (II.vi.646),60 arguably the only “act” staged 
repeatedly in the play. There is no biologic, corporeal, or ideologically fixed referent for his 
identity, which is anchored in affective ties and belief.  Indeed, the ambiguously fixed nature of 
his conversion-- the fact that this identity is a desire-founded structure, causes much epistemo-
ontologic anxiety for the other characters.  Who Polyeucte is, as husband, friend, son-in-law, or 
something else-- must constantly be read instantaneously, in the moment, or at least in différance 
to what he is not.  Furthermore, the turn of the conversion does not open onto an additive 
structure of identity, one in which his relation to religion could be supplemented onto his former 
status: rather, it is a conversion which is read as an all-encompassing totalizing change.  
 When Stratonice comes back from the temple after having witnessed Néarque and 
Polyeucte's public display of their new faith, she struggles to name him, initially only able to 
define him negatively: “Tout votre songe est vrai, Polyeucte n'est plus...” (III.ii.775).61   Pauline 
hastens to respond, hysterically, “Il est mort!”(III.ii.776), taking “n'est plus” euphemistically to 
mean “is no more.” Stratonice continues, launching into a stream of emasculating invectives: 
“Non, il vit ; mais, ô pleurs superflus ! /Ce courage si grand, cette âme si divine,/ N'est plus 
digne du jour, ni digne de Pauline./ Ce n'est plus cet époux si charmant à vos yeux” (III.ii.776-
                                                 
60
 Jean Starobinski, in his book  L’Oeil vivant discusses this desire of the Cornelian hero to capitalize on the power 
and seduction of vision: “Dans les œuvres du début [de Corneille], le héros n’est qu’un personnage ébloui ; dans les 
œuvres de la maturité, il se voudra éblouissant, non plus spectateur d’une apparition éclatante, mais source même de 
l’éclat, se montrant, se donnant en spectacle, et contemplant lui-même sa propre gloire” (55).  So in a sense 
Polyeucte’s desire to diplay himself, his need to make a spectacle of himself, is typical of the heroic type that 
Starobinski analyzes.   
61 S: Your dream is entirely true, Polyeucte is no more. 
 P: He is dead!  
 S: No, he lives, but O, superfluous tears/ This courage so great, this soul so divine/ Is no longer worthy of the 
day, no longer worthy of Pauline/ This is no longer the husband so charming to your eyes.  
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779). Effectively Stratonice places him in a series of gendered lacks, constituting a negative 
relation to his masculine courage and his spousal position.  
 Jacques Schérer draws upon Pauline's moment of misunderstanding as an illustration of 
the quiproquo, which is “un faux obstacle que [le héros] prend pour un vrai”(73).62  This term 
quiproquo, distinct from the logics of equitable exchange inherent in the anglicized usage 
quidproquo, indicates taking something for something else, but the exchangeablility is always a 
misunderstanding and a mis-taking.  Here, death is prematurely (mis)taken in the place of 
emasculation, but the interplay between death and gendered negativity is only possible through 
“l'extrême rapidité du quiproquo” or a “quiproquo-express,” as he terms this specific moment in 
the play (75). Indeed, although the brief flicker of shock is quickly dissipated, the presumed 
death exchanged for realized invectives, the lurching speed of misapprehension actually touches 
upon a deeper instability which troubles the rest of the play's action: Polyeucte's conversion 
wrests language of identity, intimacy and relation from its normative signifying function.  
 This confusion over Polyeucte's newly converted self is echoed by Stratonice's discourse.  
Unable to pin down precisely the nature of his crime, she resorts to a logic of accretion.  In 
elaborating why Polyeucte is no longer the same kind of former spouse as he had been, she pulls 
together a dozen terms:  
C'est l'ennemi commun de l'état et des dieux, 
Un méchant, un infâme, un rebelle, un perfide, 
Un traître, un scélérat, un lâche, un parricide, 
Une peste exécrable à tous les gens de bien, 
Un sacrilège impie : en un mot, un chrétien (III, ii, 780-784).
63
 
                                                 
62 “A false obstacle that the hero takes to be real” 
63 “He is the common enemy of the State and the gods, A villain, an infamous one, a rebel, a perfidious man 
A traitor, a scoundrel, a coward, a parricide, A disgusting plague on all of the good people, An impious 
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Ultimately, however, none of these terms is able to fully answer the question of why he is no 
longer worthy of holding his spousal position; taken together, the insults comprise a general 
negative image, but it is unclear why Stratonice needs to resort to so many “injures” in order to 
prove her point.  Pauline herself even says, weakly, in his defense:  “Ce mot [chrétien] aurait 
suffi sans ce torrent d'injures” (III, 2, 785). 64 The “torrent” performs a type of grasping, a rapid 
avalanche of names barely hooked together by commas, unhinged from grammatical order, 
powering forth not through verbal linkages, but with one word slipping and sliding to the other. 
The phrase “en un mot,” set up by the colon promises some sort of logical justification anchoring 
the stream of invectives (“to sum up...”). The word is doubly insufficient, not only weakly 
topping off such a hyperbolic stream of insults, but also because Polyeucte has not “merely” 
converted. He has shattered his former bonds between himself and the State, his family, and 
more. Stratonice's discourse seems to be searching for another kind of word which could point to 
Polyeucte's conversion as being not only religious, but perhaps rooted in a second, sexualized 
turn, a turn that has unearthed new affective attachments and desires.   
 The characters' anxieties over the relationship between “fruit” and “séduit” reflect a 
paranoia over the origin of religious conversion—such investigation of the “origin” reveals 
another destabilizing “fondement,” in its definition as “raison, cause sujet” (DF 343): is locating 
the cause for something the same as providing a reason for its existence? These same questions 
haunt contemporary debates over queer etiologies.  Valerie Rohy writes that homosexuality has 
figured, in the paranoid social imagination, either to be transmitted through genetic reproduction 
(which normative heterosexuality has claimed exclusively as its own) or through memetic 
reproduction, or transmission of a queer “meme”:  
                                                                                                                                                             
blasphemer: in one word, a Christian” 
64 “This word would have sufficed without this torrent of insults”  
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In this anxious etiology, homosexuality is a dangerous idea that persists like a 
biological trait, a barren desire that outpaces heterosexual reproduction. Same-sex 
desire, in other words, is construed as the expression not of a gene but of a 
meme…As a “unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation,” the successful 
meme shares the same qualities as the successful gene: “longevity, fecundity, and 
copying-fidelity” (Dawkins, Selfish Gene, 192, 194) […] Queer genealogy 
reinvents human relationality, forging what Hocquenghem calls “non-limitative 
horizontal relations” instead of the vertical “hierarchical succession” of Oedipal 
genealogy (109). While genes pass vertically from parent to child, memes can 
move horizontally through culture; homosexual generation could therefore 
proceed metonymically, spreading rapidly across a population. Detached from the 
geometry of straight lineage, queer reproduction is not a vertical descent of man 
but a web of horizontal relations, offering tropes not of inheritance but of 
transmission, communication, and contagion. Like the straight gene, the gay 
meme would replicate itself, mutate, and find expression—but the meme, in this 
fantasy, does it better (108, 109-110).  
Rohy notes that antigay groups have used both the gay “gene” and the gay “meme” to power 
anti-marriage and anti- adoption agendas, but fighting such homophobia on the same grounds of 
etiology is always doomed to fail; such efforts to correct and defend the “true” cause of queer 
reproducibility forget the fact that the point of antigay groups is to “sterilize” (both figuratively 
and literally) the spread of queerness altogether.  Antigay groups, according to Rohy, fail to 
realize that heterosexuality is no less “unnatural” than homosexuality; that heterosexual desire is 
equally constantly bolstered up through culture, discourse, and other social ideological 
institutions: “It is the effort to obscure that unnatural form of heterosexual reproduction that 
 92 
impels the association of homosexuality with unnatural (discursive or memetic) proliferation and 
heterosexuality with natural (sexual or genetic) increase” (123).   
 Ultimately, in the final conversion scene, however, the tropic logics that govern 
etiological paranoia fall short. Polyeucte's literal death coincides with the death of the generating 
metaphor itself.  A temporality founded upon “natural” (sexual or genetic) generation is to be 
privileged through excessively staging its difference from “unnatural” (queer or memetic) 
transfer.  In these paranoid imaginaries of reproduction, natural generation takes as its trope the 
metonym of blood, and memetic generation is imagined as occurring through synchronic, 
metaphorized “contagion.” Pauline's conversion describes a scene where blood refuses its 
traditional place as the metonymic condensation of diachronic generation and, instead, swerves 
to reproduce more of the same, synchronically and memetically through contagion. She says:  
Son [Polyeucte's] sang, dont tes bourreaux viennent de me couvrir, 
M'a dessillé les yeux, et me les vient d'ouvrir. 
Je vois, je sais, je crois, je suis désabusée : 
De ce bienheureux sang tu me vois baptisée (V, v, 1725-1728).
65
 
 Thus, in Pauline's conversion scene, blood (sang) is wrested from its function which enables 
heteronomative linkages (“Polyeucte a du nom, et sort du sang des rois” [II, 1, 420]) a role that 
secured and fixed a certain political hierarchy and was the origin of Pauline’s urged/forced 
marriage to Polyeucte in the first place.  Here, in the image of the blood-spattered Pauline, 
blood’s dramatization collapses the justifying metonym (sang du rois)  by “literalizing” it as its 
refused other/specter-- the deviance which could be memetically, contagiously transferred. 
In Polyeucte, the anxiety over just how Polyeucte converted and left the arms of his wife 
for the “fruits” that Néarque offered occludes the fact that “properly” oriented heterosexual 
                                                 
65 “His blood, with which your executioners have spattered me/ Has unblinded my eyes and opened them finally/ I 
see, I know, I believe, I am disillusioned/ In this glorious blood you see me now baptised” 
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marriage and heterosexual desire is itself forced and performatively installed. Pauline’s 
relationship with Polyeucte was born out of reason and calculation (on the part of Pauline’s 
father), and not from “natural” inclinations towards each other.  She says: “Et moi, comme à son 
lit je me vis destinée, /Je donnai par devoir à son affection / Tout ce que l’autre avait par 
inclination” (I, iii, 214-216).66 If heterosexuality is posited as “normal” and the intense 
homoerotic intimacy that Néarque and Polyeucte share might be viewed as “unnatural,” the 
quotation reveals that “affection” can be contrived or constructed in order to please another 
person.  In the case of Pauline, she rationalizes the development of her affection: “comme à son 
lit je me vis destiné.”  Her orientation (towards the bed) is guided and monitored by her father, 
Félix, in order that she orient herself properly: heterosexually, and within a biopolitical 
framework of producing class-acceptable children. Thus, the type of relationship that is normally 
posited as “natural”—heterosexual marriage—is actually more artificial and forced than the 
organically blossoming, flourishing affections between Néarque and Polyeucte.  We see the same 
“forced naturalness” in the scene between Félix and Pauline, when she resists seeing Sévère 
upon his return.  Félix scolds her for having followed his orders too perfectly, saying that he 
wished she had resisted her original marriage to Polyeucte:  
Ah! Pauline, en effet, tu m’as trop obéi,  
Ton courage était bon, ton devoir l’a trahi.  
Que ta rébellion m’eut été favorable,  
Qu’elle m’eut garanti d’un état déplorable ! (I, iv, 331-334)67 
Within such a repeated training and taming of desire, heterosexuality appears fairly contrived 
                                                 
66 “And I, seeing myself destined for his bed/ I gave in to his affection through duty/ but what I gave to Polyeucte 
the other had taken from me freely.” 
67 “Oh Pauline, actually, you have obeyed me too well/ Your spirit was right but your duty betrayed you/  How 
your rebellion would have been favorable to me/ And how it would have saved me from this deplorable state.” 
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and only performed through manipulation and obedience.  Even in this sense, Pauline's 
adherence to patriarchal decree by obeying her father and marrying Polyeucte still elicits his 
displeasure, underscoring the fact that what appears as “normative” alliances of love and 
marriage were always staged, and even rebellion (in whatever form it might be enacted) would 
still be ultimately re-conscripted for political ends.      
           Pauline attempts to use the existing heteronormative structures to her own advantage: by 
“taking on” the figure of the typical woman, she tries to resist her father’s wishes. 
Mon père, je suis femme, et je sais ma faiblesse, 
Je sens déjà mon cœur qui pour lui s’intéresse,  
Et poussera sans doute, en dépit de ma foi,  
Quelque soupire indigne et de vous et de moi.  
Je ne le verrai point (I, iv, 341-344)
68
 
Félix performs another “orientation” move : “Il faut le voir, ma fille/ Ou tu trahis ton père et 
toute ta famille” (I, iv, 249-250).  Even through pressure and emotional blackmail, he insists 
orienting her in the correct (or presumably correct) direction, whether towards Polyeucte’s bed or 
face-to-face with Sévère. In this circulation of substitutions, just as Félix stands in for the 
emperor Décie, Pauline here stands in for her father’s will.  This politicized seduction of Sévère 
in deference to the father’s/ King’s desire echoes a rather homoerotic economy of political 
favorites.
69
  Such an economy depends upon women, in this case Pauline, serving as conduits to 
                                                 
68 “Father, I am a woman, and I know my weakness/ I feel, already my heart begins to stir for him/ And it will 
emit, no doubt, in despite of myself/ Some amorous sigh unworthy of you and of me/ I will not see him.” 
69
  While I lack space to fully unpack this strange moment in the text, Albin recounts how Sévère, long thought dead, 
was actually rescued from the battlefield by the enemy king, who was so taken by his beauty and his heroism 
alone: 
 
Le roi de Perse aussi l’avait fait enelever 
Témoin de ses hauts faits et de son grant courage, 
Ce monarque en voulut connaître le visage 
On le mit dans sa tente, où tout percé de coups,  
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advance power.  At the same time, this circulation of metonymy is one that Polyeucte and 
Néarque refuse to participate in—just as Polyeucte casts off Néarque’s use of “sa grâce” and 
insists “Vous me connaissez mal—la même ardeur me brûle,” (I, 1, 41) they defy such a system 
of substitutions in favor of insisting, outright, on expressing their samenesses to one another, 
sans (female) conduit.  And it is this sameness that not only serves a phatic function, to reaffirm 
that they have heard each other and are on the same page, but this mode of attunement takes on, 
itself, an eroticized nature.  
 
IV. Overtones, or the Attractions of Attunement  
 
Polyeucte in particular presents tropes of queer desire which do not signal marginality, but rather 
take center stage, hidden in plain sight, in its dazzling over-legibility.  This gesture of over-
legibility presents itself in such a way that it precludes the interrogation of, or even presentation 
of, gaps and margins. However, contrary to a superficial reading, over-legibility does not operate 
in a unilateral gesture, suppressing or covering over certain queer desires lurking at its core, but 
rather serves to iteratively engender such “deviant” intimacies and forging non-normative 
connections. This type of presentation resonates with Anne-Lise François' “open secret” in which 
the open secret reveals without announcing itself as claiming a discrete type of knowledge; the 
revelation does not purport to have a teleologic weight but rather is unveiled merely to be 
revealed:  
the 'secret' of the 'open secret' need not mean hidden or unstated, but simply 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tout mort qu’il paraissait, il fit mille jaloux  
Là bientôt il montra quelque signe de vie :  
Ce prince généreux en eut l’âme ravie (I, 2, 288-294).  
So while Polyeucte’s declaration of Christian faith is instigated by his desire to “suivre” his friend Néarque, such a 
male-male fascination leads to both of their martyred deaths.  Here, while Sévère is meant to die on the 
battlefield, he is actually saved by the rival king’s male-male fascination, especially his interest in Sévères face 
and injured body.  The two tales, one of a seduction into death and the other of a seduction into life, seem to 
mirror each other loosely.  
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unavailable, untouchable, nonposessable, implying a relation to the beloved that 
neither appropriates nor denies.  In a context where the norm for fulfillment 
remains sexual possession, it describes a chaste and chastening mode of 
interaction: chaste in the double sense of bearing little or no material 
consequences and of belonging to those who engage in the least possible 
intercourse, chastening in the sense of limiting anyone's power to do more than 
leave and be let alone.  This chasteness also refers to the open secret's perfect 
economy of means: for both its revelation and concealment, it uses no more than 
already available channels of communication (81).
70
  
Due to the nature of classical theatre, time, in some form (whether strictly adhering to the unities 
or not) must pass in some way on stage.  The unity of time becomes both the “available channel 
of communication” as well as the restriction on the communication. Velocity, or strange bursts of 
speed or drag, becomes one of the only ways possible of using this “available channel,” of 
openly representing within the terms given, but staging a friction within this channel.  
When presenting this work at a conference, I was approached by a horrified French 
professor who exclaimed: “I hope you aren’t implying that Néarque and Polyeucte were secretly 
gay!” At that time, I was at a loss as to how to respond to her indignation that I was “putting” 
gay feelings where they did not belong.  The insistence that Polyeucte is absolutely in love with 
Pauline is prevalent and widely insisted upon in Corneillian scholarship.  Dubrovsky, for 
example, acknowledges that Polyeucte avoids and repudiates Pauline, but he transforms this 
rejection into a “feint” to cover up Polyeucte’s amorous feelings for Pauline:  
Car Polyeucte est, nous l’avons vu, épris de sa femme autant qu’on peut l’être, 
mais tout son effort, lorsque s’ouvra la pièce, va justement à se déprendre. Aussi 
                                                 
70
 It may be of some interest, in terms of the question of chasteness, that Polyeucte is childless.  Thus, 
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son attitude envers sa femme est-elle aimant, plutôt qu’amoureuse; son langage 
tendre, mais non attendri; poli, certes, mais point chevaleresque. Il peut même, au 
contraire, s’accommoder, par instants, d’une certaine brusquerie: “Un songe vous 




What would it mean, however, to consider this “brusquerie” not as a cover for his true romantic 
feelings, but rather as a type of “open secret”: Polyeucte’s openly evident disdain for women in 
comparison to his burning ardor and zeal for Néarque’s suggestions? At the same time, it would 
be anachronistic to diagnose this situation as “protogay.”  
Furthermore, like François’s interpretation of the open secret, queer desires in Corneille's 
Polyeucte are openly present, but do not signal themselves as such or seek to gain purchase “in 
the name of” a certain type of sexual politic. Such desires, rather than residing in the marginal, 
are actually generated through their intensity of legibility and perfectly harmonized attunement. 
Hinging on an aesthetics of over-legibility, in which dazzling visibility enable types of 
articulation which proffer themselves as entirely other than queer but invoke queer desire 
through an apophatic turn: of indexing what cannot be mentioned by overtly unmentioning it. 
While François' analytic hinges on a communication of quietly persistent demurral or refusal, 
what I call “dazzling over-legibility” works through tropes which equally “uses already available 
channels of communication” but trades on tropes which appear to announce and put forth a claim 
about desire.   
I wish to take seriously Judith Butler’s question: “For how can one read a text for what 
does not appear within its own terms, but which nevertheless constitutes the illegible conditions 
                                                 
71
 “For Polyeucte is, we have seen, as taken with his wife as much as one can be, but all of his efforts from the 
beginning of the play, are focused on ridding himself of her. His attitude towards his wife is caring, rather than 
loving, kind, rather than tender; polite, certainly, but hardly chivalrous.  He can even manage, at times, a certain 
brusqueness: “A dream makes you afraid… goodbye, your tears are too much for me.”” 
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of its own legibility? Indeed, how can one read a text for the movement of that disappearing by 
which the textual ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are constituted?” (Bodies that Matter, 37).  Sexuality, 
once consigned to the domain of the legible, participates in reiterating and reinforcing the 
structures that allow certain kinds of desires to be grouped together in graspable form (“gay” or 
“homoerotic”). But in the instance of such a declaration, such a making-legible, that action of 
condensation itself bears no marker of (and pays no debt to) the “illegible conditions” or the 
network of situations, structures, reading hermeneutics, and discourses that make something 
appear as legible.   
 In this case, the claim that the “open secret” makes, because so visible and perfectly 
legible, doubly marks the “movement of that disappearing” through which certain sexual desires 
are made to be not only unfulfilled but also impossibly unfulfillable.  It “covers over” these 
illegible conditions because the “openness” of the claim presents something (a sexual desire, an 
erotic twinge, an inkling of intimacy).  At the same time, its exaggerated, outright openness 
points to the falseness and the contingency upon which any act that could be termed “legible” is 
complicit. In my analysis, it is that movement itself which queers discourse, and perhaps it is 
through tracing that gesture of over-legibility that one can also find within, spectrally suppressed, 
the movement of that disappearance.  
 A paradigm for this might be the overtone or harmonic in music: sometimes, when two 
instruments play notes in perfect harmony, an unexpected, higher extra pitch is generated.  
Importantly, the harmonic tone is not actually played by the musicians, but produced as a 
supplementary product of the perfect matching-up of two notes.  The overtone marks a type of 
over-legibility insofar as it is both the marker of this exact matching as well as its excess.  The 
harmonic interests this study insofar as it suggests a way of conceiving of aberrant or non-
normatively accessed pleasure (be it sonic or sexual) which can only be grasped through 
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perfected articulation-- instead of being sounded marginally or edged out, such desire is 
apparent, in plain sight, but only caught by the trained hear to the unexpected, lingering 
overtones.  While I will indulge in a slight digression here to discuss the overtones, I believe that 
they will illuminate the dynamic between Polyeucte and Néarque in a way that clarifies the 
“overlegible” (and not “protogay”) intimacy between them.  
 Early modern scholars of music theory, physics, and mathematics suspected the presence 
of overtones, but could not fully account for or explain it.  The puzzle was this: when a note was 
played, say on a vibrating string on a violin, if one listened closely, one could hear a few faint, 
specific, higher resonances at the same time.   Another way of discerning these ghostly higher 
tones (or “upper partials”) was to play a stringed instrument and to watch or touch certain higher-
pitched strings while the lower note (called the “fundamental”) was being played.  And here the 
“base” of the fundamental appears once again.  
This phenomenon was observed by Descartes in his “Abregé de la musique,” a little-
studied treatise on music theory, pleasure, and taste which was filled with more musings than 
actual “cartesian” analysis.  He notes rightly however that “j’ai reconnu par expérience dans les 
cordes de luth ou de quelque autre instrument que ce soit, que si vous en touchez une, la force du 
son ébranlera toutes les autres cordes qui seront plus aiguës d’une quinte ou d’un diton[...] Or 
cette force des accords ne peut venir sans doute que de leur perfection ou imperfection (460).
72
  
For Descartes, the sympathetic vibration of neighboring strings by certain intervals was enough 
to assert that there was a “natural” basis for certain notes to be harmoniously brought together.  
Such productive resonances, only effectuated through perfect attunement, provided poetic 
                                                 
72 “I have seen through experience in the strings of the lute or whatever other instrument that it be, that if you 
touch one, the force of the sound will vibrate all of the other strings which are tuned higher by a fifth or a major 
third […] however the force of this harmonization can only come, without a doubt, from their perfection or 
imperection” 
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inspiration for seventeenth century dramatists.  Even if the mechanics of such a phenomenon 
were beyond their grasp, this trope appears, for example, in Calderòn's El Médico de su honra: 
Dicen que dos instrumentos 
Conformemente templados, 
Por los ecos dilatados 
Comunican los acentos : 
Tocan el uno, y los vientos 
Hiere el otro, sin que allí 
Nadie le toque; y en mí 
Esta experiencia se viera ; 
Pues si el golpe allá te hiriera, 
Muriera yo desde aquí. II. 1211-1220
73
 
The physical and mathematical reason for this mutual vibration would not be discovered until the 
mid-eighteenth century.  Thomas Christensen notes that Marin Mersenne touches upon the same 
problem and hazards a guess, but is unable to fully explain it: “Eventually the correct theory 
occurred to Mersenne, to wit: 'it seems it is entirely necessary that [the string] beat the air five, 
four, three, and two times at the same time.' But Mersenne rejected this idea as 'impossible to 
imagine' and 'against experience'” (136).  Effectively, what Mersenne was puzzling over was 
this: hearing a higher pitched sound meant that the string had to vibrate more rapidly and 
frequently than the way the string would vibrate at a lower tone. But if only one string was being 
played, how could it vibrate both quickly and slowly at the same time?  
                                                 
73 They say that two stringed instruments, when perfectly in tune, transmit the tones by echoing each other: play 
the one, and the other, though untouched, is moved by the whisper of the wind. And so it is with me: if a blow 
struck you there, I would die here.  
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 These ghostly higher tones, simply put, were byproducts of the string vibrating many 
different ways at once. The string has a main speed, or frequency of vibration-- interestingly 
enough, called the “fundamental.” At the same time, the string vibrates in perfect integer 
multiples of this fundamental frequency, and the faster vibrations cause the string to be “split” or 
subdivided into perfect halves, thirds, etc., divided at places called “nodes.” These smaller sub-
sections, because “shortened,” are the ones which produce the faint higher pitches of the 
overtones. Rameau grouped this whole system under something he called the “corps sonore” 
(sonorous/ vibrating body): 
The corps sonore-- which I rightfully call the fundamental sound-- this single 
source, generator, and master of all music, this immediate cause of all its effects, 
the corps sonore I say, does not resonate without producing at the same time all of 
the continuous proportions from which are born harmony, melody, modes, and 
genres, and even the least rules necessary to practice (quoted in Christensen, 167).   
Even if the intricacies of the physics of this musical phenomenon escaped these early modern 
theorists, they were touching upon some key concepts which serve as useful paradigmknos for 
illustrating the modes of queer expression in Polyeucte: 1) that the whole system of attunement, 
harmony, and complex supplementary higher pitches was governed by the “fundamental,” or the 
lowest, bottom note ; 2) what was at stake in the analysis of overtone was that the impossible 
seemed to be taking place-- that the higher speeds or frequencies of vibration were happening 
simultaneously with the fundamental, slower speed; 3) that notions of “natural” generation of 
harmony hinged on sectioning, sub-dividing, and splitting the fundamental into aliquot parts. In a 
later section, I will treat the multiple nature of this “fundamental” and its relationship to queer 
desire. 
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 Such higher overtones (upper partials) become more readily apparent when two (or more) 
instruments play the same note in unison. A musician must make sure that the frequency of the 
vibrations of his or her instrument is perfectly in tune with (at the same pace as) the other's. Such 
an anxiety over sameness, over matching one's pace and speed the other other is apparent in 
Polyeucte and Néarque's dialogue.  Both Néarque and Polyeucte exhibit an anxiety over their 
ability to perfectly match up the intensity of their desires. There are no stand-ins or go-betweens 
for them.  Polyeucte's reassurance in the first act points to an emphasis on sameness, with “aussi 
que” and “la même”: “Vous me connaissez mal: la même ardeur me brûle/ Et le désir accroît 
quand l’effet se recule/ Ces pleurs, que je regarde avec un œil d’epoux/ Me laissent dans le cœur 
aussi chrétien que vous” (I, i, 41-44).74 With “la même ardeur me brûle,” he insists upon the 
homogeneity of their burning passions.  Polyeucte lays aside a description of his husbandly 
concern over Pauline’s tears to in favor of focusing on an insistence upon the perfected sameness 
of affective intensity between himself and Néarque. The phrases “aussi que” and “la même” 
repeat throughout the play, indicating an attention not only to phatically confirming the other's 
sentiment, but also, and more importantly, attuning and adjusting one's emotion to equal the 
other's.  
 In the play, not only does desire need to be matched, but speed as well. In the first scene, 
Néarque urges Polyeucte to convert, saying “Hâtez-vous donc de l'être,” to which Polyeucte 
responds, “Oui, j'y cours, cher Néarque/ Je brûle d'en porter la glorieuse marque” (I, i, 93-94),75 
indicating a privileging of rushing and haste; later, however, once Polyeucte has converted and 
wants to over turn the idols in the temple, Néarque balks.  Polyeucte says, “Mais loin de me 
                                                 
74 “You don't understand me: the same ardor burns within me/ And the desire only increases when the effect is 
withdrawn/ These tears, which I see with a husband's eye/ Strike a heart just as Christian as yours” 
75 “Yes, I run there, dear Néarque/ I burn to bear the glorious mark” 
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presser, il faut que je vous presse ! / D'où vient cette froideur ?” (II, vi, 681-682).76  Thus, the 
metaleptic speed (“If you love (me) God, convert right away”) is as equally as important as 
attuning these speeds, as engendering a unison frequency, the exact same fundamental tone, 
which could possibly sympathetically resonate and generate the overtones, however faintly 
present, of their desire for one another.  Such a matched frequency perfects and confirms the 
generative resonances of the sonorous body.  For Rameau, Christensen notes, “the corps sonore 
assumed cosmic proportions in his writings as a veritable icon, the progenitor of all the arts, 
sciences, and even religion” (28).   
 This generative “corps sonore” is present again in the pivotal scene of Acte II, when the 
two men finally decide to present themselves as Christians (to come out and “montrer qui nous 
sommes”), while they do not actually speak in unison, they do the next closest thing: repeating 
and reciting each others' words à la lettre.  Polyeucte says, in response to Néarque’s hesitation:  
Il faut (je me souviens encore de vos paroles) 
Négliger, pour lui plaire, et femme, et biens, et rang, 
Exposer pour sa gloire et verser tout son sang. 
Hélas ! Qu'avez-vous fait de cette amour parfaite 
Que vous me souhaitiez, et que je vous souhaite?  
S'il vous en reste encore, n'êtes-vous point jaloux 
Qu'à grand'peine chrétien, j'en montre plus que vous? (II, vi, 686-692)
77
 
Polyeucte points to the unifying effect of the repetition by indicating that the words of one man 
are being passed exactly from Néarque's lips to his own.  He draws upon this “unisson” device 
                                                 
76 “But far from rushing myself, I must rush you/  Where does this coldness come from?” 
77 “One must (I still remember your words)/ Reject, to please him, wife, goods, and rank/ Reveal yourself for his 
glory and pour forth your blood./ Alas, what have you done with this perfected love/ That you wished me, and 
that I wish you/  If there is any left in you, are you not ashamed/ That barely Christian, I show it more than 
you?” 
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because he is alarmed at the disaccord wrought by the “j'en montre plus que vous”-- an intensity 
that is out of sync with and in excess of Néarque's.  Additionally, what is at stake in this 
performance of unifying repetition is to reassert the “amour parfaite,” ambiguously pointing to 
both Christian love as well as the love between the two men.  Polyeucte's slid-in parenthetical 
remark underscores that what he says (or is about to say) are actually Néarque's words, preserved 
and memorized, and recited to draw his friend in to perfect attunement.  
 In contrast to the notion of this perfected unison, as exemplified by Doña Mencía in the 
earlier Calderón citation or in Néarque and Polyeucte's performance of unified speed and speech, 
Pauline, Polyeucte's wife, expresses her anxiety over feeling terribly disjointed from her 
husband.  Her friend Stratonice comforts her, saying,  
  On n’a tous deux qu’un cœur qui sent mêmes traverses, 
Mais ce cœur a pourtant ses fonctions diverses,  
Et la loi de l’hymen qui vous tient assemblés 
N’ordonne pas qu’il tremble alors que vous tremblez,  
Ce qui fait vos frayeurs ne peut le mettre en peine :  
Il est Arménien, et vous êtes Romaine  
Et vous pouvez savoir que nos deux nations 
N’ont pas sur ce sujet mêmes impressions (I, iii, 145-152).78 
Here we see an insistence upon diversity or difference that wasn’t present in the scene between 
Néarque and Polyeucte.  While the two men overflow with protestations of dedication and love, 
and employ the rhetoric of “sameness” to emphasize their passion (for God, but perhaps also for 
each other) Stratonice’s description of Pauline’s relationship emphasizes differences—
                                                 
78  “We all have hearts that feel sentiment/ but the heart, however, has diverse functions/ and the hymeneal law 
which ties you together/ Does not command that you tremble when he trembles./ That which makes you afraid 
doesn't need to affect him/  He is Armenian, and you are Roman/ And you should know that our two nations/ 
Don't have the same reactions to the same subject.” 
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differences between separate bodies that are divided by cultural and corporeal uniquenesses.  By 
insisting on the separation between the bodies of husband and wife, Stratonice attempts to 
explain why the two bodies do not tremble in fear at the same time. Unlike the perfectly attuned 
instruments of Calderón's lovers or the perfectly unified speech between Néarque and Polyeucte, 
the relationship between Pauline and Polyeucte is defined by a non- attunement.  If the two 
bodies are not attuned to the same frequency to tremble together in fear, perhaps neither do they 
tremble together in passion. Rather, Stratonice emphasizes “la loi de l’hymen” which unites 
Pauline and Polyeucte.  Because their relationship has been effected in the (merely) legal 
domain, it does not merge their hearts (“qu’il tremble alors que vous tremblez”).  Love here is 
presented as merely technical, legal, and must be intellectualized and rationalized in order to 
make sense.  
 Tropically, one way of indicating the harmonic-generating unision may lie in 
paronomasia, denoting perfected unity of sounds which are matched up in one word (sect/sex) 
but generate, as a function of this attunement, a supplementary sense which haunts the term 
sonically. Several times throughout the play Christianity is labeled a “secte”.  More than merely 
euphemism or connotation, secte is not too far away from its paired paronomastic twin, “sex.”  
For Quintilian, there is something seductive about the trope of paronomasia, which is classified 
in a group of figures “which attracts and excites the attention of the hearer by some resemblance, 
equality, or opposition of words. Of these is the παρονομασία (paronomasia), which is called by 
the Latins annominatio.” (9.3.66).  For Northrop Frye, paronomasia points to something 
secretive, private, a sort of sticking moment in the rhythm of conversation: “Paranomasia is one 
of the essential elements of verbal creation, but a pun introduced into a conversation turns its 
back on the sense of the conversation and sets up a self-contained verbal-sound-sense pattern in 
its place”( 276).  The paronomasia of sect/sexe enacts a fleeting fleetness, in which one word and 
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its twinned other are heard simultaneously, almost too quickly to be caught, slipped in together 
in a unison pair.  Thus, the trope of paranomasia, in the excesses of meaning produced by its own 
internal and hidden sameness, condenses and dramatizes the essential role that another kind of 
sameness—the identical matching-up of velocity—plays in undergirding, reinforcing, and 
expressing a certain kind of inarticulate erotics. 
Paranomasia points to the very “movement of disappearing” insofar as the enactment of 
the rushed language instantaneously creates an “inside” and “outside”, the presented word and its 
back-turned double. The fleetingess, in its rushed briefness, points to the very hurdles of 
inarticulacy that queer intimacies face in grasping for a discursive form.  As a by product of this 
tenuousness, its flickering intensifies the very nature of that shared intimacy.  
 Throughout the play, although the term “secte” begins as a denigrative insult, when the 
sound of its aural double, “sex” is struck simultaneously, the notion of “hiding in plain sight” 
becomes more apparent.  Stratonice says at the beginning, comforting Pauline's fears of the 
Christians: “Leur secte est insensée, impie, et sacrilège, /Et dans son sacrifice use de sortilège” 
(I, 3, 257-258)
79
, using the pejorative term “sortilège” to denigrate the Eucharistic 
transformation.  Later, after Polyeucte has converted, Pauline begs her father to save Polyeucte, 
saying, “Ne l'abandonner pas aux fureurs de sa secte” (III, 3, 909),80 emphasizing the potential 
force of the irrational passion within sects.  In yet another example, the ever-compassionate 
Sévère, despite the fact that his rival Polyecute's death means that he himself could marry 
Pauline, tries to defend Christianity to his friend, saying “La secte des chrétiens n'est ce que l'on 
pense,/ On les hait, la raison je ne la connais point […]/ Par curiosité, j'ai voulu les connaître” 
                                                 
79 “Their sect is crazed, impious, and sacriligious,/ and in their sacrifice, use sorcery” 
80 “Don't abandon him to the furies of his sect” 
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(IV, 6, 1412-1413; 1415).
81
  In all of these: denigration of a transformative process, crazed 
passion, and curious temptation, we see that the conceptual and cultural difference between sects 
and its homonym, sex, are not so far apart. Sévère's comment expresses a longing to mingle with 
Christians, perhaps to expose himself to the possibility that he too may be “seduced” into the 
faith as Néarque seduced Polyeucte, but in this context the religious transformation could occur 
only through “knowing” (connaître) which redoubles the sexual euphemistic quality and points 
to the anxieties over queer memetic “contagion.” 
 Far from being just a device of affirming sameness, the unison engenders a certain 
particular pleasure afforded by the unison, not only due to its overtone-generating properties, but 
also in its relation to temporality.  Descartes proposes that  
On se sert de ces syncopes dans les cadences, parce qu’on goûte mieux ce qu’on a 
désiré longtemps. Ainsi le son se repose et s’arrête plus doucement dans un 
accord parfait ou un unisson, lorsque quelque dissonance les précède ; les degrés 
même doivent être mis entre les dissonances : car tout ce qui n’est point un accord 
passe ici pour une dissonance· Il faut encore observer que l’oreille se plaît 
davantage à entendre finir les parties par une octave que par une quinte, et encore 
mieux par l’unisson ; non pas que la quinte ne soit le plus agréable de tous les 
accords, mais parcequ’à la fin on doit chercher le repos, qui est plus grand dans 
les sons entre lesquels il y a peu ou point de différence, comme dans l’unisson  
(499-500).
82
     
                                                 
81 “The Christian sect is not as we think it is/ We hate them, but I have no idea for what reason/ Out of curiosity I 
wanted to know them” 
82 “One uses syncopation in cadences, for we best savor what we have desired for a long time.  In this way the 
sound rests and finishes more gently in a perfect chord or in a unison when some dissonance has preceded it; 
degrees must be placed between the dissonances, for everything that is not harmonized can be dissonant.  One 
must also observe that the ear delights all the more by hearing the sequence completed by an octave than by a 
fifth, and even best by the unison.  This is not because the fifth is the most pleasant of all the intervals, but 
because at the end one is driven to seek rest, and this rest is the greatest in the sounds between which there is 
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Pauline's character is one specifically associated with such delay and drag, serving not 
only as a foil to the perfected “unisson” between Polyeucte and Néarque but also pointing to 
certain eroticizations of temporality itself. Pauline represents an un-timeliness, an out of sync 
nature as indicated by her proleptic dreams, the fact that her former lover comes back two weeks 
too late to marry her, the fact that she converts only after witnessing Polyeucte's death.  In a 
sense, then, the difference and delay that Pauline generates stands to render Polyeucte's perfected 
unison attunement with Néarque all the sweeter “parce qu'on goûte mieux ce qu'on a désiré 
longtemps.”   
 
V.  The Fundaments of Sexual Difference 
 
In this interplay between the denigrated minority status of Christians and the surprising 
twists, excesses and harmonies that Néarque and Polyeucte are able to produce, this drama seems 
to echo Deleuze’s rallying cry that I cited in the introduction: “Theater will surge forward as 
something representing nothing but what presents and creates a minority consciousness as a 
universal-becoming.  It forges alliances here and there according to the circumstances, following 
the lines of transformation that exceed theater and take on another form, or else that transform 
themselves back into theater for another leap” (255-256).  And in lieu of a conclusion to this 
chapter, I will risk a digression by taking Deleuze seriously and following a line of 
transformation with a flying leap. Just as Néarque and Polyeucte are able to make the pre-
existing language of identity and nomenclature stutter (“en un mot…. Un chrétien,” Stratonice 
sums up weakly), I am interested in highlighting the fundaments and sexual overtones of their 
radical break to consider how what Deleuze would call their “foreignness” is able to make the 
                                                                                                                                                             
little or no difference, such as a unison.” 
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language of sexuality and sexual difference stutter.  
The paronomasia of sex and sects are not only related sonically, but also somewhat 
etymologically, as Derrida mentions, in his text “Fourmis” where he takes up the unlikely figure 
of an ant to conceptualize sexual difference.  Pausing for a moment over Derrida’s “Fourmis” is 
not a mere digression; in fact, it gets to the heart of the sexual economy that drives Polyeucte as 
well as many other Corneille plays. Greenberg, among others, have noticed the particular sexual 
dynamics that animate this play, significant even among the Cornelian canon insofar as the play 
begins with the marriage already having taken place:  “Polyeucte is a play about “the already-
there of marriage, the already-there of sexual union, whose realization in the other plays had only 
been ad istant, flickering mirage” (CS 128).83  Sexual difference, in this play, is not only the 
structuring force of a hierarchy in which wives and daughters submit to fathers and husbands, but 
rather it is a sexual economy that is used and remarked upon openly, even used by certain 
characters to achieve one end or another.  
In Derrida's analysis, the symbolic cut between the sexes is impossible, since one 
depends on the other, they are just as linked as they are distinctly separated—he illustrates this 
using the figure of the ring: that which physically serves to sever and separate, but also link, 
literally at the joint between the different bulbs of the ant's body.  And this word, “fourmi” or 
“ant” is one that enters into his writing dreamily, or at least via a dream:  
Fourmi est un mot tout neuf pour moi. Il me vient d’un rêve d’Hélène, un rêve 
qu’elle a fait et qu’elle m’a donc raconté ces jours-ci sans savoir jusqu’à cet 
instant comment ce “fourmi” cheminerait en moi… puisqu’il y eut épiphanie d’un 
fourmi dans le rêve, que d’une fourmi il est bien difficile de voir, sinon de savoir, 
                                                 
83
 In a sense, Le Cid could be thought of as an inversion of Polyeucte.  In Polyeucte, the marriage has already taken 
place and the father (in law) kills the son; and the pathos derives from the layering of dual and contradictory 
relationships: wife and widow, father-in-law and executioner.  In Le Cid, the marriage is yet-to-take place and the 
son is made to kill the father (in law).  The specific temporality of the marriage (to happen, and already taken 
place) is one that Corneille manipulates skillfully in order to increase a certain sublimity.  
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la différence sexuelle, et non seulement parce qu’elle est imperceptiblement noire, 
mais parce que le mot fourmi,  dès lors que dans un rêve, par exemple, celui 
d’Hélène, il se masculinise, nous le voyons à la fois soustrait au voir, voué au noir 
de l’aveuglement mais promis par là même à la lecture (71-72). 
By punning on “elle,” which refers to either “la différence sexuelle” or the ant (la fourmi), 
Derrida points out that it (both the ant and sexual difference) is difficult to see.  But how can 
sexual difference be invisible?  What we “see” when we look at sexual difference is not the 
difference itself, but the already-condensed by-products: sexes, sorted into male and female.  In a 
sense, Derrida is asking a similar question to Butler’s:  How to read for that movement of 
disappearing by which an “inside” and an “outside” are constituted?   
The forced rendering-legible of this always-differed, always differentially located sexual 
difference is noted through a torsion of grammatical regularity, by introducing “le” fourmi-- an 
imposition of the masculine article on the (presumably natural/normal) feminine une fourmi.  He 
writes:  
(entre parenthèses, tous les mots sont des fourmis, et par là des insectes, il faudra 
en tirer toutes les conséquences pour la différence sexuelle: dès qu'ils sont partie 
prenant de la différence sexuelle, il y a des mots ou plutôt des traces à lire.  Elle 
commence par là.  Il peut y avoir de la trace sans différence sexuelle, par exemple 
pour du vivant asexué, mais il ne peut y avoir de différence sexuelle sans trace, et 
cela ne vaut pas seulement pour 'nous', pour le vivant que nous appelons humain.  
Mais, dès lors, la différence sexuelle reste à interpréter, à déchiffer, à 
désencrypter, à lire et non à voir. Lisible, donc invisible, objet de témoignage et 
non de preuve-- et du même coup problématique, mobile, non assurée, elle passe, 
 111 
elle est de passage, elle passe de l'un à l'autre, par l'un et l'autre, de l'une à l'autre 
comme une fourmi, un fourmi de rêve) (74-75).
84
 
With “entre parentheses,” he imposes a cut already on the text, but points to the punctuation 
marks by textually writing it out: “entre parenthèses.” The redoubled superfluity indicates the 
parentheses' doubled status as both supplement and excess.  If all words are fourmis, or insectes, 
it is because all words already are marked and cut, sectioned like the “sect” of the insect, but also 
because they instantiate a cut, a difference (legibility) which produces meaning, or what we 
consider to be meaning.  The parenthesis also effect a passage: one could pass over such a text, 
or one could think of the parenthetical half moons as effectuating an insertion: “Elle passe, elle 
est de passage.” Such passages, or insertions echo vaginal connotations as well as a 
transportational metaphor, with “passage.”  At the end of the text, with the oscillation of “une 
fourmi” to “un fourmi de rêve” indicates that both it stems from the dream but also that it is only 
dreamt, it cannot exist. The magical immediate transformation from “elle” (referring to “la 
différence sexuelle” but possibly also to femininity at large) is effectuated by the simplest cut, 
taking off the tiniest ant-sized letter “e” to make it from “l'un à l'autre” to “l'une à l'autre.” And 
yet this smallest, most impossible cut makes the greatest difference.  For what is this “autre” that 
sexuated “un” and “une” can become?  Is there any “other” besides male/female, un/une? And 
how can we dream of this “other”?  
 The fixed nature of sexual difference itself and its concomitant ideologies and structures 
of legibility drive much of the early scenes in the play. There is a certain uncontestible 
                                                 
84 “(In parenthesis, all words are ants, and consequently [par là] insects, one must assume all of the consequences 
for sexual difference: as soon as there is participation in sexual difference, there are words or rather traces to be 
read.  It begins there [par là]. There can be traces without sexual difference, for example for unsexed living 
things, but there can be no sexual difference without traces, and this goes not only for 'us,' the living thing we 
call human.  But, thenceforth, sexual difference remains to be interpreted, deciphered, decrypted, to be read and 
not  seen.  Legible, and therefore invisible, object of testimony and not of proof-- and in the same way, 
problematic, mobile, unfixed, it  [elle] passes by, it serves as passage, it passes from one to the other, by one and 
the other, from one [l'une] t o the other like une fourmi, un fourmi of a dream)” (Prenowitz, 21, with some of my 
amendations).   
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fossilization of gender polarities that the characters draw upon to justify their actions earlier on 
in the text.  Polyeucte telles Néarque “Mais vous ne savez pas ce que c’est qu’une femme/ Vous 
ignorez quels droits elle a sur toute l’âme”  (I, 1, 9-10) as he explains why he still feels obligated 
toward his wife. Similarly, Pauline says “Mon père, je suis femme, et je sais ma faiblesse” (I, 4, 
341) as a means of gesturing towards incontestible gender universals that allow her to shirk her 
daughterly duties.   
It is the  turn away from such normativizing gender ideologies that the play enacts, in 
Polyeucte and Néarque’s revolutionary turn.  
For Polyeucte, the cut that “négliger, pour lui plaire” insists on, the cut that divides him 
from the generating structures of family and rank, must act like the separating cut of the insect-- 
it divides, yet joins together.  (Re)production is not wrought from heterosexual liaisons (the two 
of the male/female) but rather, produced from the unified ephemerality of speed that is made 
possible when unhinged (cut) from the temporal unity. There is something generative in the 
rushed attunement between himself and Néarque, a production which lies outside of queer 
memes or straight genes, wrought from the division that he insists on, in the difference that he 
performs in his affective/elective identity. So in this sense, the phrase “Négliger, pour lui plaire, 
et femme…” indicates Néarque and Polyeucte’s rejection not only of his wife, but also, more 
radically, womanhood, and the categories of gender and sexual difference that the previous 
political hierarchy was founded upon.
85
  
 The figure of the ring ties together sexuality and sociality in several important ways.  
Derrida also notes that the ring links, in specifically social and sexuated ways, through the 
                                                 
85
  This relationship between sameness and difference and the ways that unique difference (the either/or of the sex 
binary, for example) can be reconscripted by power is addressed by Badiou:  “Thought becomes universal only 
by addressing itself to all others, and it effectuates itself as power through this address.  But the moment all, 
including the solitary militant, are counted according to the universal, it follows that what takes places is the 
subsumption of the Other by the Same. Paul demonstrates in detail how a universal thought, proceeding on the 
basis of the worldly proliferation of alterities (the Jew, the Greek, women, men, slaves, free men, and so on), 
produces  a Sameness and an Equality (there is no longer either Jew, or Greek, and so on).  The production of the 
equality and the casting off, in thought, of differences are the material signs of the universal” (109)  
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matrimonial ring and the circumcisive cut:  
Au fond la fourmi mérite le titre d'insecte: c'est un animal à anneaux.  Son corps 
est marqué, scandé stricturé par une multiplicité annulaire de rings, qui viennent 
couper sans le couper...voilà de quoi on aimerait parler: du séparé/ non sépare du 
coupé/ non coupé – et du mot 'sexe', de la différence sexuelle dans son rapport au 
coupé (et) (mais) non coupé, au coupé qui ne s'oppose plus au non-coupé, entre le 
'séparé' et le 'réparer'(76).
86
  
Stratonice, as we noticed before, emphasizes the paradox in this ring-bound link, the inherent 
tenuousness of the together-separation elicited by the arbitrary bonds of marriage:  “Et la loi de 
l'hymen qui vous tient assemblés / N'ordonne pas qu'il tremble, alors que vous tremblez” (I, 3, 
148-149). Derrida, elsewhere, also uses “anneau de peau” to refer to the circumcisive act, which 
is yet another cut that joins (a community), a binding cut that does not cut. The ring's status, in 
both cases, is a supplementative: without such a (bodily/ accessorial) marker of the ring, one's 
status as cut from or included in the social group is ambiguous, and yet the ceremonial 
(performative) bestowing of the ringly cut that links is the founding of this sexual-social identity.  
In both cases, whether in the temporality of marriage or the generational time of circumcision, 
the “ring” marks a socio-sexual time that is founded upon clear male and female differences. 
And just as Lupton argues that Paul’s radical break with the Law installs a fallenness in the rite 
of circumcision, that is to say, the act becomes mere symbol instead of critical passage, here the 
transformation (perhaps, the radical transformation) that Polyeucte is advancing is a fallenness of 
sexual difference, for such foundational (fundamental) binaries to become “merely” symbolic.  
 Derrida brings together la fourmi  and le fourmi-- the ant-as-animal and the fourmi as 
                                                 
86“Fundamentally, the ant deserves the name of “insect”: it's a ringed animal.  Its body is marked, divided, 
strictured by a ringed multiplicity(annulaire =  ring finger), which cut without cutting it... look at what one would 
like to speak about : of separated/ non-separated, of cut/ uncut-- and of the word « sex » of sexual difference in its 
relation to the cut/ted (and)  (but) not cut, of the cut/ted which opposes to the uncut/ted, between the « separated » 
and « repaired »” (34)  
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formed word, but puts them together in the “ring”, a term which he leaves in English for two 
reasons: one, in French, “ring” refers to the boxing ring, and therefore he hopes to allude to some 
struggle, or some impossibly constructed dichotomy between the “reality” of sexual difference 
and its figuration.  Secondly, however, Derrida begins darting between English and French in his 
text here, as sparring partners in a match, while staging the impossibilities wrought by the 
spoken against the written: 
Il y a là en vérité deux mots, deux adjectifs qualificatifs : l'un veut dire 'coupé', 
l'autre 'non coupé'.  Le premier vient de inseco, il signifie 'coupé' ;  l'autre est 
privatif ou négatif-- in-sectus, a, um-- il signifie 'non coupé'.  Et c'est le ring de la 
fourmi et du fourmi quasiment circoncis : coupé-non-coupé, strictement, 
stricturellement resserré(e) par des anneaux parenthétiques.  Ceux-ci compriment 
sans interrompre, ils interrompent sans interrompre (ce que j'appelle la différance 
avec un a : interruption ininterrompue, continuum et délai de l'hétérogène) (93).
87
 
In the unified pronouncement of “insect” we cannot hear the two other mutually exclusive words 
that comprise it and feed into its meaning etymologically. The inseco  from which insect derives, 
also acts like the harmonic insofar as the plucked string is subdivided, cut into higher 
frequencies, and yet continues in its perfected integrality, to generate and produce: the 
fundamental appears yet again as the base and basis for generation.  Derrida requires this French-
English confusion and interplay to introduce his biggest pun, “tous les deux” which is also his 
most important commentary on the legibility of sexual difference, a paronomasia between 
English and French (or between the aural and the written).  Derrida begins by elaborating on the 
verb inseco, describing how both of the roots of the word related to the insect are related to 
                                                 
87“There are two words here in truth, two qualifying adjectives: one means ‘cut’, the other ‘not cut’ The first comes 
from inseco, meaning ‘cut’; the other is privative or negative—in-sectus, a, um— meaning ‘not cut’.  And it is the 
ring of la fourmi  and of le fourmi practically circumcised: cut-un-cut, strictly, stricturally  choked by parenthetical 
annulations.  These compress without interrupting, they interrupt without interrupting (what I call différance with an 
a, uninterrupted interruption, continuum and delay of the heterogeneous)” (34).  
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production, historical time, and legibility:  
L'une, inseco (secui, sectum, secare), signifie donc couper, sectionner, déchirer, 
tailler... l'autre inseco (insequo), sequis, plus archaïque, qui veut dire non pas 
écrire mais dire, raconter, enchaîner, poursuivre à la trace dans un récit ou dans 
une phrase.  On a donc à la fois l'histoire et l'interruption, l'enchaînement, narratif 
et la coupure, la réparation et la séparation dans le rapport, entre eux deux, de ces 
deux verbes qui signifie justement la coupure et l'enchaînement, l'interruption et 
le récit : “tous les deux”(93).88 
Here, “tous les deux” first appears to be a generic enough term to indicate the pair, both of them.  
But at second glance, the “tous” easily transforms aurally into “two,” its English paranomastic 
double, just as Derrida transforms the “fourmis” into “for/me”, dividing the word in two to make 
four, and also to make a “for”—a doubling and a splitting into a term has a perfectly 
understandable sense in English, but a nonsense meaning in French.   Thus “tous les deux”, la 
fourmi and du fourmi, and four/me itself produce meaning through only a willful mishearing, or 
a misheard will and pointing to the frictive slippages between languages, between the twos, 
between difference and sexual difference. All of these twos, the paired languages, the sound and 
its written double, the ant and the fourmi, the two sexes-- all  are embedded in and produce 
sequence (and perhaps, thus, temporality and history) are always already doomed to be 
unraveled.  Paradoxically, however, this separation which does not separate (the coupé/ non-
coupé), as différance, is actually a deeply productive and seminal tool ; in other words, instead of 
straining for the illusion of unity, they grasp for the generative division of différance.  
 Corneille’s re-imagining of the original history/myth eliminates the fact that Polyeucte 
                                                 
88 One, inseco (secui, sectum, secare), means to cut, to sever, to tear, to carve… the other, inseco, (insequo), sequis, 
is more archaic and means not to write but to say, to recount, to link up, to  pursue traces in a narrative or in a 
sentence.  So we have at once the story and the interruption, the narrative linking up and the cutting, the reparation 
and the separation in the relations, between the two of them, of these two verbs that signify precisely the cut and the 
link, the interruption and the narrative, « tous les deux » (34) 
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had children; instead, Stratonice, Pauline’s confidente, says of Polyeucte, we recall; “Néarque l’a 
séduit : / De leur vieille amitié c’est là l’indigne fruit” (III, ii, 807-808).  These fruits of 
seduction and reproduction deviate from normative teleologies, eschewing reproduction, 
sequence and succession in favor of temporal, queer swerving. But because there are two, “tous 
les deux” both of them, there has been, and can be, a “fruit” of seduction.  Because they are two, 
they become, tous les deux, a figure for “tous les deux” – all of the twos, the pairs, the intimate 
relations which fail to figure properly, but still lingering, however metaleptically erased or 
preposterously reversed, in a strategic failure which could écorcher (flay) the norms of a 
fundament or a Ring which would restrict, constrain—or even link together. 
 In the middle of “Fourmis,” Derrida slides in a parenthetical and cryptic comment about 
gender, one that he does not explain fully, but rather embeds it secretly and silently in the rest of 
his text.  He writes about the feminine behind our image of God:  
Je risquerai entre parenthèses une sorte de confidence naïve. La lecture de la 
différence sexuelle, cela commence avec Dieu. Je suis toujours à nouveau surpris 
quand […] j'apprends ou je me vois rappelle que, dans la tradition juive, la 
schekina, à savoir la manifestation de la présence divine, garde les trait d'un 
visage féminin, et qu'il penser une certaine féminité du Dieu juif-- d'autre part 
transcendant, séparé, jaloux. À dessin, j'évite ici de tenir un discours trop élaboré 
et non primaire: je veux me contenter de marquer ceci: dans ce qui reste d'enfance 
primitive en mon rapport à ce Dieu plutôt juif, à ce vieil homme sévère et juste, 
un tutoiement s'adresse à lui qui joue en moi de la différence sexuelle: et ce jeu 
est une lecture, une critique, une discrimination qui choisit.  Elle élit: c'est une 
élection et une sélection; le tutoiement qui s'adresse à lui en moi s'adresse alors 
aussi à elle  en moi (86). 
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 As a quiet foil to Derrida’s grand gestures of deconstructing the sexual binary or 
punningly unraveling the etymologies of words that we associate with sexuality and gender, he 
points out a moment of surprise, and confession.  He brings up the image of “Dieu,” but not just 
any God, specifically the femininity within God. This “surprise” is one not of discovery, or of 
militant agonizing toward a revolutionized future—rather, as Derrida points out the nature of 
‘élection,” it is always already present.  To trouble the patriarchal “vieil homme sévère” is not to 
declare onself a martyr or a revolutionary.  Rather, it is to simply be open to noticing a different 
type of fundament: instead of “ce Dieu,” what of “cette DS?” We only have to be open to 
noticing this DS (déesse, or différence sexuelle), just as we might happen take notice of the tiny 
ant—not seeking a fabulous figure, but possibly the smallest thing lingering in insects or in sex.  
Or sects. Or, as in Polyeucte and Néarque’s case, in the tiniest fleeting moments of perfect 






‘AUX CENDRES D’UN ÉPOUX’: TRAUMA AND THE ASHES OF DESIRE IN RACINE’S 
ANDROMAQUE 
I. The Aftermath of Fire and Ash 
 
If Polyeucte is attempting to stage a radical break that enables a different type of sexual 
economy, this is a move that could be thought of as futurally-oriented. Corneille’s play figures a 
move from fixed sexual hierarchies to advancing forms of intimacy that are deracinated from the 
overriding ideologies of blood, rank, and male/female binaries. Jean Racine's 1668 play 
Andromaque takes up these similar concerns regarding norms of sexuality and gender, but in this 
play, the radical break does not address imagined futural forms, but rather treats of possibility of 
staging a radical relationality to the past.  
 Everything is blanketed in ash in Andromaque, set in the post-apocalyptic aftermath of the 
Trojan War. The ashes of families and lovers lie amongst the burnt remains of the incinerated 
city. Haunted by the memories of burning Troy, the survivors of the war, the children of the 
Trojan War’s legendary heroes, try to make sense of the possibilities of loving and living. In this 
post-war context, the tale hovers between two extremes of trauma, “the story of the unbearable 
nature of an event and the story of the unbearable nature of its survival” (Caruth 7). In the 
aftermath of this war, “cendres” aptly figures both extremes of these unbearables: language can 
no longer sufficiently account for the trauma, but at the same time, the ruined materiality of 
“cendres” (and of language) can't help but persist and attest to the destruction wreaked upon it.  
It is due to this doubled status of ash-- as both ruin and remainder—that it emerges as my prime 
analytic for considering possibilities of non-normative erotic attachments in this play, insofar as 
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“ash” inhabits a paradoxical temporality. 
The play, which skyrocketed and secured young Jean Racine's career, depicts a fraught 
chain of love interests. The story centers on Andromaque and her infant son Astyanax, who have 
been taken captive by Pyrrhus, the king of Épirus. It is actually the captor, Pyrrhus, who is 
prisoner to his passionate, unrequited love for Andromaque. The king threatens Andromaque 
with a blackmail ultimatum: either marry him or he will surrender her child to Orestes and the 
Greeks, who will execute the infant for fear that he will grow up to become like his famed 
warrior father Hector. Orestes’ diplomatic mission to retrieve Astyanax, however, is only a 
pretext to return to Épire to win the heart of Hermione. While Hermione is betrothed to Pyrrhus 
and loves him desperately, Pyrrhus continues to long for Andromaque. His advances go ignored, 
as she insists on remaining faithful to the memory of her beloved Hector. When faced with the 
choice to either remarry her captor Pyrrhus or to allow her son Astyanax to be executed, 
Andromaque responds with extreme deferral and delay. Waiting and suspense become the 
conditions of the ensuing deadlock which ensares all four main characters: Hermione, who pines 
interminably for her fiancé Pyrrhus to forget Andromaque and to turn to her, Orestes, who longs 
for Hermione to finally reciprocate his love, and Pyrrhus who is torn between his passion for 
Andromaque and the mounting political pressures. 
 Andromaque's lagging delay to make a decision, extending over three acts of the play, has 
long puzzled scholars. It is this stalling that Barthes criticizes, writing: “Devant la contradiction 
de son devoir, ce n’est nullement sa maternité qu’Andromaque consulte (et si elle l’avait 
consultée, aurait-elle hésité un instant?)” (81).89 Scholarship has traditionally classified 
Andromaque either as a poor mother or an overzealously attached widow: what mother in her 
right mind would hesitate to save the life of her son? However, against this dismissive logic and 
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 “Faced with contradictory obligations, Andromaque fails to turn to her maternal side (and if she had thought 
maternally, would she have hesitated even for a moment?)” (78)  
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the myopia of limited gender roles, and instead of reading Andromaque's hesitation in reaction to 
what is it not doing (not moving forward with her life, not saving her son), I would like to 
consider Andromaque's hesitation as actively pointing to something else. I read her stillness as 
performing a type of resistance and gesturing toward a different type of erotic attachment, one 
that remains inarticulable and perhaps indecipherable if read through the sexual logics of 
chrononormativity. 
 Instead of Andromaque boldly counteropposing the Greeks’ blackmail ultimatum or the 
political injunctions to “move on” post-war, she turns to the most fleeting and insignificant 
figure: of “cendres” or ashes in order to indicate a type of erotic attachment that animates her.90 
Andromaque appears to virtuously persist in her affection for her dead husband Hector, as she 
consistently refers to her husband as “ash” (cendres), engaging in a present-tense dialogue with 
his ashes and consulting him for advice.  Céphise, her friend, asks her what she will do: if she 
will give herself to Pyrrhus in order to save her son Andromaque answers neither in the 
affirmative or the negative, instead plaintively exclaiming, “Ô cendres d'un époux! Ô Troyens! Ô 
mon père!/ Ô mon fils, que tes jours coûtent cher à ta mère” (III, 8, 1045-1046).91  She cries out 
to her beloved dead first and then adds on her son, almost as an afterthought. While the list of 
people she invokes is not strange, what is odd is that instead of sighing for Hector, she calls out 
to his ashes.  Every other person she names normally, but Hector alone is figured by and through 
the invocation of ash.  And even stranger is that when Céphise presses her again as to what she 
will do, Andromaque replies, almost calmly, “Allons sur son tombeau consulter mon époux” (III, 
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   Rei Terada suggests that we can understand this “other,” in its refusal to accept the given not as transgression, 
but rather as “opting out” that points to a divergent form of gaging with the fixity of expression (what “counts” 
as a demurral or as an acceptance?).  Rather, she, argues, “Further, the idea of that the recession or even 'refusal' 
of the phenomenophile is transgressive in the first place adopts and slightly paranoid point of view, in which 
simply declining to participate is society's fantasy of an insult to itself […] it isn't a new norm that's being sought 
here, only a vacation from orchestrated affirmation”(32).  
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 Foregrounding “cendres” allows Andromaque to preserve and mourn Hector in this 
strange dual temporality, as both ruin and remainder. To have an intimate relationship or at least 
an active dialogue with ash qua ash is an orientation that stands outside the bounds of the 
normally articulable. That is to say, the conditions of trauma as well as what I have termed 
“inarticulate erotics” both delineate a certain set of impossible difficulties in regards to the 
adequacy and inadequacies of language. If there is something in the traumatic event (of death, of 
war) that lies outside the grasp of dominant forms of discourse, how can this “outside” be re-
conscripted in the service of gesturing toward these non-normative desires?  
Andromaque is the only Racinian tragedy that can be said to take place in a truly post-war 
context, where imminent violence (as opposed to La Thébaïde or in Iphigénie) is not at stake, but 
rather the question of how to gather up the pieces of shattered lives in order to piece together the 
semblance of a new polis. So while “trauma” may seem to be a surprising (and some might 
argue, anachronistic) reading of the play, of all of Racine's tragedies, Andromaque may provide 
the richest source of investigating the twinned status of (in)articulacy and temporal divergences 
that trauma can beget. The preceding long, seemingly interminable years of the war color the 
“present” of the play, in which the characters, especially Oreste, Hermione, and Pyrrhus, all seem 
exasperated with having waited for some loving affirmation from the other. In this sense, the 
other characters' desires contribute to general “forward movement” of temporality, against which 
Andromaque's hesitation stands out all the more starkly. The preceding trauma of the war not 
only conditions the play temporally, but also stylistically. 
One paradigmatic figure of the brokenness of the past is offered by Oreste in the first 
scene of the play. Upon his return to Épire, he tells his friend: “Tu vis mon désespoir, et tu m’as 
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 “We’ll go to the tomb to consult my husband.” 
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vu depuis/ Trainer de mers en mers ma chaîne et mes ennuis” (I, i, 43-44).93 Here the “désespoir” 
refers most immediately to his hopelessness and despair in seeing his beloved Hermione given in 
betrothal to Pyrrhus. But we may also imagine the word in a larger sense referring to a collective 
pain of the survivors’ losses. This particular “despair” itself signals a break in the verse which is 
cleaved into two hemistiches by the comma—much like the general structure of trauma itself, 
which signals a rupture in “normal” fluidly progressing time, a rupture in narrative cohesion or 
logics of ethos. The comma itself both breaks the alexandrine fluidity and unites the two halves; 
the verse is split, but pushes on. The tragedy of the situation for Orestes (as well as for the other 
characters) is that there is a “living on,” or a “depuis” enduring after the rupturing break of utter 
despair. Cathy Caruth asks rhetorically, “Is trauma the encounter with death, or the ongoing 
experience of having survived it?”(7). Echoing this paradoxical paradigm, “depuis” and “ennuis” 
are fittingly a matched rhyming couplet, paired not only phonically but also thematically, as the 
temporality of the “since” (depuis) becomes both indebted to and shackled by the sorrow of 
survival.  
This is the figure of the forced continuity past the discontinuous rupture. Orestes’ 
metaphoric “chaîne” is particularly apt: it is a chain that anchors him solidly nowhere, yet weighs 
upon him constantly during his voyages “de mers en mers”. The weight of the chain itself marks 
the past weight alluded to in the verb “traîner,” as well as the past’s own splintering. This 
paradox of both the forced continuity and the compressed pain of the past, then, becomes 
condensed in a breath, the lightness of the comma, which simultaneously ironizes and dramatizes 
the situation.  
This double crisis of death and survival plays out most dramatically in the character of 
Andromaque, the character who is arguably most haunted by the past and the one person on 
                                                 
93
  “You witnessed my despair, and you saw me thereafter/ Dragging my chain and my woes from sea to sea” 
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whom almost all decisions about the future hinge: her son’s future, Pyrrhus’ romantic future, and 
Hermione’s engagement. Although all the characters in the play address this particular crisis of 
the “unbearable nature of survival” in various ways, it is Andromaque’s particular ciphered 
telling that interests me the most and  will serve as the focal point for this chapter’s investigation 
of her queer velocities.  
 For Andromaque, this struggle to testify to her desire for ash takes place in particular on 
the rhetorical battlefield, staking out the terrain of the figurative power of language, which 
trauma has unmoored from its normative signifying function.  Although Racine’s particular 
interplay of figurative and literal language has been treated by other scholars, it remains to be 
seen the ways that trope intervenes, both as a bridge and as a hindrance, to the testimony and 
expression of trauma. Robert W. Hartle, analyzing the use of metaphor in Racine, proposes: 
“What is important to notice is the frequency with which Racine uses a dead metaphor to express 
the moral problem in a place, and then suddenly in the final scenes of the play he uses that 
metaphor quite literally and quite concretely as the instrument of catastrophe” (135). In my 
analysis, however, the opposite trajectory also takes place: the literal “instrument of 
catastrophe”— ash and fire, as markers of the violence of war, actually become re-metaphorized 
to function tropically. Ash and fire appear at key moments in the drama, deployed as strangely 
figural or else painfully literal.  These moments of toggling between the literal and the figurative 
occur when Andromaque's “non-metric” and “personal” time, deeply imbued with mourning and 
testimony, clashes against Pyrrhus' future-oriented temporality.  Because everything hinges on 
the articulation Andromaque's affection and love, the stakes of claiming temporal normativity, 
and this temporality's relationship to sexuality, run high.  
  Oreste presses Pyrrhus to hand over Astyanax, reminding Pyrrhus of Hector’s violent 
past, a past which threatens to haunt the Greeks’ and Astyanax’s future. Oreste chooses an 
 124 
appropriately fire-filled moment to insist on the risk: 
Et qui sait ce qu'un jour ce fils peut entreprendre ? 
Peut-être dans nos ports nous le verrons descendre, 
Tel qu'on a vu son père, embraser nos vaisseaux 
Et, la flamme à la main, les suivre sur les eaux” (I, ii, 161-164).94 
The image of the destructive Hector is only seen by torchlight, the very fire which destroyed the 
Greek ships: the possibility of memory is contingent upon the agent of destruction. This same 
fire, Oreste insists, may be taken up by Hector’s son; the uncertain future is illuminated only by 
the flickering destructive fires of the past.  
 As Pyrrhus recounts the Greeks’ demands to Andromaque, he depicts himself as still 
burning with phantom fires. Although Oreste attemps to warn by invoking the image spectralized 
fire, the fires which both catalyzed the traumatic destruction and inscribed the event, Pyrrhus 
takes up these traumatic flames, or the flames which foretell a vengeful future, and transforms 
them into unsatiated fires of his desire. Speaking to Andromaque of his unrequited love, he says:  
De combien de remords m'ont-ils rendu la proie ? 
Je souffre tous les maux que j'ai faits devant Troie : 
Vaincu, chargé de fers, de regrets consumé, 
Brûlé de plus de feux que je n'en allumai, 
Tant de soins, tant de pleurs, tant d'ardeurs inquiètes... 
Hélas ! Fus-je jamais si cruel que vous l'êtes ? (I, iv, 317-322)
95
 
Here, “fire” used metaphorically loosens the sign from the signified and allows a substituitive 
logic to unfold. When Pyrrhus was formerly the victor, warrior and captor, substitution allowed 
                                                 
94
  “And who knows what this son might do one day? Perhaps we will see him sail upon our ports, just as we saw 
his father ignite our ships and drive them out to side, with fire in his hand.” 
95
  “How much remorse have my victims given me? I’ve suffered, myself, the very pain I caused Troy. Destroyed, 
burdened with chains, and with regrets, and burning with more fires than I ever lit. So many woes, tears, and 
troubled passions—oh, was I ever as cruel to you as you are to me now?” 
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him to imagine and to depict himself as also suffering “tous les maux que j'ai faits.” Within the 
breadth of only a few lines, the excess of literal fires “que je n’en allumai” becomes the gnawing 
burning of guilt, “tant d’ardeurs inquiètes”; the unabsolved remorse which doggedly plagues him 
transforms, through a metonymic fire-figured chain, to burningly persistent lust and unrequited 
love: “fus-je jamais si cruel que vous l’êtes?” Rhetoric and figuration, then, become his means of 
erasing the trauma of the past, metaleptically exchanging the inconstestably destructive Trojan 
fires for the promise of a generative flame of desire. 
 We see an example of this strategic metaphorical euphemism in Pyrrhus’ phrasing of his 
blackmail. Pyrrhus needs the literal image of “cendres” to mark the finality of the war. He offers 
Andromaque a deal: marry him and he will protect Hector’s son only in exchange for 
Andromaque’s consent to love him: “Animé d’un regard, je puis tout entreprendre;/ Votre Ilion 
encor peut sortir de sa cendre” (I, iv, 329-330).96 Ashes continue to figure, for Pyrrhus, a type of 
futurity, a post-facto temporality in which renewal is possible and his burning desires have been 
satiated. To this end, the active verb, “entreprendre”, is crucially paired with “cendre” to 
emphasize the possibility of moving on, of taking action. 
 Pyrrhus’ formerly future-pointing “cendres” become, in Andromaque’s vocabulary, a 
testimony/testament to the past. In Andromaque's usage, the same word subsequently becomes 
“re-metaphorized”; “cendres” no longer alludes elliptically to the war, but rather it begins to take 
on generative meanings of its own.
97
 In response to Pyrrhus’ ultimatum (either marry him or 
surrender her child), Andromaque turns his language of fire and ash back upon him, responding 
by invoking the image of “cendres.” And yet, as we have noted before, it is not merely the ash of 
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  “Galvanized by a sole glance from you, I could take on anything. Your Ilium may still rise from its ashes.” 
97
  In regards to this loving, persistent spectrality, although Hector as a “ghost” does not appear, the enduring nature 
of his presence that Andromaque cultivates might be elucidated by the Derridean concept of “hauntology,” of 
which Colin Davis writes: “Hauntology supplants its near-homonym ontology, replacing the priority of being and 
presence with the figure of the ghost as that which is neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive. Attending 
to the ghost is an ethical injunction insofar as it occupies the place of the Levinasian Other: a wholly 
irrecuperable intrusion in our world, which is not comprehensible within our available intellectual frameworks, 
but whose otherness we are responsible for preserving” (373). 
 126 
destruction and war that she invokes, but rather the specific ashes of Hector: 
Et pourquoi vos soupirs seraient-ils repoussés ?  
Aurait-elle oublié vos services passés ?  
Troie, Hector, contre vous révoltent-ils son âme ?  
Aux cendres d'un époux doit-elle enfin sa flamme ?  
Et quel époux encore ! Ah ! Souvenir cruel !  
Sa mort seule a rendu votre père immortel (I, iv, 355-360).
98
 
The “cendres” that Pyrrhus has tried to use to represent the quenching of the fires and a moment 
of “moving on” emerges in Andromaque’s discourse to figure the absent/present body of Hector. 
Representing a person by a thing would seem, initially, to strip a person of his humanness, to 
reduce him to a thing, but here, the term “cendres” enacts multiple movements of (re)animating, 
testifying and mourning. Mis-metaphorizing the lost husband as an object, as mere ashes, 
testifies to the traumatic violence done against him and the Trojan people, in which they were 
treated as things. It also reflects Andromaque’s sense of the inadequacy of language to express 
her loss.  
 The perversity of Andromaque's attachment is anchored in the literalness of “cendres” 
and her relation to them. Through this figure, she expresses the longing for her husband not in a 
way that substitutes or memorializes, but rather is conveyed through and as loss (in the ashes).  
So in contrast to an incessant mourning that would ceaselessly cling to the ash as a memorial of 
the deceased Hector, her desire actually and actively reaches toward the ash as ash.
99
 Hers is an 
                                                 
98
  “And why would all of your advances be repulsed? Has Andromaque forgotten everything you’ve done? Do 
Troy and Hector turn her heart against you? Do her husband’s ashes demand her love still? And what a husband! 
Oh! What memories. His death gave your father immortal glory.” 
99
  Freud’s depiction of mourning and of melancholia serves as a counterpoint to this image of loss and stasis that I 
am investigating. Freud writes: “In mourning we found that the inhibition and loss of interest are fully accounted 
for by the work of mourning in which the ego is absorbed. In melancholia, the unknown loss will result in a 
similar internal work and will therefore be responsible for the melancholic inhibition. The difference is that the 
inhibition of the melancholic seems puzzling to us because we cannot see what it is that is absorbing him so 
entirely. The melancholic displays something else besides which is lacking in mourning—an extraordinary 
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intimacy that employs and is obfuscated by the screen of virtue. It is not a queer desire that 
signals itself as marginalized, but this desire is actually read as a non-confession: what appears to 
be a blatant attachment to a virtuous marriage vow, conceals, in the very same “open” language 
and orientation, a perverse attachment to the traumatic loss, and the material marker of such 
loss.
100
 As François suggests, “the 'secret' of the 'open secret' need not mean hidden or unstated, 
but simply unavailable, untouchable, nonposessable, implying a relation to the beloved that 
neither appropriates nor denies” (81). In a sense, this open reticence is only and specifically 
enabled by an attachment to the figure that not only marks the ruin but is actually the ruined and 
remains past the point of ruin itself: ash.
101
 
  Andromaque’s excessive attachment to her dead husband Hector is remarkable in its 
perverse persistence. Even her confidante, Céphise, urges, “Madame, à votre époux c'est être 
assez fidèle:/ Trop de vertu pourrait vous rendre criminelle.”(III, viii, 981-982)102 Céphise's 
comment, which reads Andromaque's hesitation as “criminelle,” has been echoed by other 
scholarship of the play. As Mitchell Greenberg has argued, “Suffering from an inability or a 
                                                                                                                                                             
diminution in his self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. In mourning it is the world which 
has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself” (246).  
100
  Murray suggests that “so Lacan and Laplanche would say, the stuff or 'thing' of tragic dialogue signifies to its 
spectator without the spectator knowing exactly what it signifieis. The spectator leaves tragedy armed not so 
much with the truth of skepticism as with the enigma of the signifier gesturing so frantically to the trauma of 
fantasy, to the hole in the Real” (DT 32). 
101
 François builds her analysis upon the famous “l'aveu sans suite” in Madame de Lafayette's La Princesse de 
Clèves, in which the Princess tries to stifle a life-long adulterous attraction to the Duc de Nemours and 
steadfastly clings to the virtues of her marriage vow, even past the moment of her husband's death, a reticence 
and a non-expression of desire that is useful to our analysis. François summarizes it elegantly: “Through almost 
no fault of her own, things happen in such a way that she can hold herself responsible for the death that liberates 
her, and she is stopped from proceeding by the very thing that opens the door for her. Her husband profits so 
little from her faithfulness to him that, where he is concerned, she might as well have committed the physical act 
of adultery. As for the lover, he is no closer to possessing her for knowing himself loved or for seeing the 
husband dead. Her virtue is as free of effect as her passion is as innocent of consequence” (68). The Princess's 
confession is almost a mirrored opposite pair to Andromaque's. Andromaque divulges what can be considered a 
“non-aveu, malgré suite.” This “non-aveu” is “malgré suite” in that all of the consequences of her inaction 
unfold in such a way that she could have not confessed at all, in a mirrored similarity to the Princesse's situation. 
All of the hesitations, hand-wringing, and (zero velocity) declarations leading up to Andromaque's 
announcement of her “innocent stratagème”-- not of her threatened suicide, but rather of her persistent ash-
oriented love-- might as well not have happened at all, in that Pyrrhus' murder and Andromaque's crowning in 
Act V unfolds according to no one's plan.  
 
102
  “Madame, you’ve been faithful enough to your husband, too much virtue could become criminal.”  
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refusal to work through her mourning, [Andromaque] seem stymied in a melancholy that is, 
effectively, a dislocation from reality so radical that it threatens the very person she claims to 
want to save” (Racine 63), pinning the source of the “threat” to Astyanax's life in Andromaque's 
“refusal” to work through. “Inability” and “refusal” here point to different levels of volition, and 
indeed gesture toward varying levels of (un)ethical disregard for Andromaque's infant son.  My 
project here, however, will re-examine an otherwise denigrated passivity in order discern a type 
of erotics that is simultaneously revealed and concealed.  
 Although on the surface, Céphise’s remark alludes to the fact that Andromaque’s delay to 
make a decision augments the probability that Astyanax will die, could it be that Andromaque’s 
love is “criminelle” in another sense? For example, what about types of loves, or desires that are 
denigrated as “criminelle” because they are considered "invalid" or "incomprehensible”, or 
“sexually divergent”?103  This “dislocation from reality” is not only a by-product of her excessive 
mourning, but also indicates an affective and emotional position that is unmoored from any 
terms of traditional sexual logics. And, as mentioned before in the introduction, this divergence 
from normative discourse engenders a particular type of inarticulacy. In other words, taking 
seriously Andromaque's resistance to speak, or to choose, actually makes legible a trace of 
desire. This desire has been effaced by lenses of analysis limited to the temporality associated 
with normative concepts of “good” motherhood or wifedom that occlude other possibilities, 
tempos and speeds of attachment and other affective anchorings.  
                                                 
103
  Much like Antigone, Andromaque chooses the tomb over the bridal chamber, saying, “Ma flamme par Hector 
fut jadis allumée ;/ Avec lui dans la tombe elle s'est enfermée.” (III, iv, 865-866). Judith Butler argues in 
Antigone’s Claim that Antigone seems to take up a queer position apophatically (through negation): “Certainly, 
she [Antigone] does not achieve another sexuality, one that is not heterosexuality, but she does seem to 
deinstitute heterosexuality by refusing to do what is necessary to stay alive for Haemon, by refusing to become a 
mother and a wife, [...] by embracing death as her bridal chamber and identifying her tomb as a 'deep dug home' 
(kataskaphes oikesis)” (76). While I don’t mean to over-equate the non-reproductive position with a queer one, it 
is useful and illuminating to consider the alternate forms of intimacy and desire, especially those patterned after 
the archetype of Antigone, in these plays. For further reading, in addition to Butler, Julia Reinhard Lupton in 
“Antigone in Vienna” (Citizen-Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology) considers the ways that Antigone (as 
well as Isabella, in the Merchant of Venice) challenge the reproductive economies mandated by the polis in favor 
of a sibling-oriented eroticism, but this type of attachment in and of itself also challenges the norms of the oikos.  
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 Andromaque's desire, and the loss inscribed therein, becomes dependent upon its ashes 
(the material marker of loss). Desire then desires ash, in its twinned status as both ruin and as 
remainder; the persistence of desire itself becomes a testimony to trauma. Timothy Murray, 
drawing upon Jean Laplanche, extends the latter's notion of “traumatophilia” in Drama Trauma, 
saying, “... loss, in contrast to lack, continually haunts the symbolic certainty of representation. 
Loss functions as the death drive of implosive designation whose enigmatic dynamism is to be 
performed and enjoyed, not to be contained and feared, as the stuff of seduction”(15). In this 
sense, Andromaque's longings cannot merely be brushed aside as the irrational disposition of the 
“melancholic lover” but rather, the desire for ash as ash opens up a different possibility—
perhaps for the “stuff of seduction.” Taking seriously Andromaque’s attachment to ashes allows 
for an ethics of testimony to and of trauma. In the rhetoric of “ash” lies a testimony not only to 
the trauma of the experience but also to the unforgivable inadequacy of the language available.  
As mentioned in the introduction, “cendres” has a bifurcated and paradoxical meaning 
insofar as it can either be thought of as a “ruin” or as a “remainder.” By this I mean that ashes are 
the marker of destruction and irrevocable loss, but ash in and of itself also exists and persists as 
matter that endures and remains. In one word, the duality of two seemingly incompatible 
extremes, “absolute loss” and “absolute continuity” are condensed.  By the “rhetoric of ash,” I 
mean to suggest that ash takes on particular discursive and figural qualities that enable both of 
these possibilities, traditionally thought mutually exclusive, to be expressed.  I follow both of 
these dual functions of ash—as ruin/loss and as remainder-- throughout this chapter.  Firstly, in 
its status as ruin, the figure of ash functions as a cipher, or “zero,” a powerful early modern 
concept that I employ to re-imagine Andromaque's supposed zero-action (passivity).  In its 
capacity as a remainder (that which persists past the moment of destruction), ash functions as the 
“wrongful” metaphor known as catachresis, which I will discuss shortly.  
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II. Bearing (Zero) Witness: Catachresis and Testimony 
 
When Andromaque's radically passive desire is intertwined with testimony and trauma, 
however, her open reticence also complicates the ethics of bearing witness, moving from a 
concept of “bearing” as in “to give witness” to a notion of “bearing” as enduring. And this 
endurance is one that is not signaled or gestured toward, but can be considered as participating in 
what Anne-Lise François has termed a theory of recessive action. In her words, the reticent 
revelation, as a type of open secret, “wishes to make a claim lightly, not so as to be disbelieved 
or protected from its consequences but because lightness is part of the claim” (120). François' 
formulation is particularly useful here insofar as it illuminates the idea of a still velocity that is 
replete with intentionality. Instead of reading stasis and hesitation as a regression, or a refusal to 
opt for the velocity of movement, or to move on (in the context of a post-traumatic experience), 
considering it as a “velocity of stillness” indicates that this position takes its own proper speed, 
Like Miron V.'s impossibly slow gestures that make perfect sense in “non-metric” temporality, 
Andromaque's stillness does not need to be measured differentially against the velocity that it 
“lacks.” 
Taking up the figure of ash is more than a mere rhetorical embellishment; it also enacts as 
certain side-stepping of the real, phenomenal world in a turn to the most fleeting of figures. Rei 
Terada proposes that against an injunction to accept the world “as is,” latching on to subtle 
moments of ephemerality embodies a type of technique she terms “looking away” that 
turns toward these perceptions to deflect the other's invasion,by the reasoning-- 
the comically quick and amoral reasoning typical of the unconscious-- that if the 
other is inexorable once perceived, then obviously one should put off perceiving it 
or not look straight on. Weightless, merely phenomenal perception complements 
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the spectre as figure of the other: it is the other of the inexorability of the other, 
and of equal rank (31). 
Andromaque's desires then, are retained in “stillness” despite injunctions to produce discourse, to 
give discernable shape to experience, but through its very stillness, is able to endure.
104
 Lightness 
becomes a paradoxical counterweight to the burden (weight) of proof, of testimony. Such a 
revelation of stillness – both enveloped in stillness and enacted through stillness – blurs the 
boundaries of the articulable, insofar as it simply refuses outright divulgence. And yet, this type 
of “stillness” still manages to hint at an unfolding of expression, precisely by declining to engage 
with pre-existing discursive structures.  
 In this sense, Andromaque’s refusal to decide is not necessarily “criminelle” nor an 
outright extension of an overindulgence in mourning. Rather, her reticence signals this type of 
divergence from expectations of testifying, mourning, melancholia, and futurity. It also is a 
detour from the privilege accorded to articulateness and sexuality (the “anticipatory” and the 
“agnostic”) that I delineated in the introduction.  Against those who would determine certain 
speeds of “moving” — characters who urge “moving on” in wake of the trauma and critics who 
seek “moving forward” in the action of the play — Andromaque's radical delay marks both a 
divergence from diegetic and affective temporal norms. Indeed, reading Andromaque's hesitation 
through temporal normativity (with certain expectations of gender, marriage, and attachment) 
means that she falls into predictable categories of failed motherhood or overzealous spousehood. 
                                                 
104
 Claudia Brodsky fine article “The Impression of Movement” notes that reading for “movement” in Racine's texts 
becomes difficult due to the very structure of Racine's language:  
Unsubordinated to the form of diachrony, Racine's tragedies attempt to constitute a moment out of the 
conceptual matter of words, endowing a predominantly abstract vocabulary with the still weight of things, 
the gravity of unified mass. It is this verbal combat, between the experience of an instant and its necessarily 
temporal articulation, between the moment of an impression and its dramatization, that defines the drama of 
the texts in turn (174). 
Thus “movement” in Racine, instead of being neatly mapped onto a teleologic trajectory, emerges as static, 
statuesque, and still. For Brodsky, however, the “movement” generated from Racine is rooted in this very still 
quality, in opposition to the flow and dynamism of the baroque aesthetic, Racine's classical style holds its 
movement as potential energy, or restraint. 
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For Barthes the tomb becomes a condensation of Andromaque's eroticism: “Ce vide de la légalité 
troyenne est symbolisé par un objet qui détermine tous les mouvements offensifs: le tombeau 
d’Hector; il est pour Andromaque refuse, réconfort, espoir, oracle aussi, par une sort d’érotisme 
funèbre, elle veut l’habiter, s’y enfermer avec son fils, vivre dans la mort une sorte de ménage à 
trois”(81).105 Barthes's analysis pins Andromaque's erotic investment to the tomb as telos, but in 
so doing actually undermines the ciphered movement of her desire, which craves not necessarily 
death, but rather an active reaching toward the ashes. Temporal norms produce blinders that 
encourage us to align her hesitation with a certain kind of relationship to the past.  Instead of 
understanding Andromaque as being stuck and mired in what was, or the death that is yet to 
come, Andromaque indicates an actively present engagement with Hector's ashes.  
 In the case of Andromaque, the torsion “against usage” of “ashes” alters the settledness of 
language in order to fashion the language to express her “personal time” not of waiting, but of 
stillness.  The use of “cendres d'un époux” instead of Hector's proper name can be thought of as a 
type of catachresis.  The trope called “catachresis” is generally thought of as a “wrongful” 
metaphor. In the Institutes of Oratory, Quintilian defines catachresis as a type of trope “which 
we properly call abusio, and which adapts, to whatever has no proper term, the term which is 
nearest… catachresis is used where a term is wanting; metaphor, for where another term is in 
use” (VIII.6.34). In its “abusive” figuration, catachresis simultaneously marks and un-marks— it 
reaches toward figuration, but in its improperness, it also traces figure's “failure” in its improper 
substitution. As Derrida notes, catachresis is born from a lack in language, when language is 
missing the means to signify but is forced to do so nevertheless: 
Ces 'idées' existaient déjà […] étaient déjà dans l’esprit comme un trace sans mot; 
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 “This lack of Trojan legality is symbolized by an object that determines all of the offensive gestures: Hector's 
tomb.  It is, for Andromaque, refuse, comfort, hope, oracle as well, through a sort of funereal eroticism, she 
wants to occupy it, close herself within it with her son, live through death a type of ménage à trois” (76). 
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mais on n’aurait pu les retracer, les traquer, les tirer au jour sans le coup de force 
d’une torsion qui va contre l’usage, sans l’effraction d’une catachrèse. Celle-ci ne 
sort pas de la langue, elle ne crée pas de signes nouveaux, n’enrichit pas le code; 
et pourtant elle en transforme le fonctionnement, elle produit, avec le même 
matériau, de nouvelles règles d’échange de nouvelles valeurs (307).106 
This catachrestic mourning “preserves” the alterity of the lost other (“avec le même matériau”) 
but at the same time attests to the necessity of a “new” language, for within this post-war, post-
traumatic state the old referential language cannot justly represent the brokenness of the world. If 
Andromaque lacks a proper term to archive her loss of her beloved, to catalogue the enduring 
nature of both this remainder of memory, “cendres” becomes (through catachresis), “wrongly” 
adequate. The “wrongness” of the trope itself becomes the proper measure of at least three 
things: the linguistic lack (the insufficient language); the “wrongness” of Hector's death and the 
“misplacement” of erotic energy diverging from the proper in Andromaque's attachment.  
  Catachresis, as the “abusive” metaphor, acts as the metaphor that marks language’s lack. 
Parker reminds us of the underscored link between violence and catachresis:  
The emphasis on place and transgression in the classical view of metaphor 
explains its obsession with catachresis, or the 'figure of abuse,' the 'forced' transfer 
which Fontanier, in Les Figures du discours, is so careful to distinguish from 
metaphor's 'freedom,' a figure whose condemnation by Locke as a merely verbal 
or monstrous joining […] reminds us that the figures of catachresis in Dante-- the 
centaurs and the Minotaur-- are the emblems of the circles of forza, or violence 
(LFL 39). 
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  “These ‘ideas’ already existed…were already in the mind like a grid without a word; but they could not have 
been retraced, tracked down, brought to daylight without the force of a twisting which goes against usage, 
without the infraction of a catachresis. The latter does not emerge from language, does not create new signs, does 
not enrich the code; and yet it transforms its functioning, producing, with the same material, new rules of 
exchange, new values” (Trans. Alan Bass, 256). 
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The trope of “torsion” further traces this violence, the “wresting” that conditions Andromaque's 
status as survivor and as captive. But also, we recall, if catachresis itself performs as certain 
violence on language, this reinforces the clash that I delineated earlier. Pyrrhus tries to re-
metaphorize “fire” and “ash” in order to cultivate a temporality of “moving-on” in which 
Andromaque could love him, so “fires” becomes metaphorized as “flames of ardor.” In contrast 
to this “proper” poetic production, Andromaque insists on re-deploying these same terms 
catachrestically, tracing a certain violence against the normative use of language that preserves 
the nature of force, strangeness and violence that characterizes her impossible situation and her 
ultimatum.  
 Catachresis becomes a fitting means of expressing one of the two meanings of “ash” that 
I alluded to earlier-- the sense of ash as a remainder.  Dumarsais, in Les Tropes aligns catachresis 
with extension, and therefore a type of excess generated from lack: “Les langues les plus riches 
n'ont point un assez grand nombre de mots pour exprimer chaque idée particulière, par un terme 
qui ne soit que le signe propre de cette idée; ainsi on est souvent obligé d'emprunter le mot 
propre de quelqu'autre idée, qui a le plus de rapport à celle qu'on veut exprimer” (52).  Just as 
Hector does not actually, presently exist in the play, Andromaque needs the next closest idea to 
express and mark this present absence.  Catachresis lasts and produces meaning, even though it 
is not supposed to-- thereby linking such an extension with the temporal extension of the 
“remainder” of ash. Dumarsais goes on to define catachresis similarly to Fontanier's (and 
Derrida's) gloss on the figure, but with the added notion of movement and displacement: “Ainsi 
la catachrèse est un écart que certains mots font de leur première signification, pour en prendre 
une autre qui y a quelque rapport, et c'est aussi ce qu'on apèle extension”(54).107 Aligning 
movement with tropes, especially early modern rhetorical considerations of metaphor was not 
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 “In this way, catachresis is a divergence that certain words take from their original meaning, to take on another 
that has a related meaning, and this is what we could also call extension” 
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uncommon, insofar as metaphor was frequently aligned with the idea of “transfer” (transumptio 
or translatio) of one word to another place.
108
 Therefore, if we are investigating the limits of 
language and the ways that Andromaque re-appropriates expression (catachrestically), it is fitting 
that we also consider what such “movement” looks like and can do.  
 Andromaque's “velocity of stillness” shows the ways that the desire for “cendres” as such 
diverges from the temporal norms that condition a relation to the past (mourning, melancholia) as 
well as a future-oriented temporality that would demand moving-on.  Velocity requires both 
speed and direction in order to be defined, and both definitional components taken together are 
necessarily in order to consider Andromaque's particular desire for the present absence (of ash) 
or absent presence. Understanding her use of the misplaced metaphor as expressing a “velocity” 
is not so far-fetched, insofar as Patricia Parker underscores the classical notion of metaphor as 
movement: 
The development after Aristotle of the links between proper place, property, sens 
propre and 'propriety' may be perceived retrospectively in nuce in the famous 
Aristotelian definition: 'Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs 
to something else […]' The phora of the Aristotelian epiphora or 'transfer' is, as 
Paul Ricoeur remarks, 'a change in respect to location,' a crossing of 
predetermined boundaries (LFL 36).  
In contrast to this image of metaphor moving (properly) from one place to another, catachresis, 
by contrast, could be imagined to move very little, or only slightly, insofar as it (after Quintilian) 
“takes the term which is nearest.”  We could metaphorize this metaphorical trope’s “small” 
                                                 
108
  Peter France, in Racine’s Rhetoric underscores the fact that Racine had exposed and in-depth training in 
rhetoric: “At the Petites Ecoles of Port-Royal and at the Collège de Beauvais Racine received a thorough training 
in rhetoric... There is in the Bibliothèque Nationale a manuscript in the hand of Racine containing numerous 
extracts from the Institutio Oratoria. We may assume that as school Racine read his Latin authors like all other 
schoolchildren of the seventeenth century (Arnauld cites Cicero, Tacitus, Virgil and Horace with particular 
approval) and his Greek authors perhaps more thoroughly than most of his contemporaries (37). 
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movement of the nearest or closest.  In this imagined mapping, in this sense, if velocity has a 
“magnitude” or a number marking the greatness of its speed, we might imagine Andromaque's 
particular velocity, that which is expressed through her invocation of “cendres” as being zero, or 
close to it. The zero, here, brings us to the second quality of “ash” that I mentioned previously.  
  Early modern mathematical treatises express confusion about “the zero's singularity-- 
and its paradoxical connotations of a deadly absence that is nonetheless generative, potentially 
productive of multiplicities” (Raman 162). The zero was also called a “cipher,” a term which 
seems doubly fitting to Andromaque's desire insofar as it can be imagined as improperly 
(catachrestically) zero-- her desire comes to naught--  as well as the fact that her eroticism 
becomes ciphered or “encoded” in figurative language. Shankar Raman cites Thomas 
Blundeville's mathematical treatise His Exercises to demonstrate the paradoxical place of the 
zero:  
“What belongeth to Numeration” asks Thomas Blundeville's His Exercises, and 
answers as follows: “Two things, to know the shape of the figures, and the 
signification of their places.” And how many figures are there? “These ten,” 
Blundeville informs us, “1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.0”, but he immediately qualifies his list 
by insisting upon the zero's exceptional status: “whereof the tenth made like a o. 
as you see here, is called a Cypher, which is no number of it selfe, but serveth 
only to fill up a number'(1613: 1). [...]The cipher operates via a principle quite 
different from that governing the so-called simple numbers: eschewing the 
monotonic repetition of a singular unity or sign […], it relies on the emptiness of 
its signification to produce the fullness of its effects (167).  
Just as François' “light claim” insists on the fact that lightness is part of the claim, the cipher of 
zero in Andromaque's velocity (in her radical passivity) reveals a certain emptiness which is 
 137 
integral to her desire.  Andromaque's attachment to the dead Hector, when figured as zero, 
simultaneously marks and produces both the place of its absence as well as points to absence qua 
loss itself.  In addition to the ways that the zero of Andromaque's zero-velocity connotes 
ephemerality (fleeting non-enduringness) as well as traumatic loss, the zero also elicits question 
of foreignness and intrusion of place.  
 Raman's analysis of the zero and the one not only sets up two opposed figural concepts, 
but also “a tension between two different numbering systems, Arabic and Roman, to which the 
early modern era is heir” (168).  Just as the zero marks both the disjunct and the tension between 
two conceptual measuring systems, Andromaque's passivity, her zero-response to the ultimatum, 
and her hesitation, also marks a fundamental incompatibility between two affective response 
systems.  The zero-position marks an infinitesimal space poised between two tendencies of how 
to understand her actions; it signals a “neither-nor” refusal of both the injunction to “move on” 
and to marry Pyrrhus as well as swerving away from the commonplace of the zealously attached 
widow. In the face of ultimatums to which Andromaque can only “look away” or remain 
radically passive, the “zero” seems apropros to Andromaque's status as foreign captive.  Her use 
of stillness, as zero velocity, marks her status as a mere captive but also serves as a cipher in that 
“beynge joyned with any of the other figures, encreaseth their value”(Raman, citing Baker 167).  
In a sense, this use of “zeroness” to discuss the limits of articulation under captvitiy, post-trauma, 
or queerly convoluted may only be metaphorically resonant.  
 Pyrrhus insists upon his rights as the captor of his Trojan victims. Andromaque and 
Astyanax become property, perhaps “properly” so according to the codes of war. Pyrrhus recalls 
the division of the captives like so many war goods between the victors: “Sur eux, sur leurs 
captifs, ai-je étendu mes droits?/ Ai-je enfin disposé du fruit de leurs exploits?”(I, ii, 191-2).109 
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  “Did I extend my claims towards the other victors, their captives? / did I try to profit from their own rewards?” 
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According to this logic, however, Andromaque's survival is contingent on her placelessness, or 
her status as (beloved) captive, and thus survival becomes radically im-proper: lacking proper 
place and home,
110
 usurping the place of Hermione as the betrothed, improperly extending the 
life of Hector's son, who should have died in the war. In a sense, Andromaque performs the 
“placeholding” that the zero of the cipher does, but in holding a place, even as the “zero” that she 
is, she ultimately ends up generating supplementary value.  
 Andromaque's out-of-placeness is underscored by the strangeness of activating 
“cendres,” the intrusively improper term.  Patricia Parker adds that “metaphor, as Ricoeur points 
out, is 'doubly alien': it is a name which belongs elsewhere and one which takes the place of the 
word which 'belongs.' Allotrios encompasses, in a single term, the notions of deviation, 
borrowing, and 'in the place of' of substitution” (LFL 36). Thus the zero's place even as 
metaphor, to destabilize order, to literally signify nothing, also becomes a means of ever-so-
lightly claiming a “place” which is not proper to it, and in this act of placement, generating 
unexpected supplemental value. Parker also glosses the Ciceronian definition of metaphor, a type 
of alien intrusion of one word usurping the place of the original. In The Arte of English Poesy, 
Puttenham defines metaphor as “a kind of wresting,” plucking a word from its originary 
signification and put to work in another (alien) context. “The 'transfer' of metaphor seems 
inseparable from a kind of violence or violation,” (LFL 38) concludes Parker. 
 One might equally extend this analysis of the “violent transfer” that metaphor enacts to 
the very plot of Andromaque, in which the question of avenging past violence launches the 
action of the play. Although Pyrrhus attempts to rationally defend the proper and propriertorship 
of his captives, the image of ash—cendres—is that which “covers” and obscures his vision and 
subsequently his decision-making capacities. While he would like to loosely slide from actual 
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  Parker reminds us that for Dumarsais in the Traité des tropes, his choice metaphor for metaphor is dwelling in 
“a borrowed home” (“Il est, pour ainsi dire, dans une demeure empruntée,”) (38). 
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murderous fires to flames of love, the “remainder” quality of ash cannot but serve as a 
“reminder” as well.  His amorous metaphorizing comes to a halt.  He loses his grasp on logics of 
ownership, as his mind fills with visions of horrific destruction: 
[…]je regarde enfin 
Quel fut le sort de Troie, et quel est son destin. 
Je ne vois que des tours que la cendre a couvertes, 
Un fleuve teint de sang, des campagnes désertes, 
Un enfant dans les fers; et je ne puis songer 
Que Troie en cet état aspire à se venger (I, ii, 199-204).
111
 
This vision of the ash-covered buildings, the mark of unaccountable loss and the 
excess/remainder of life precipitates his compassion. His “je ne vois que,” elicited by the image 
of the ash-blanketed city, can be paired syntactically with the “je ne puis”—the refusal of Troy’s 
and his vengeance. Pyrrhus affirms his commitment to the survivors, that he has, in a sense, 
inherited and accepted the burden of Andromaque and Astyanax’s survival. Although Pyrrhus 
argues, “L’Épire sauvera ce que Troie a sauvé” (I, ii, 220), what is at stake is the very 
transferability of survivor-dom. 
 Although Pyrrhus metaphorizes passion and a future-oriented desire through the figure of 
fire, Andromaque insists on literalizing the “instrument of catastrophe” by insisting on testimony 
of fire. In the famous incantatory summoning-up of a key traumatic moment, Andromaque’s 
vision of the horrors of war is illuminated by the very fires which annihilate her city and her 
loved ones.  Thus, paradoxically the possibility of the archive, memory (and even ash) is 
indebted to that which destroys.  During this nighttime pillage of her city, she can only see by 
and through the light of the burning flames:  
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 “I strain to recall/ what Troy's fate was, and what is her destiny/ but I can only bring to mind ash-blanketed 
towers/ a river stained with blood, deserted fields/ and a child, held captive. I cannot make myself believe/ that 
Troy, in this state, would aspire to vengeance.” 
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Songe, songe, Céphise, à cette nuit cruelle 
Qui fut pour tout un peuple une nuit éternelle. 
Figure-toi Pyrrhus, les yeux étincelants, 
Entrant à la lueur de nos palais brûlants, 
Sur tous mes frères morts se faisant un passage, 
Et de sang tout couvert échauffant le carnage. 
Songe aux cris des vainqueurs, songe aux cris des mourants, 
Dans la flamme étouffés, sous le fer expirants. 
Peins-toi dans ces horreurs Andromaque éperdue : 
Voilà comme Pyrrhus vint s'offrir à ma vue (III, viii, 997-1006).
112
  
Indeed, in her telling of trauma, fire gradually grows and dominates the whole narrative, the 
glittering destructive spark in Pyrrhus’ “yeux étincelants” bursts into a figured flame that 
consumes “nos palais brùlants”; the intensity of the fiery heat escalates, echoed in the increasing 
violence (“échauffant le carnage”) until ultimately all perish in incendiary annihilation: “dans la 
flamme étouffés, sous le fer expirants.” This fire-laced story culminates in the most traumatic 
image of all for Andromaque: “Voilà comme Pyrrhus vint s’offrir à ma vue” (1006)113  
 Thus, in a sense, literal vision and its uncontrollable speed of immediacy counterbalances 
the zero-velocity. Arguably the mirrored nature of the pair of speeds echoes the dual nature of 
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 Think, think, Céphise, back to that cruel night, which doomed a nation to eternal night.  Imagine Pyrrhus with his 
glittering eyes, entering by the glow of the burning Palace.  Over the bodies of my brothers he trekked his path, 
caked with blood and thirsting for slaughter.  Listen to the cries of the conquerers; hear the moans of the dying, 
by the extinguishing fires, perishing under the sword. Think of Andromaque, beside herself with horror.  Now 
see how Pyrrhus first presented himself to me 
113
 As Tim Murray argues, “Starobinski's emphasis on such a poetics of the glance foregrounds in Racine an 
inconstant visual vocabulary of moving imagery, speed, inhumanity, and even televisuality whose conceptual 
evocation can be said to have foreseen the growth of the new visual and conceptual machinery we now associate 
with the cinematic, the videomatic, and the digital” ('Animé', 13-14). So the sudden speed that Andromaque 
associates with the traumatic violence of the pillage scene also seems to gesture proleptically toward a strange, 
almost cyborgian future. In future study it might be useful to compare the prosthetic (im)material quality of Hector’s 
ash that Andromaque’s eroticism relies on with Murray’s reading of the proleptic intrusion of something like 
Lyotards inhuman.  
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trauma as per Caruth's definition: the unbearable nature of the event (and the missed encounter) 
can only be divulged with an excessively rapid velocity, while the unbearable nature of survival 
is revealed through the zero-velocity unfolding. The trauma of the flame-filled event spirals out 
from the immediate speed of the gaze and thus is divulged as such. One can't help but look, and 
yet in the very instant of the gaze, that very vision (the possibility of seeing) is predicated upon 
the very agent of destruction itself.  The flames of war, which were the bursting apotheosis of her 
trauma narrative, transform through her rhetoric into flames of testimonial vision.  Just as in 
Orestes' memory of Hector, fire becomes both the source of obliteration and the condition of 
possibility to remember; memories are only illuminated, seen, and re-envisioned by the light of 
fiery destruction.   
 
III. Contingent and Queer Temporalities.  
 
 As we continue to trace the two components of velocity, speed and direction, if we accept 
that the magnitude of Andromaque's velocity is zero (in a plurality of senses), the directionality 
of Andromaque's passivity becomes apparent when read in the context of queer theory's 
considerations of temporality.
114
 We recall, from the introduction, that Edelman’s claim for a 
queer temporal politics was one that stood resolutely against possibilities of against reproductive 
futurity. Leo Bersani has remarked on the relationship between Astayanax as figure and a future 
oriented temporality. He writes,  
Andromaque gives us Racine’s purest image of the liberating betrayal of the past; 
but the play brings us only to the threshold of a new order for which no content is 
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  In line with this critique of reproductive futurity, queer theorists such as Edelman, Carolyn Dinshaw, Beth 
Freeman, Judith Halberstam, and Heather Love have all considered resistance to “straight” time by focusing on 
backwards glances, drag, and refusal. For Dinshaw, this queer embrace of the past takes up the “touching” 
implied by “contingent” in a reappropriation of nostalgia from its purely sentimental connotations to one of a 
feeling affectively “out-of-time”; she looks at the frictions and ruptures generated by the past rubbing up against 
the present. See the Introduction for more.  
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imagined… But who is Astyanax? In a sense, he is himself no one and everyone 
else’s alibi. For the Greeks, he is a way of testing Pyrrhus’s loyalty to the state and 
his respect for Ménélas (who gave him Hermione); for Andromaque, he has 
mostly been both a reminder of Hector and an obstacle to her fidelity to Hector; 
for Pyrrhus, he has often seemed to be nothing more than the commodity that will 
buy Andromaque’s love… The survival of Astyanax is the only clear sign of a 
new order in Andromaque, and Pyrrhus and Andromaque finally identify 
themselves unreservedly with Astyanax’s safety… he is the child, the future, the 
blank page of the play, the invisible character who finally replaces the oppressive 
Hector as the absent dominating force of the other characters’ lives. Astyanax is 
nothing less and nothing more than the value of pure possibility (50).  
Bersani’s upholding of Astyanax as a figure for the future and of the new seems to echo the 
reproductive futurity that Edelman stands against. However, this future-oriented reading of 
Astyanax also alters our understanding of Andromaque's supposed indifference his impending 
doom. If Astyanax is constantly being upheld as a “blank slate” betokening a promising future 
replete with “pure possibility,” then Andromaque's “Hélas ! Il mourra donc” (I, iv, 373) may not 
necessarily indicate maternal indifference but posits a stand against an incessantly optimistic 
future.  
 Andromaque’s “dislocation from reality” (Greenberg, Racine, 63) is not only a by-
product of her excessive melancholy, but also indicates a non-normative conception of marriage, 
unmoored from any logic borne from a “typical” marriage fidelity, or motherhood (because 
located in this contingent, other-time). Andromaque’s resistance to decide on the question of 
saving Astayanax’s life is not only a delay which is temporally significant insofar as she wavers 
for three acts of the play, but it can also be understood as performatively excessive in her 
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lingering demurral and deferral. In other words, a position of zero velocity not only 
intradiegetically heightens the suspense and drama of the play, but it also performatively 
critiques the very structures that demand “moving on” or decision-making. Just as the 
“wrongfulness” of the catechrestic trope was an appropriate adequation of language’s lacks, the 
excessive delay or the temporal “wrongness” also adequately marks the divergence from future-
oriented temporal norms. Andromaque refuses to buy into the unquestioned good of the “after” 
that Edelman critiques, rejecting the libidinal fantasy of future-investment as condensed in the 
figure of the child. 
 Turning away from such norms, Andromaque's desire actively opens up alternate 
possibilities of considering non-normative temporalities. Tom Boellstorff, for instance, suggests 
thinking of “a queer time of coincidence” as one possible alternative to the figurations of 
resistance: “a queer time in which time falls rather than passes, a queer meantime that embraces 
contamination and imbrication […] a time that “falls” in coincidence with (and thus “queers”) 
straight time, in the sense that we say “May 23rd ‘falls’ on a Tuesday” (228). The concepts of 
“coincidental time” and contingent temporal speeds might help us understand Andromaque’s 
overly extreme attachment to her dead husband Hector as well as her resistance to make a 
decision about marrying Pyrrhus.  
The move to resist remarriage has been identified by Barthes as an over-investment in 
tradition, a zealous valorization of the marriage vow: the “ancienne Légalité” as mandated by 
“l’amant” (82). Outright resistance to the New in favor of the “ancienne Légalité” would indicate 
dueling temporalities which can be graphed linearly, on a “straight” timeline (past versus future). 
What instead is at stake, in my reading, are the frictive tensions created when Andromaque’s 
“queer time” (spectralized, delayed, dragging out) contingently touches/falls on “straight time.” 
These conflicting, contingent, falling temporalities manifest, for instance in Acte III. Just 
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as Pyrrhus seems ready to deliver Astyanax to the Greeks to die, Andromaque makes one last 
emboldened plea, but it is not a plea for life. Rather, she apostrophizes Hector, animating him not 
through memories but rather through the prosopopeiac image of ashes: “Ah ! S'il l'était assez 
pour nous laisser du moins/ Au tombeau qu'à ta cendre ont élevé mes soins,/ Et que, finissant là 
sa haine et nos misères,/ Il ne séparât point des dépouilles si chères ! ” (943-946).115 
Andromaque’s turn toward Hector, engaging him in conversation, effectively closes off the 
dialogue with Pyrrhus as interlocutor. Her pleas for the tomb, however, elicits a curious reaction 
from Pyrrhus: a detour from the logic of his plan, a turn, instead, to further waiting, deferral and 
demurral. The zero-velocity, here, dislodges the forward progress: Pyrrhus tells his friend, 
Phoenix, “Va m’attendre, Phoenix,” (III, vi, 947) (“Go wait for me, Phoenix”). We cannot forget, 
as Louise Horowitz reminds us, that the mythological Phoenix is associated with rising up and 
rebirth from fire and ash, and the beginning of the play itself is driven by verbs which start with 
the “re” prefix, signaling an emphasis on repeating, the “second time around” (Horowitz), a 
possibility of moving on through and by revisiting the past.
116
 Later, as Pyrrhus insists one last 
time to Andromaque that she must decide, it is “waiting” which he both dreads and uses to 
threaten: 
Mon coeur, désespéré d'un an d'ingratitude. 
Ne peut plus de son sort souffrir l'incertitude. 
C'est craindre, menacer, et gémir trop longtemps. 
Je meurs si je vous perds ; mais je meurs si j'attends 
Songez-y : je vous laisse, et je viendrai vous prendre 
                                                 
115
  “Oh, if it would suffice just to leave us alone at your tomb that my love and woes have built for your ashes. 
There, ending his hatred and our misery, we would never again be separated from your cherished corpse.” 
116
 Other articles that address the redoubled, folded temporality in this play include Muratore, M.J “The Pleasures of 
Re-Enactment in 'Andromaque'. Dalhousie French Studies. Vol 24, 1993.  pp. 57-70 and Racevskis, Roland. 
“Generational Transition in Andromaque.” Dalhousie French Studies. Vol 49, “Les épreuves du labyrinthe: 
Essais de poétique et d'herméneutique raciniennes Hommage tricentenaire (Winter 1999) pp 63-72.  
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Pour vous mener au temple où ce fils doit m'attendre ; (III, vii, 969-974). 
117
 
Instead of menacing her with violence, he insists on the ways that Andromaque’s dragged-out 
time has totally destabilized the normative temporality of his political and amorous (marriage) 
structures with phrases like “souffrir l’incertitude” (endure uncertainty) and “gémir trop 
longtemps” (sighing for far too long). Although only one act prior he had made the sovereign 
decision to do away with Astyanax, saying, “Non, non, je l’ai juré ma vengeance est certaine: Il 
faut bien une fois justifier sa haine/j’abandonne son fils” (II, v, 693-695),118 now his decisiveness 
seems uncertain and he is ready to renege on his choice. His ultimate threatening act of his 
speech is not one of violence, but rather that her son must wait for him at the temple (“où ce fils 
doit m’attendre”), perhaps extrapolating and externalizing his own conflicted struggle with her 
drawn-out delays. 
These contingent temporalities can also be said to have initiated the very action of the 
play. In a move that invites both trauma theory and queer theory's analysis, Andromaque's very 
survival, and that of her son, is contingent on her having substituted the “improper” son for the 
proper, an ad-hoc kinship deviating from the “normal” temporality mapped by the nuclear 
family, by the usual bonds of mother and biologic son. Oreste recounts how Andromaque saved 
her son by holding a false Astyanax: “Seigneur, vous savez trop, avec quel artifice/ Un faux 
Astyanax fut offert au supplice,/ Où le seul fils d'Hector devait être conduit”(I, ii, 221-223).119 
Andromaque's improper place-holding, (holding the false child in the place of the proper son) 
arrests the violent wresting which would have killed her son. The son's survival, then, is founded 
upon the properly-improper substitution of one child for the other. A strangely forged, 
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  My heart despairs—after a year of ingratitude, I can no longer endure this uncertainty. Fearing, threatening, 
sighing—this has gone on too long. I will die if I lose you, but I’ll die if I wait. Remember that. I leave you now, 
but I’ll come back to take you to the temple where your son must await. 
118
 No, no, I’ve sworn my revenge. Her hatred ought to be justified. Her son shall die. 
119
 “Sir, you know very well, through such artifice/ a false Astyanax was offered up to die/ where the proper son of 
Hector ought to have perished” 
 146 
ephemerally performed kinship that was enacted by briefly holding the false son creates an odd 
“contingent” temporality, as a fleetingly performed adoptive genealogy. This contingent 
temporality touches on and enables the “normative” genealogic temporality to continue. Living-
on, for Astyanax and for Andromaque, is only possible through the “alien” experience of 
substitution; such survival becomes, itself, alienating and destabilizing. Survival, as an excess of 
life (sur/vivre) or living-on marks a temporal excess that cannot be properly accounted for, 
lingering as an ash-like remainder.  This gesture of over-reaching, over-extending the time of 
life, through a (questionably) criminal act is another, and perhaps truer sense in which 
Andromaque had been a “bad” mother.  This “badness” in Andromaque’s generation of temporal 
excess (survival) at any cost creates a sublime irony in the sense that critics have diagnosed her 
as being “indifferent” to Astayanax’s survival.  
 
IV. Motherhood and the Missed Encounter 
 
The question of Andromaque’s capabilities as a mother has long been a source of 
scholarly debate. William A. Mould summarizes: 
Maternal Andromaque is generally considered from one of two points of view. 
The most obvious interpretation holds that Andromaque is a "good" mother: 
tender, loving, protective, concerned for her son's safety, entirely virtuous-"la 
tendre mère du petit Astyanax," in the words of Marcel Gutwirth …. An opposing 
view typified by Roland Barthes in Sur Racine…emphasizes her love for Hector, 
her coquetry, certain of her violent remarks, to the exclusion of any maternal 
sentiment whatever: “Andromaque n'est pas une mère, mais une amante” (558). 
If Andromaque’s stalled position swerves from the norm expected of her, perhaps it is because 
her story and survival itself is founded upon a mis-reading. Telling the survivors’ story is made 
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possible only with the re-writing of the past, specifically the writing-in of a lack, of a missed 
encounter. In Racine’s preface, he admits that “Il est vrai que j’ai été oblige de faire vivre 
Astyanax un peu plus qu’il n’a vécu,”120 referring to the fact that in his version of the mythology, 
Astyanax is made to survive the destruction of Troy, as I have discussed previously. The 
substitutive function that launches the action of the play (the placing of the wrong child for the 
proper child) is rhetorically encapsulated in the repetition and catachresis in the play-- in the 
interplay between the different valences of “fire” and “ash.”  
 Just as the wrong child standing in for the “real” one enables the survival of the main 
characters and the possibility to live-on and to tell their story, the substitution of the “wrong” 
word (the abusive trope or false metaphor) for a proper one (i.e. “cendres” for “Hector”) enables 
the language of trauma, mourning, and memory. Thus, both survival and the survival of 
testimony are generated by improper wresting.Andromaque’s forced witnessing of her (false) 
child dashed to its death is played out in strange ways throughout the rest of the drama.  As 
Abraham and Torok write:  
Tous les mots qui n’auront pu être dits, toutes les scènes qui n’auront pu être 
remémorées, toutes les larmes qui n’auront pu être versés, seront avalés, en même 
temps que le traumatisme, cause de la perte.  Avalés et mis en conserve.  Le deuil 
indicible installe à l’intérieur du sujet un caveau secret (266).121   
If we follow Abraham and Torok’s figuration of the “crypt” as a type of internalized, sealed-off 
desire which is unspeakable, we find two instances of past traumas which are never alluded to in 
the play, yet which drive the play’s action.  
In the beginning of the play, as Oreste and Pylade reconnect, Pylade admits: “Surtout je 
                                                 
120
 “It is true that I had to make Astyanax live for a bit longer than he actually did” 
121
 “All the words which couldn’t be spoken, all of the scenes that couldn’t be recalled, all of the tears that one 
couldn’t cry—all will be swallowed, at the same time as the trauma, scene of the loss. Swallowed and preserved.  
The unspeakable mourning takes hold in the interior of a secret cave within the subject.”(136)  
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redoutais cette mélancolie/ Où j'ai vu si longtemps votre âme ensevelie” (I, i, 16-17).122 
Greenberg remarks, “By his incisive use of the word ensevelie to rhyme with mélancolie, Racine 
immediately establishes, as Freud would do two hundred years later, the intimate relation of 
melancholia and death” (60). That which is buried, however, is not only Oreste’s “âme” but also 
the secret of his crime. Prior to the play's action. Oreste has murdered his mother, Clytemnestra 
to avenge the fact that she had previously slain Oreste’s father, Agamemnon. Clytemnestra 
viewed the murder of her spouse as just recompense for Agamemnon’s decision to sacrifice their 
daughter Iphigénie in order to garner a favorable wind and launch ships toward Troy.  
Although Oreste's past is never explicitly mentioned in the text, theatergoers in the 
seventeenth century would have surely been attuned to the mythological context.
123
 Jean 
Apostolides' summary of Oreste's situation bears more than a passing similarity to the structure 
of the “open secret” as analyzed by François;124 the murder remains buried, as knowledge of past 
crimes which remains known, but unsaid, and lingering without any pressing imperative to act 
upon this weighted knowledge: “Lorsque débute de la pièce, et bien que Racine laisse dans 
l'ombre tout cet aspect du personnage, Oreste a déjà vengé son père et Pylade était présent lors de 
l'assassinat de Clytemnestre”( 94).125 This weightless knowledge may be enabled by the fact that 
“Oreste garde Pylade comme un témoin muet de son passé d'Atride” (Apostolides 95) (Orestes 
keeps Pylades as a mute witness of his Atrides past). Pylade's status as bystander to the crime 
enables a particular type of testimonial vision; Shoshana Felman, in Testimony, suggests that “the 
victims, the bystanders, and the perpetrators are here differentiated not so much by what they 
                                                 
122
  “I was especially afraid of this melancholia which, for so long, enveloped your spirits.” 
123
  Mitchell Greenberg writes, “Nowhere in the text of Andromaque is any mention made of this most famous and 
most shocking of crimes attached to the Oreste legend. This does not prevent knowledge of his crime…like the 
Enrinyes who follow him everywhere from being inextricably attached to his persona, Oreste enters the play, 
whether acknowledged or not, with all the weight and opprobrium of his matricide” (Racine 61). 
124
  François' work suggests “the ways in which the open secret as a gesture of self-canceling revelation permits a 
release from the ethical imperative to act upon knowledge”(3). 
 
125
 “At the beginning of the piece, and even though Racine obscures the rest of his character, Orestes has already 
taking revenge on his father and Pylades was present at the murder of Clytemnestra.” 
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actually see […] as by how they do not see, by what and how they fail to witness” (208).  To this 
end, Felman suggests that the position of the bystander, as exemplified by the Poles in the film 
Shoah  (Lantzman 1985), is one of seeing-but-not seeing.  This may be likened the ephemerality 
elicited by Terada's “looking away”  or similar in structure to the abusive figuration of 
catachresis, of figuring, but failing to figure: “The Poles, unlike the Jews, do see, but, as 
bystanders, they do not quite look, they avoid looking directly, and thus they overlook at once 
their responsibility and their complicity as witnesses” (208). Thus when Pylade admits, “Surtout 
je redoutais cette mélancolie/ Où j'ai vu si longtemps votre âme ensevelie” (I, i, 16-17)126, the 
“mélancolie” that is seen (vu) condenses both the noted, superficial understanding of the 
performed melancholic affect as well as the over-looked traumatically-buried matricide.  
Surely Oreste’s diplomatic voyage to Épire carries not only the evident pretext of wooing 
Hermione, but also the hidden, encrypted acting-out of the weight(lessness) of his murder. By 
making the move that he does—demanding Astyanax on behalf of the Greeks—he puts pressure 
on Andromaque both as a mother and as a wife, replicating almost perversely, in reverse, the 
same dilemma with which his mother was faced: does her fidelity as a wife take precedence over 
her identity as a mother? Clytemnestra felt that Agamemnon’s blow to her motherhood, killing 
her beloved daughter Iphigénie, assured her enough justification to murder her husband upon his 
arrival back home. The opening “chess move” performed by Orestes enacts and replicates an 
eerily similar re-iteration of the same questions his mother faced. 
 As previously analyzed, Andromaque’s reaction to this particular “chess move” is 
released in a zero-velocity reaction. Indeed, her response to Pyrrhus’ ultimatum is simply “Hélas 
! Il mourra donc (I, iv, 373) (“Alas, he'll die, then”). Obscured in this decisive indecision is her 
encrypted trauma experienced from the war—her apparent passivity and acceptance that 
                                                 
126
 “I especially feared the melancholia that I saw/ the melancholia in which your soul was buried for so long.” 
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Astyanax would die indicates a deeper, buried guilt over the too-ready sacrifice of the false 
Astyanax. Indeed, the second and only other time that “ensevelis” is mentioned in the text, the 
word is made to rhyme with “fils”: “Il élève en sa cour l'ennemi de la Grèce,/ Astyanax, d'Hector 
jeune et malheureux fils,/ Reste de tant de rois sous Troie ensevelis”(I, i, 70-73).127 The child’s 
living-on, his status as son/child-- the “reste” of Trojan kings, is predicated upon Andromaque’s 
willing sacrifice of another child. The buried kings dictate the progress of futurity and lineage, 
but buried with these past kings are also the trauma and violent acts that make the apparently 
smooth transition of power possible, such as Andromaque’s complicity in the deception. Thus 
Astyanax’s very position as “son” (and that which makes Andromaque “mother”) is founded 
upon that which is buried and repudiated. 
 This “missed encounter”—the accident which was an enacted, fully carried-out threat, yet 
never touched Astayanax himself—is further traumatic because Andromaque was made to 
witness the horror of it, but it was an event whose horror to which she could never testify, 
because it would be a testimony filled with “almosts”—“I almost saw my son die/ I willingly let 
my almost-son die before my eyes”. This “almost” is enabled by a duplicitous doubling: the 
twinning of the false son and the real son. Andromaque condenses all three of Shoshana Felman's 
witnessing positions at once: she is the bystander (who insists on overlooking her complicity in 
the event), the perpetrator (by seizing the false child) and the victim (of the actual event).  
 In a sense, Orestes as foil to Andromaque's situation, with his twinned bystander Pylade, 
amplifies the inarticulable trauma of the slippages.  Pylade's mother, Anaxibie “fait partie du clan 
de Atrides […]  elle est la tante d'Oreste et d'Hermione, qui sont cousins germains.  Selon la 
tradition, Oreste et Pylade auraient été élevés conjointement à la cour de Strophios, leur lien de 
                                                 
127
  “In this very court he is bringing up the enemy of Greece. Astayanax, Hector’s young and woe-burdered son. 
The last of the line of kings now buried under Troy.” 
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parenté de doublant d'un lien d'amitié (Apostolidès, 94)
128
.  Thus with the words 
“conjointement,” “doublant” and “cousins germains,” Apostolidès wishes to emphasize the very 
twinning of the two, but only in order to establish Pylade as the witnessing bystander.  We can 
extend this doubling further, by crafting a more elaborated picture of mere foils and mirroring 
through Patricia Parker's exploration of the equivocation and wordplay in “cousins germains:”  
But the Shakespearean canon also plays repeatedly on the tension between the 
sense of german as honest, genuine or true and the doubled sense of cozen both as 
relative and kin and as cheating or cozening.  Shakespearean playing on germane 
and german in contexts that sometimes evoke its closeness in sound to gemmen, or 
twin, conveys just such a sense of the potentially duplicitous, treacherous, or 
cozening 'german' (SM 129).  
Although drawing upon Shakespearean wordplay here, Parker's notion still seems particularly 
apt for this buried, traumatic event: the question at stake here is the honest swindle (german 
cozening) of the false son for the real son, honest because earnest, and well-intentioned. Or else 
it becomes a case where the “duplicitous doubling” (129) itself becomes german, it feels entirely 
real, and the slippery nature of the swapping means that the traumatic loss of the false son feels 
no less false than the real (proleptic) loss of the real son.  
 Through the layers of doubling, of the shifting in and out of focus between reality, loss, 
and bystanding vision, this trauma remains unspoken, and must remain sealed, so thickly 
cemented over with obfuscating layers of guilt and haunting.  As Caruth reminds us: 
The accident, that is, as it emerges in Freud and is passed on through other trauma 
narratives, does not simply represent the violence of a collision but also conveys 
the impact of its very incomprehensibility.  What returns to haunt the victim, these 
                                                 
128
 “She is part of the Atrides clan […]  she is the aunt of Orestes and Hermione, who are german cousins.  
According to tradition, Orestes and Pylades had been conjointly raised at the court in Strophios, their familial 
ties redoubled with a link of friendship.”  
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stories tell us, is not only the reality of the violent event but also the reality of the 
way that its violence has not yet been fully known (6).  
For Andromaque, this “missed encounter” with death, touched and yet not touched by it, 
literalizes the temporal delay/ unexpectedness of trauma. The death of her (false) son has already 
happened, which she is processing and understanding belatedly (or even not at all), but the death 
of the real son is still imminent, yet-to come. In the doubling of the false son and the real son, 
Andromaque is made to experience the “too soon” and “too late” simultaneously. Her own life, 
her own incomprehensible and unbearable survival, is based solely upon Astyanax’s living-on, a 
survival for which she is ultimately guilty and responsible. 
 
V. Desire, Deixis and Temporality 
 
Andromaque’s traumas engender an out-of-jointness with time, a disengagement that is 
effected through her stalling, deferral, and hauntedness. In many respects, however, all of the 
characters in the play are “out of time”: they are all latecomers and view themselves as 
secondary en-actors of the cataclysmic event which has already happened. This point is 
emphasized by Roland Racevskis in Tragic Passages. He views Andromaque as embodying a 
generational transition and working through the throes of change in regards to a past which has 
both traumatized them (in the war) and overdetermined them (though their parents’ famed 
legacies).
129 
The preceding generation, in a sense, hovers spectrally over their progeny who can 
only envision themselves as going through the motions of the grand gestures of their forefathers’ 
exploits. As Oreste says to Hermione: “Mettons encore un coup tout la Grèce en flamme;/ 
                                                 
129
  “The inheritors of the heroic deeds of Hector and Achilles, of Menelaus and Agamemnon, can only invoke the 
greatness of their parents, while struggling with the historically petty, amorous concerns of their own sparse 
present on the threshold to an unknown future. Latecomers, in a parasitically referential relationship to the 
accomplishments of those who preceded them, the characters in Andromaque stand on a void, the constantly 
vanishing temporality of their own lives, the slippage of their becoming” (Racevskis, 157) 
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Prenons, en signalant mon bras et votre nom,/ Vous, la place d’Hélène, et moi, d’Agamemnon” 
(IV, iii, 1158-1160).
130
 For Oreste, there is no anxiety of influence here: he does not want to 
outdo his ancestors, but rather he hopes to re-enact à la lettre the exact scenes from their parents’ 
exact positions. Oreste's call to take “la place” of their parents betokens a type of plot-less 
stagnation. I underscore this stagnation to compare such a position with Andromaque's passivity, 
to illustrate why I read her “zero velocity” as so radical. The second generation's desire for 
duplication is echoed in epithetical names: Pyrrhus is called “fils d’Achille” Hermione is “fille 
d’Hélène, Oreste “fils d’Agamemnon.” And impressively, Astyanax is called “fils d’Hector” (son 
of Hector) no less than six times in the play. This generational naming has the tautological effect 
of producing the child as both the product and the justification for the progress-oriented linearity 
of “straight time.” Significantly, Andromaque is the only character not epithetically attached to 
the preceding generation or parents. Instead, her appellation is the “veuve d’Hector,” a type of 
naming which appears, in contrast, as a type of a synchronic swerving against the force of the 
diachronic generational trajectories.  
 From her epithetical name to her actions, she does not follow the linear timeline of 
generationality, the “straight time.” An example in miniature of this type of temporality that she 
resists, and another moment of inarticulate clashing is grammatically presented in the first scene 
of Acte IV. Céphise, Andromaque's confidante, is relieved and elated that, apparently, 
Andromaque has acquiesced to marry Pyrrhus, thus securing both the structure of 
heteronormative marriage ties, royal lineage and the future of the child. Céphise says: 
Ah ! Je n'en doute point ; c'est votre époux, Madame, 
C'est Hector qui produit ce miracle en votre âme. 
Il veut que Troie encor se puisse relever 
                                                 
130
  “Let’s set all of Greece aflame again, let’s take the place of Helene and of Agamemnon” 
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Avec cet heureux fils qu'il vous fait conserver. 
Pyrrhus vous l'a promis. Vous venez de l'entendre 
Madame : il n'attendait qu'un mot pour vous le rendre (I, iv, 1049-1054).
131
 
Céphise’s speech opens with a flurry of cataphoric deixis: “c’est votre époux,” “c’est Hector,” 
“ce miracle,” the deictic “ce” announcing the husband, the husband’s role and the miracle as yet-
to-be explained. Cataphoric deixis, defined as a “forward-pointing”, indicates a type of 
presentness and immediacy which is still-to-be announced within the context of the phrase. For 
example, when Céphise says “ce miracle” it creates a tension between the extremely present-
oriented indicative of “this” and the anticipatory promise of fulfilling this knowledge gap (“what 
is ‘this’ miracle?”). Céphise uses the grammatical mood elicited by this forward-pointing to hold 
up the future-oriented values of production (“produit”), saving the child (“cet heureux fils… 
conserver”) and moving on (“relever”). She even enthuses later: “ Quel plaisir d'élever un enfant 
qu'on voit craître,/ Non plus comme un esclave élevé pour son maître,/ Mais pour voir avec lui 
renaître tant de rois !”(IV, i, 1069-1071).132 
Against this optimistic futurity encapsulated affectively and grammatically by Cephise’s 
discourse, Andromaque’s ‘innocent stratageme” is her plan to marry Pyrrhus in order to secure 
Astaynax’s future and then to immediately kill herself.  
Quoi donc ? as-tu pensé qu'Andromaque infidèle 
Pût trahir un époux qui croit revivre en elle ; 
Et que, de tant de morts réveillant la douleur 
Le soin de mon repos me fît troubler le leur ? 
                                                 
131
  “I have no doubt, my lady, it’s your husband ! It’s your husband who has produced this miracle in your heart. He 
wants Troy to rise up again, through this lucky child that he has helped you save. Pyrrhus promised—you’ve just 
heard it yourself, Madame: he just awaits a single word to give your son back to you.” 
132
  “What a joy to raise a child that one has seen grow—not as a slave, but rather as a master, and to see, through 
him, the rebirth of so many future kings.” 
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Est-ce là cette ardeur tant promise à sa cendre ? (IV, i, 1077-1081).
133
 
This strategy is one that is illegible and incomprehensible within Céphise’s future-oriented 
vision.
 
Andromaque corrects Cephise with the image of ashes, emphasizing that her decision is 
one which is intensely informed by her hauntedness and spectrality.  
Indeed, for Andromaque, if survival (as opposed to mere ‘existence’) is to be conditioned 
upon love, or at least the possibility of love then we must also take into consideration the fact 
that loving may not take the form which makes the most sense in the context of a future-oriented, 
hetero-reproductive temporality. Perhaps the most telling component of Andromaque’s haunted 
time is that she simply disappears from the stage after she announces her “innocent stratagème.” 
Ultimately, we find out that the people of Épire murder Pyrrhus in a maddened fury and crown 
Andromaque queen, but this narrative is only recounted through others’ words. This 
disappearance must be read as such—insofar as she continues to linger in the rest of the play’s 
action but ceases to be a physical, speaking being on stage
134
. Andromaque herself figures a 
productivity (diegetic, mythologic, political) which is generated outside of the temporality of 
hetero-reproductive chronology, a figure, like ash, which persists in marking a desire, and 
longing even beyond the end. 
This complex process, as we have seen, includes subtle gestures of re-metaphorization 
and catachresis in order to erase, to testify and to figure the past.  It includes “working through” 
                                                 
133
  “So you thought that an unfaithful Andromaque could possibly betray her husband, who lives through me? And 
that I would reawaken the grief of countless dead, the careless ease of my sleep haunting their eternal rest? Is this 
the love that I promised to his ashes?” 
134
  In an earlier version of the play, Racine has Andromaque reappear briefly to give a speech (“Deux fois veuve et 
deux fois l'esclave de la Grèce”) in which she confronts Hermione for her murderous plot and mourns Pyrrhus. 
Raymond Picard, in the Pléaide edition of the text, notes: “Cette longue variante comprend surtout un discours 
d'Andromaque qui rompait le rhythme de l'action […] Racine, attentif à maintenir la dureté inflexible du drame, 
l'à supprimée”(1089). While in the final (definitive) version, Andromaque's silence and disappearance supports 
my argument about the illegibility of contingent (passive/spectral) temporalities, the very history of the play's 
writing, with a long intrusive digression and spectralized re-appearance, could be interesting to extend in further 
analysis. For another take on the duality implicit in this speech and the poetics of non-closure, see Richard 
Goodkin's “A Choice of Andromache's”, Yale French Studies, 67, 1984. 
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traumas of motherhood and violence which may lie encrypted and invisible, unapparent even to 
the protagonists. Addressing trauma, as Andromaque demonstrates, may necessitate a torsion 
within time’s trajectory, a twist which arrests the insistent forward flow in order to bring to the 
fore the value of stillness, sorrow, and lingering over loss. The choices that Andromaque has 
made before the play’s beginning and which she faces within the play’s trajectory are not easy 
ones, and, through her use of “flamme” “tombeau” and “cendres” in multiple and surprising 






CIRCLING THE HYMEN: THE TEMPORALITY OF DILATION IN RACINE’S BÉRÉNICE 
I. Excess and Minimalism 
 
While Andromaque forestalls marriage to Pyrrhus in the name of preserving her 
catachrestic attachment to Hector, in Bérénice, delay is orchestrated in order to produce a 
different result: to defer saying goodbye. This simple act of delaying bidding adieu stands as the 
prime and sole action of the tragedy. Racine’s dramas are characterized by a strict adherence to 
the minimalism privileged by classical aesthetics, and this tragedy is no exception.  In fact, it 
may be considered the ultimate paradigm of the Racinian style.  Bérénice is marked by simplicity 
in the extreme: nearly nothing “active” happens. There are no murders or suicides; indeed, there 
is no bloodshed at all in this drama. Abbé Villars, in his critique of the play, says “à peine y a-t-il 
une action ici, bien loin d’y en avoir plusieurs” (517).135 He dismissively calls it nothing more 
than extended elegiacal fluff: “depuis le commencement jusqu’à la fin, n’est qu’un tissue galant 
de Madrigaux et d’Élégies” (516).136  
The play’s action is admittedly quite simple. Titus, who has recently been named the 
emperor of Rome, must bid farewell to his beloved mistress of five years, Bérénice, because 
Roman law forbids a stranger, and a royal queen, to share the imperial throne. At the same time, 
Titus’ best friend Antiochus takes this opportunity to declare his long-smoldering love for 
Bérénice. Bérénice, despite her love for Titus and his love for her, must accept Titus’ farewells 
and decline Antiochus’s declarations of love. At the end of the play, the three part ways and 
renounce their love forever.  According to tradition in literary history, apocryphal or not, the 
subject was selected as a type of competition with Pierre Corneille, organized by Henriette 
                                                 
135
 “There is hardly a single action/story here, let alone several” 
136
 “From the beginning to the end, it’s nothing but a frivolous romance woven of madrigals and elegies” 
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d’Angleterre, who encouraged the reigning literary heavyweight to pen a play on the same 
material.
137
 Literary history has tended to award the laurels to Racine.  
However, while Corneille’s version featured four characters who try to manipulate and 
coax each other into loving and committing to one another, leading to the ultimate plot climax of 
Bérénice’s banishment, Racine’s version can seem absurdly simple on the level of form as well 
as in its limitation of subject matter. As Racine says in the preface, “Il y avait longtemps que je 
voulais essayer si je pourrais faire une Tragédie avec cette simplicité d’Action qui a été si fort du 
gout des Ancients” (451).138 Racine’s version only features three main characters, and, more 
importantly in terms of the temporality of the action, Titus come onstage already knowing and 
already committed to sending Bérénice away. One does not wait with bated breath to see if 
Bérénice might stay; we know from the beginning that she must go. Critics have argued that the 
only “action” of the piece is mustering the courage to declare this to her. As Villars says, “Car 
toute cette pièce, si l’on y prend garde, n’est que la matière d’une Scène, où Titus voudrait 
quitter Bérénice” (517).139  
Racine’s inspiration for the piece derives from a single line of Suetonius’ histories "Titus 
reginam Berenicen, cui etiam nuptias pollicitus ferebatur, statim ab Urbe dimisit invitus 
invitam," which Racine translates as: “Titus, qui aimait passionément Bérénice, et qui même, à 
ce qu’on croyait, lui avais promis de l’épouser, la renvoya de Rome, malgré lui, et malgré elle, 
dès les premiers jours de son Empire”(450)140. And yet, even in his preface, Racine seems overly 
                                                 
137
 Mitchell Greenberg summarizes the myth of the play’s origin “According to ‘la petite histoire,’ Henriette 
d’Angleterre supposedly suggested to both Racine and Corneille that they use the historical disguise […] to 
represent an episode in Louis XIV’s amorous career. As legend has it, Louis, when a young man, fell 
passionately in love with Marie Mancini, niece of his cardinal prime minister Mazarin. Despite their ardor, 
higher demands of the state worked inexorably against the match. A more politically motivated marriage awaited 
Louis, a marriage upon which the possibility of a generalized European peace depended (CS 139). 
138
 “For a long time, I have wanted to see if I could craft a Tragedy with the same simplicity of action that was so 
cherished by the Ancients”  
139
 “ Since this whole play, if one is paying attention, is actually nothing more than a story worthy of one scene, in 
which Titus tries to leave Bérénice.” 
140
 “Titus, who passionately loved Bérénice,  and she who believed  that he would marry her, sent her away from 
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concerned with justifying the richness of this single line of material, asserting that Bérénice and 
Titus’ story, like Dido and Aeneas’ has largely sufficient poetic and dramatic matter with which 
to craft a tragedy: “Et qui doute, que ce qui a pu fournir assez de matière pour tout un Chant d’un 
Poème héroïque, où l’Action dure plusieurs jours et où la Narration occupe beaucoup de place, 
ne puisse suffire pour le sujet d’une Tragédie?”(450).141  Racine insists on the temporal duration 
required to stage such rich material.  So the same play is read as either scanty material “a 
peine… une action” or else an excessive action that lasts “plusieur jours” and whose narration 
“occupe beaucoup de place.” How can such a tragedy be both “rien” as well as excess?  
Despite the supposed simplicity of the tale, the classic story of lovers being separated, 
invitus invitam, resonated deeply with audiences. Villars himself reports that once he abandons 
“mes Demoiselles les règles [du Théâtre] à la porte” he is immediately drawn into the spectacle : 
“j’ai l’ai trouvée fort affligeante, et j’y ai pleuré comme un ignorant” (511).142  And indeed it is 
the public’s reponsive overflowing of tears that Racine holds up as evidence of his work’s 
success: “Mais aussi je ne puis croire que le Public me sache mauvais gré de lui avoir donné une 
Tragédie qui a été honorée de tant de larmes, et dont la trentième représentation a été aussi survie 
que la première” (451).143 From this (nearly) non-action of bidding adieu, and the overly 
simplistic classical restraint in terms of style and form, we have an excessive spilling over of 
tears and emotion. 
At the same time that we are presented with this extremely spare dramatic material, critics 
have also targeted what appears to be excess. If the play’s only substantive action consists of 
saying goodbye and mourning the loss of the beloved, why does it need to be repeated so many 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rome, despite his will and despite her will, during the first days of his Empire” 
141
  “ And who would doubt that the material that could furnish enough storyline for an entire length of an Epic 
poem, in which the action extends for several days and the narration takes up a fair amount of space—that it 
could not equally and sufficiently serve as the subject of a tragedy?” 
142
  “my darlings, the rules [of the theatre]  at the door”/  “I found it powerfully sad, and I wept like a simpleton”  
143
  “And yet I would not imagine that the Public would hold it against me that I gave them such a tragedy that was 
laureled by so many tears, and that the thirtieth show was just as well attended as the first”  
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times? Georges Forestier cites Racine who says “Toute l’invention consiste à faire quelque chose 
de rien” (1445).144  In response to this aphorism, Forestier remarks, slightly sarcastically,  
“Étonnant (mais involontaire) rappel de la proximité des principes de la composition dramatique 
et de ceux de la composition rhétorique, comme si Bérénice avait été conçue sur le modèle de la 
chrie, exercice rhétorique qui précisément ‘consiste à faire quelque chose de rien’!” (1445).145146 
While this idea of repetition is teasingly reduced to pedagogic copia, I would like to reconsider 
this flourishing of synonymous repetition not as a mere rhetorical exercise—rather, such 
rhetorical practices such as the copia are never “merely” futile repetitions.147 In this text, the 
repetition is a key to understanding the temporal and erotic dynamics of the piece.  
Notably, the repetition produced by returning again and again to the same (sad, sorrowful, 
longing) affective sentiment is redoubled by a strangely circular temporality of the play. Titus 
says of Bérénice: “Depuis cinq ans entiers chaque jour je la vois, / Et crois toujours la voir pour 
la première fois” (II, 2, 545- 546),148 putting forth a temporality of non-progress.  The 
pleasurable, surprising renouvelement begins again each day, a circular time that stands in 
contrast to the sovereign temporality of progress, decision-making and change.  Such circular 
time delays the time of Titus’ sovereign decision-making, when he has to finally bid her 
farewell.  In a sense, this chapter will analyze the ways that non-progressive temporality is 
                                                 
144
 “All invention is making something out of nothing.” 
145
 This “nothingness” also can remind us of another iteration of the cipher, or the zero-ness (nothingness) that can 
engender expansive and surprising meanings. 
146
 “Surprising and yet involuntary reminder of the proxmity of the principles of dramatic composition and rhetorical 
composition, as if Bérénice had been developed according to the model of the “chrie,” a rhetorical exercise that 
actually consists in making something out of nothing.” 
147
 For more on the relationship between early modern pedagogy, including the types copying exercises that 
Forestier mentions, and the disciplining of the Humanist subject, please see Lynn Enterline’s Shakespeare’s 
Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion.  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. Ultimately, although 
Forestier means to lightly tease the way that Bérénice could be read as a schoolboy’s practice of writing 
“goodbye” a hundred different ways, Enterline’s work sheds a light on how such seemingly mundane repetitive 
practices actually constituted a powerful affective classroom scene of shame, emotion, mastery, imitation, and 
more. While Enterline’s work focuses on the English classroom, it would be interesting to extend her particular 
angle of analysis to France, particularly because Racine had an exception amount of training in Latin and Greek 
thanks to his schooling at Port Royal.  
148
  “For five years I’ve seen her every day, and feel like I am seeing her for the first time.”  
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wrenched in sync with a sovereign progress characterized by futurity and the exclusion of “fruit 
illegitime” or Bérénice’s royal blood.  What stands in the way of such temporality is this delay, 
or dilation, which takes on various specifically spiral or circular figurations throughout the text.  
 In addition to the rhetorical (and gendered) dilation of the repetitive “chrie,’ the other 
“excess” in the play that critics have flagged is the character of Antiochus. The introduction of 
Antiochus into the play has been critiqued as nothing but a means to expand the simple action of 
saying goodbye into a full five-act play: “Ses adieux (Antiochus) à Bérénice sont de l’invention 
du Poète pour gagner du temps, pour tricher et pour fournir un Acte” (Villars, 511).149 However, 
more than merely adding a superfluous character to flesh out what would have otherwise been a 
ridiculously short tragedy, Racine seems to insist on Antiochus’ necessity in the drama; 
Antiochus is the character who speaks both the opening and closing lines of the play.
150
 Leaving 
aside, however, these formal qualities highlighting his importance, in my reading Antiochus 
serves as necessary third figure in the play, acting as a prism or even an erotic conduit through 
which Titus’ and Bérénice’s love can be measured, articulated, and witnessed.  
The supposed paucity of action and excess of rhetorical “chrie” intertwine to mark a 
certain inarticulate erotics.  Far from being aesthetic faults of the drama, what critics have 
dismissed as non-action or as repetition derives from reading and understanding the play through 
normative temporal lenses: certain expectations of progress derive from fixed notions of what 
                                                 
149
 « His goodbyes (Antiochus’) to Bérénice are the invented imaginings of the author to gain some time, to cheat 
and to stretch it out to an Act”  
150
 “À côté de ce couple, le rôle d’Antiochus—personnage semi-historique rapproché d’un duo historique—n 'a 
cessé de troubler la critique depuis trois siècles, au point que certains y voient la grande faiblesse de la pièce : au 
pire, on le traite de ‘confident monté en grade’, au mieux, on en fait un personnage purement fonctionnel… 
Autrement dit, sous le couvert de permettre à Titus d’esquiver le spectacle de la souffrance de Bérénice, il sert à 
retarder cette explication. Du coup, après la grande rencontre entre les amants du quatrième acte, son rôle semble 
terminé et il ne paraît plus que de manière intermittente… Comme le dit l’abbé de Villars, Antiochus serait donc le 
rôle qui permet de faire de la matière d’une scène une pièce tout entière. Et en effet, son apparition dans quatorze 
scènes (contres quinze à Titus et onze à Bérénice) et le fait que Racine lui prête trois cent cinquante vers (à peine 
cinquante vers de moins que Bérénice) ne paraissent se justifier que par ce souci d’extension d’une matière 
extrêmement ténue[…]Cependant, si ce personnage se réduit à n’être qu’un rôle purement fonctionnel, il rest à 
comprendre pourquoi il reparaît au quatrième acte après l’explication décisive entre les deux amants, pourquoi 
Racine insiste sur le pathétique de sa propre situation […] et enfin pourquoi c’est à lui que revient d’exprimer le 
dernier soupir de la pièce”(Forestier, 1465). 
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tragic drama, or historical sovereignty “should” look like.  There are certain hegemonies of 
intimacy and gender that govern these normative temporal lenses: one is the primacy of 
understanding the play through figure of the couple, or the duo, the exclusion of something more 
ambiguously polyamorous, fluid, and triadic.  
The play is usually analyzed in terms of pairs, of the pathos of the invitus invitam—the 
sorrowfully departed male/female couple. Such readings erase Antiochus’ attachment to Titus, 
the ways that Titus relies upon Antiochus’ voice and witnessing eyes, and the manner in which 
Antiochus’ love for Bérénice is always presented in mirrored comparison to Titus’ love, which I 
will analyze in a later section. I argue that the eroticism ungirding the dynamics of this triad 
relies on a temporality that is “dilated”—undecided, repetitive, yet full of possibilities. Such an 
ambiguously erotic triangulation is especially enabled by the circular, non-linear temporality— a 
temporality that is only possible when the (sovereign) decision fails to take effect. And fittingly, 
it is not just any decision, but precisely the decision that must be made regarding the hymen, or 
impending possibility of marriage.   
 In addition to the exclusionary gesture that the primacy of the couple performs, another 
factor that creates “blinders” is the investment in depicting Bérénice as specifically Oriental, 
exoticized and otherized, a racial identity and gendered femininity that, in scholarship of the 
play, serves as both the justificatory principle for her banishment as well as the originary source 
of her seduction. It is my contention that such an overdertermined description of Bérénice acts as 
an overly simplified “red herring”—in other words, such an obvious “Other,” presented in 
excessive Orientalist splendor, distracts us from paying attention to subtler, less obvious 
“otherized” sexualities or gender positions, other inarticulate erotics.    
 
II. Dilation, Delay, Desire 
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Racine’s play so strictly follows the classical ideals that blood and death are both 
eliminated from the stage that it effaces the traces of the body itself. Mitchell Greenberg also 
takes up the Racine citation “Toute l’invention consiste à faire quelque chose de rien” but 
suggests that the site of this “rien” points to something else:  
By eliminating death as a necessity for his tragedy, Racine shifts the locus of 
tragic intensity from a culpable body, a body that is the site of sin, and places it in 
a noncernable ‘other space.’ The trace scenario shifts from the palpable, the 
tactile, the manipulable, from the thing, the body itself, and becomes rather a 
purely undefinable, ungraspable, absence: a no/thing, a rien. It is precisely this 
‘no/thing’ that Racine tells us, in his preface, that Bérénice represents (CS, 136). 
However, instead of thinking of the “rien” as an allegorical placeholder for the body’s 
banishment on the French neo-classical stage, or as a zero-basis on which “chrie” or repetitive 
fluff could be embroidered, we need to consider the rhetorical strategies by which this “rien” is 
produced  itself, taking the generation of rien seriously. To reappropriate an oft-repeated 
Shakespeare pun stemming from a different play, instead of a no/thing, we could read “nothing” 
as an ‘O’ thing — by reconsidering the “rien” of open space specifically in relation to language, 
gender and sexuality.  
 In Patricia Parker’s article “Deferral, Dilation, Différance” and in her seminal study 
Literary Fat Ladies, she argues that the relationships between delay, gender and rhetorical excess 
coincide in the Renaissance figure of dilation:  
Derrida’s punning ‘différance’ is silent on this third term from that single Latin 
root, that of dilatio or dilation, which in Renaissance usage in its verbal form 
meant not only to expand, disperse, or spread abroad, but also to put off, 
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postpone, prolong, or protract— meanings that still linger in the modern English 
‘dilatory.” But it is, as we shall see, this particular term for the combination of 
temporal deferral and spatial extension which crucially defines the self-reflexive 
strategies of a wide range of Renaissance texts, in which ‘dilation’ as delay 
functions as a kind of semantic crossroads, a complex in which constructs 
rhetorical and narrative, philosophical and theological, judicial and erotic overlap 
as figures for the space and time of the text itself (LFL 182-183). 
Parker’s work highlights the spatial and sexual dimension of the Latin differe, which she relates 
to but distinguishes from Derrida’s différance.  Parker reads the Renaissance concerns with 
dilation and delay as “finally caught within the horizon of a telos or ending, however tentatively 
or self-consciously construed” whereas she reads Derrida’s différance as being unlimited 
(“Deferral” 204). The renaissance context in which Parker reads dilation requires some sort of 
eschatological horizon, or an end, against which or in sight of which renaissance writings 
struggle, desire, and turn away.
151
  
If Parker’s analysis of dilation adds a gendered (third) supplement to the spatial and 
temporal “spacing” inherent in différance, Derrida’s own analysis of the forked meanings of 
differe also complements Parker’s work by underscoring the necessity of temporization.  Derrida 
insists on différance being neither a word nor a concept; instead of providing a definition, he 
traces the movement of différance by way of semantic analysis, to bring to light an amalgam and 
plurality of meanings that différance enacts.   
                                                 
151
 The infinity that différance can enact is well summarized by Martin Hägglund in his book Radical Atheism; “In 
contrast, différance articulates the negative infinity of time. No moment is given in itself but is superseded by 
another moment in its very event and can never be consummated in a positive infinity. The negative infinity of 
time is an infinite finitude, since it entails that finitude cannot ever be eliminated or overcome. The infinite 
finitude of différance is at work before, within, and beyond anything one may circumscribe as being. Différance 
is thus without being but not because it is something ineffable that transcends time and space. On the contrary, 
différance is nothing in itself because it designates the spacing of time that makes it impossible for anything to 




[Il y a] deux motifs du differre latin, à savoir l’action de remettre à plus tard, de 
tenir compte, de tenir le compte du temps et des forces dans une opération qui 
implique un calcul économique, un détour, un délai, un retard, une réserve, une 
représentation, tous concepts que je résumerai ici d’un mot dont je ne me suis 
jamais servi mais qu’on pourrait inscrire dans cette chaine : la temporisation. 
Différer en ce sens, c’est temporiser, c’est recourir, consciemment ou 
inconsciemment, à la médiation temporelle et temporasatrice d’un détour 
suspendant l’accomplissement ou le remplissement du ‘désir’ ou de la ‘volonté’, 
l’effectuant aussi bien sur un mode qui en annule ou en tempère l’effet. cette 
temporisation est aussi temporalisation et espacement, devenir-temps de l’espace 
et devenir-espace du temps, ‘constitution originaire’ (DF 80)152 
We are familiar with différance’s role in  structuralist meaning- how the sign signifies insofar as 
it indicates its difference from what it is not (what is not-there, but what is not-it).  Différance 
also works temporally, insofar as it defers meaning’s presence. But what is interesting here that 
Derrida highlights is the necessity of mediation (temporizing).  And we can’t forget that “to 
temper” also has the connotations of adding something in order to moderate, dilute, or even 
neutralize what would otherwise have been extreme. This additional moderation, or neutrality, as 
embodied in the figure of Antiochus, we shall see, is key to the temporal dilation’s spiraling 
increase. There is a way in which the addition of the neutral, to moderate or mediate, is indeed 
the operative key that opens and incites the whole dilatory operation.  
                                                 
152
 This word combines the two motifs of the Latin differe, to wit, the action of putting off until later, of taking 
account of time and of the forces of an operation that implies an economical calculation, a detour, a delay, a relay, a 
reserve, a representation—concepts that I would summarize here in a word I have never used but that could be 
inscribed in this chain: temporization. Différer in this sense is the temporize, to take recourse, consciously or 
unconsciously, in the temporal and temporizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or 
fulfilment of ‘desire’ or ‘will,’ and equally effects this suspension in a mode that annuls or tempers its own effect 
[…]  this temporization is also a temporalization and spacing, the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space 
of time, the “originary constitution” of time and space (“La Différance” 8)  
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Dilation can help us understand the particular gendered ways that temporality and 
rhetoric are intertwined. Parker associates the figure of dilation with the “literary fat lady.” While 
not necessarily physically “large,”  this “fat lady” highlights the role that feminine excess plays 
in renaissance texts-- whether in terms of swelling bodies or generational increase, temporal 
dilations or delays, to excessive female speech or even the unfillable space of unsatiated 
feminine desire. Of Parker’s “literary fat ladies” that serve as several different key organizing 
tropes in Renaissance literature, I have drawn on four main paradigms that thread through my 
reading of Bérénice.  The first is one akin to what Forestier calls the chrie.  Parker remarks on 
the gendered and geographical associations of excessive speech:  
This tradition of rhetorical dilatio – with references to the ‘swelling’ style or its 
relation to the verbal ‘interlarding’ produced through an excessive application of 
the principle of ‘increase’ […]  Ascham’s Schoolmaster  treats of the use of 
‘epitome’ in reducing the inflated bulk of an oration through the example of the 
need to put an ‘overfat’ and ‘fleshy’ style on a diet.  Though fat is not gendered as 
female in this passage from Scham, it most definitely is in anti-Ciceronian 
contrastings of a more effeminate Ciceronian or Asiatic style—linked with 
‘bignesse’ as well as prodigality—to the more virile Attic […] A similar contrast, 
with the appropriate shift of symbolic locus, informs the opposition of fat and 
effeminating Egypt to lean and virile Rome in Shakespeare’s Antony and 
Cleopatra (14). 
The supposed “pithiness” of Ascham’s epitome, or example, stands as a “point” to which a 
meandering, repetitive discourse could close.  Inflation, in regards to hyperbole as well as to 
repetition characterizes the speeches the characters give at the end of the play:  Bérénice 
threatens suicide faced with Titus’ abandon, Antiochus also entertains the thought of ending his 
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life, and Titus offers to give up the empire in order to love her.  In this final act, Titus gives a 
speech that reveals his indecision. While he had previously confirmed to others that he would 
send Bérénice away, here he tries to take back his declaration:  
Oui, Madame. Et je dois moins encore vous dire 
Que je suis prêt pour vous abandonner l’empire,  
De vous suivre, et d’aller trop content de mes fers 
Soupirer avec vous au bout de l’univers. 
Vous-même rougiriez de ma lâche conduite 
Vous verriez à regret marcher à votre suite 
Un indigne empereur sans empire, sans cour 
Vil spectacle aux humains des faiblesses d’amour (V, 6, 1399-1406)153 
The gendered overtones of restraint compared to indulgence cannot be overlooked. In this 
instance Titus not only paints himself as weak and felled by emotion, but he also uses this “fat” 
style of over-repetition, fixating at length on the fact that he is ready to give up his empire simply 
to trail after Bérénice forever (this is only a seven line sample of a sixty-line monologue in which 
he expresses much the same sentiment). Just as such rhetorical dilation is linked to geographical 
place (East versus West) in Parker’s argument, it is significant that Titus imagines himself in “no 
place,”  or rather hopes to be in “any place” that is not the Roman empire, intending to simply 
follow Bérénice wherever she goes. This excess, overall, proves to be too much for Bérénice: 
Arrêtez.  Arrêtez.  Princes trop généreux 
                                                 
153
 Yes, Madame.  And I should not tell you 
that I am ready to abandon my Empire for you 
To follow you, and to go, quite happy with my chains 
To sigh, next to you, even to the ends of the universe. 
You yourself will blush at my cowardly choice 
You will regret to see, walking by your side 
A shameful emperor without empire, without a court 
Ugly spectacle to others, of the weaknesses of love.  
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En quelle extrémité me jetez-vous tous deux ! 
Soit que je vous regarde, ou que je l’envisage,  
Partout du désespoir je rencontre l’image.  
Je ne vois que des pleurs.  Et je n’entends parler 
Que de trouble, d’horreurs, de sang prêt à couler (V, 7, 1469-1474)154 
Significantly, Bérénice draws upon the figures of liquidity in tears and blood—markers of bodily 
excess --to reject the nature of this repetitive, fat copia.  If Ascham prescribes a lean and spare 
epitome or example to cut the “fat” of overly repetitive style; similarly, with the word “example” 
itself the drama comes almost abruptly to a close. Bérénice’s final speech, punctured by the 
brusque “Arrêtez” is given in a comparatively shorter, cleaner style than that of Titus’ romantic 
ramblings.  Later, she summarizes: 
Je l’aime, je le fuis.  Titus m’aime, il me quitte.  
Portez loin de mes yeux vos soupirs, et vos fers. 
Adieu, servons tous trois d'exemple à l'univers 
De l'amour la plus tendre, et la plus malheureuse, 
Dont il puisse garder l'histoire douloureuse (V, 7, 1500-1504).
155
 
Example, here, condenses the circular or repetitive temporality to a pithy point, a kernel that is to 
be imitated by future generations to come.  Plotted as such on a linear, pedagogically progressive 
trajectory, it marks a definitive exit from the dilatory temporality of love, delay, and sorrow that 
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 Stop. Stop.  You overkind princes 
Both of you thrust me in such an extreme position 
Everywhere I look, or what I imagine ahead  
I only see the image of despair.  
I see nothing but tears.  And I only hear of 
Trouble, horrors, and blood ready to be spilt.  
155
 I love him, I flee him.  Titus loves me, he leaves me.  
Take away, far from me, your sighs and your chains 
Goodbye, let’s serve, the three of us, as an example to the universe.  
Of the most tender and woeful love 
So that the sorrowful story can be preserved.  
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the three had indulged in earlier.  
 If dilation in the text is characterized as feminine excess in copia, or what Parker calls the 
“effeminate Ciceronian… ‘bignesse’” (14), we might also consider a second sense of dilation in 
terms of the narrative structure as a whole, “the dilatory meandering of plot or romance” and the 
“narrative topos of overcoming a female enchantress or obstacle en route to completion and 
ending” (Parker, 11).  Racine drew upon the tale of Dido and Aeneas analogously to justify his 
take of Bérénice, and it is this same tale that Parker employs to highlight the importance of delay 
in light of narration itself “such indulgence in romance was a form of dilatoriness or dalliance, 
preventing all such latter-day Aeneases from getting on with business more proper to them” (11).  
In this sense, delay not only furnishes “assez de matière” but it also points to a discord between 
temporal economies: one of sovereign progress pitted against one of seductive dalliance.  Paulin, 
Titus’ advisor, draws upon a similar history of romances to illustrate his point that Titus can no 
longer put off Bérénice’s repudiation: 
Jules, qui le premier la soumit à ses armes,  
Qui fit taire les lois dans le bruit des alarmes, 
Brûla pour Cléopatre, et sans se déclarer,  
Seule dans l’Orient la laissa soupirer 
Antoine qui l’aima jusqu’à l’idolâtrie 
Oublia dans son sein sa gloire et sa patrie 
Sans oser toutefois se nommer son époux 
Rome l’alla chercher jusques à ses genoux 
Et ne désarma point sa fureur vengeresse 
Qu’elle n’eût accablé l’amant et la maîtresse (II, 2, 387-397)156 
                                                 
156
 Julius who first submitted Rome to his arms 
who silenced the law under the noise of alarm 
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Paulin here points to the dangers of such romantic delay, insofar as it numbs and neuters the 
force of sovereignty, whether through the silencing of laws or the forgetting of obligations. 
Parker proposes that we can contrast the “resolutely teleological drive of epic in its repeated 
injunctions to ‘break off delay’ (rumpe moras)” with the narrative drive itself, with the “romance 
delaying tactics […] which disrupt or postpone the end promised from the beginning” (13).  And 
indeed, what is staged, possibly most blatantly, is precisely this delay, and the affective impact of 
such delay in the face of such female “enchantresses”.157  So when the play’s first line, “Arrêtons 
un moment” (I, 1, 1) (“Wait a moment”) is spoken by Antiochus, we are launched into a 
paradoxical temporality, where the beginning is that of stasis, or rather the beginning of an 
extended, staged paralysis.   
Narrative delay, in this play, is condensed in not only the historical specter of the 
distracting Aenean dalliance, but also in the recurring figure of silence, and the weighty effort 
required to speak.  Titus says that despite the fact that he has made his decision, he cannot find 
the language or even the force to abide by the rules of sovereign conduct expected of him and to 
send her away:  
Résolu d’accomplir ce cruel sacrifice 
J’y voulus préparer la triste Bérénice.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Burned for Cleopatra, but never confessed it 
And left her, sighing in the Orient.  
Antony who loved her to the point of idolatry 
Forgot his glory and his nation 
and still avoided taking her as his wife. 
Rome brought him to his knees  
And was unceasing in such vengeful fury 
that both the lover and the mistress were brought down.  
157
 Roland Racevskis writes, “The atmosphere of tense anticipation and unrealized activity manifests itself 
physically, as Maskell points out: ‘The gap between potential and actual bodily contact can general theatrical 
tension. Suspense is created when an arrest is anticipated, because the spectactor has a visual image of actual arrest, 
conditioned by his previous experience. The same kind of tension can be generated in the case of embraces, which 
may be seen on stage of may be the focus of expectant anticipation.” The corporeal tensions that can be elucidated in 
the theatrical subdiscipline of proxemics find in their verbal analogue in the interplay between utterance and silence 
in interrogative dialogue, another significant source of dramatic tension”(TP 33). 
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Mais par où commencer ? Vingt fois depuis huit jours,  
J’ai voulu devant elle en ouvrir le discours, 
Et dès le premier mot ma langue embarrassée 
Dans ma bouche vingt fois a demeuré glacée (II, 2, 471-476)
158
  
In this sense “opening” the dialogue (“ouvrir le discours), another form of dilation, is impeded 
by Titus’ “langue embarrassée.”  The sexualized double-entendre of the tongue’s impotence is 
underscored by the organ’s inability to “open” discourse due to its frozen immobility. And such a 
delay is internal to the plot itself, insofar as Titus refuses to tell Bérénice himself, but asks 
Antiochus send her away on his behalf, not aware that Antiochus is also in love with Bérénice 
and has just confessed this secret to her.  
As an extension of this emplotted delay, dilation can also be linked to the temporality of 
sexual pleasure, bringing us to the third sense of dilation, “an erotic one within a specific 
masculinist tradition—the putting off of coitus or consummation which Andreas Capellanus 
describes as a feminine strategy in the art of love, a purportedly female plot in which holding a 
suitor at a distance creates the tension of a space as well as an intervening time” (Parker 16).  
Consummation in this play, however, is not literal, but rather allegorized as speech or as a 
declaration.  Barthes remarks, “l’on sait combine la voix est sexualisée dans le théâtre racinien, 
et singulièrement dans Bérénice, tragédie de l’aphasie” (96).159 The erotics of such a struggling-
to-speak is most dramatized by Antiochus, who is silenced by Bérénice for five years before 
finally breaking the silence and expressing his love:  
Votre bouche à la mienne ordonna de se taire 
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 Resolved to undertake this cruel sacrifice, 
I wanted to forewarn sad Bérénice 
But where to begin?  Twenty times in eight day 
I wanted to speak to her 
But my tongue was stuck even on the very first word 
And in my mouth, twenty times, my tongue lay there frozen.  
159
  We know how much the voice is sexualized in Racinian theater, and particularly in Bérénice, tragedy of aphasia. 
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Je disputai longtemps, je fis parler mes yeux. 
Mes pleurs et mes soupirs vous suivaient en tous lieux. 
Enfin votre rigueur emporta la balance,  
Vous sûtes m’imposer l’exil, ou le silence (I, 4, 200-204).160  
Whereas Titus attempts to ‘open’ discourse by dilating his frozen-shut mouth, Antiochus gives 
an account of mouths being silenced by pressed-together lips (with all of the erotic implications 
of the proximity of “votre bouche à la mienne.”)  In response to this closure, Antiochus struggles 
against the excess leakages of tears, sighs, and gazes that he cannot contain.   
Even though Bérénice has already left for Rome, Antiochus’ suspended state of desire, 
unspeakable and unfulfillable, means that he can only retrace again and again their same circular 
path: “Je demeurai longtemps errant dans Césarée,/ Lieux charmants, où mon coeur vous avait 
adorée/  Je vous demandais à vos tristes États, / Je cherchais en pleurant les traces de vos pas ” (I, 
4, 235-239).
161
  The putting-off of erotic fulfilment only heightens his desire to see, speak, and to 
be either reciprocated or rejected.  At the same time, the lengthy wait time only seems to increase 
his desire for the time of desire: “Exemple infortune d’une longue constance/ Après cinq ans 
d’amour, et d’espoir superflus/ Je pars, fidèle encore quand je n’espère plus” (I, 2, 44-46).162  
Barthes argues that Antiochus’ function in the play is to serve as a foil of constancy and waiting 
in contrast to Titus’ repudiation: “On le sait, il y a chez Racine un vertige de la fidélité. Ce 
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 Your mouth ordered my mouth to silence 
I struggled for a long time, I willed my eyes to speak 
My tears and my sighs trailed after you always 
Finally your rigor tipped the scales 
You threatened me with either exile or silence.  
161
 I lingered for a long time in Cesarea 
Beautiful places, where my heart had worshipped you 
I asked after you, always 
I sought, weeping, the traces of your footsteps 
162
 “Unlucky example of a long-drawn fidelity/ after five years of love, and superfluous hope/ I leave, yet still 
committed to her though I can hope no more” 
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déchirement, attesté dans toutes les tragédies de Racine, trouve dans Bérénice son expression la 
plus claire du fait que l’infidèle Titus est pourvu d’un double fidèle: Antiochus” (95).163   
At the same time, I would suggest that Barthes has mis-diagnosed the doubling at stake 
here; Titus is not straightforwardly “infidèle,” in fact, it is his faithful attachment to Bérénice that 
causes him to renege on his decision and waver back and forth between promising marriage and 
promising to send her away.  Antiochus and Titus are, in fact, doubled in another way: their 
desire for dilation.  Both struggle against but also depend on silence, and speaking, in a way that 
eroticizes the delay itself.  Both seek to “open” (mouths, discourse) but it is not actual speech 
that they seek but rather the anticipatory temporality of waiting to puncture this silence that they 
cultivate and develop. So while Titus, on the surface seems to regret the delay that such silence 
engenders, “Ma bouche, et mes regards muets depuis huit jours/ L'auront pu préparer à ce triste 
discours” (III, 1, 737-738), he still talks about his silence with references to his tongue, his 
mouth, giving an almost sexual corporeality to his experience of this silent delay. Similarly, in 
the scene in which Antiochus is meant to reveal to Bérénice the cause of Titus’ silence, her 
demands ring with desperation, and yet there is still a similitude between a sexual and aural 
craving here: “Et vos refus cruels, loin d’épargner ma peine/ Excitent ma douleur, ma colère, ma 
haine. (III, 3, 875-6).  Antiochus’ silence, delaying the moment of truth, does not neutralize or 
numb, but rather arouses her emotions.  Finally, when Antiochus agrees to divulge Titus’ news, 
he says: “Madame, après cela je ne puis plus me taire/ Hé bien, vous le voulez, il faut vous 
satisfaire/ […] Je connais votre cœur.  Vous devez vous attendre/ Que je vais le frapper par 
l’endroit le plus tendre” (III, 3, 887-888 ; 891-892), the innuendo of “satisfying” Bérénice’s 
desire to know, and the revelation of knowledge (the end of the delay) is couched in terms of 
striking a tender spot, the sexual overtones of which cannot be ignored.  
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 “We know that in Racine’s work there is a vertigo of fidelity.  This cleaving, apparent in all of Racine’s tragedies, 
finds its clearest expression in Bérénice in the fact that the unfaithful Titus is given a faithful double: Antiochus” 
(91)  
 174 
 A final dilation or womanly “bignesse” (Parker, 14) is, of course, that of pregnancy, one 
that is not touched on explicitly in the play, but the proleptic specter of which is used as 
justification for Bérénice’s departure.  Fear of foreignness is further exacerbated by wariness of 
feminine procreative powers when Paulin, Titus’ advisor, implies that children born of the union 
between Titus and Bérénice would never be acceptable to Rome: “Rome, par une loi, qui ne se 
peut changer,/ N'admet avec son sang aucun sang étranger,/ Et ne reconnaît point les fruits 
illégitimes” (II, 2, 377-379) (Rome, by a law that can never be changed/ Will not allow mixed 
with its blood any foreign blood/ and will never recognize such illegitimate offspring). So part of 
what is at stake here is controlling dilation and generational progeny.  In order to control an 
illegitimate dilation, and to wrest this delayed time to one of acceptable sovereign progress, 
Bérénice must go.  Parker writes, “Dilation as the ‘opening’ of a closed text to make it ‘increase 
and multiply’ and to transform its brevity into discourse ‘at large,’ then, joins dilation as both 
sexual and obstretical ‘opening’ and the production of generational increase” (15).  
 The importance of dilation in Bérénice also brings out two interrelated figures: the 
“point”—as in the end-point of the long dilatory delays or the pithy kernel puncturing the 
fattened rhetoric, and the “wall” or partition which paradoxically subdivides the text (multiplying 
it into ‘members’) while also controlling increase. And such a puncturing “point” and dividing 
wall, the temporality of romantic completion, or the time of erotic delay, the relationship to the 
dilatory female body-- all converge in the figure of the hymen.   
 
III. Enter the Hymen, Between 
 
From différance, Derrida suggests, we are not far from the hymen, since it is a figure that 
inscribes différance within itself.  Derrida reminds us of the double sense of the word “hymen” 
in French: the nuptial union as well as the virginal membrane that is torn.  It is, in fact “entre” 
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(between two, the two spouses, but also the two vaginal walls) and in the sound of the word one 
can also hear the word “antre,” which in archaic French means “Cavene, lieu vide, concave, en 
forme de voûte, est le terme générique” (261) (Cavern, empty space, concave, in the form of a 
vault, is the generic term) The 1680 Richelet dictionary defines it as “caverne [Un antre obscure, 
noir, profond]”(34), resonating with the “bignesse” of the dilatory space.” And fittingly, the play 
takes place in an antechamber, a waiting space or a non-space between the queen’s bedroom and 
Titus’s:  
Souvent ce cabinet superbe et solitaire 
Des secrets de Titus est le dépositaire 
C’est ici quelquefois qu’il se cache à sa cour, 
Lorsqu’il vient à la reine expliquer son amour.  
De son appartement cette porte est prochaine 
Et cette autre conduit dans celui de la reine (I, 1, 3-8) 
The “entre” of the space of the play itself literalizes and redoubles the “entre” ambiguity of the 
hymen.  Such a room, un “lieu vide” like Derrida’s “antre,” is critical because it is a neutral, 
apolitical space separated from the goings-on of the court. Neither political, nor sexual, such a 
“cabinet” is the passage, or conduit between Titus’ and Bérénice’s rooms while remaining 
distinct from (and prior to) the bedroom.  Such a tense division is highlighted in a scene where 
Bérénice is threatening suicide, once confronted with Titus’ rejection, but the Senate is 
demanding to speak to Titus.  The birfurcation of Titus’s sovereign duties pulling him between 
the lover’s desires and the Senate’s demands is evidenced in the line split:  
  PAULIN: Venez, Seigneur, passons dans la chambre prochaine 
  Allons voir le Sénat 
  ANTIOCHUS :  Ah ! courez chez la reine.  (IV, 8, 1247-1248) 
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This “entre/antre” of the “cabinet superbe” carves out a zone that is neither public nor private, 
and yet can’t help but gesture toward the sexualization or politicization of space.   
As such, the “hymen” stands as the marker of the convergence of two distinct bodies (the 
collapsing of difference between man and wife, or the unified membrane linking together of two 
distinct walls/selves/entities)  as well as the marker of difference (the mark of hymenal rupture, 
or even the unpunctured division between the inside [antre] and outside).  In other words, one 
could think of the hymen as materializing and temporalizing différance itself.  Derrida writes that 
the hymen itself plays on the “entre,” verbalizing the noun and effectively performing an “entre” 
of being “between” dialectically opposed meanings:  
L’hymen, consumation des différents, continuité et confusion du coït, mariage se 
confond avec ce dont il parait dériver: l’hymen comme écran protecteur, écrin de 
la virginité, paroi vaginale, voile très fin et invisible, qui, devant l’hystère, se tient 
entre le dedans et le dehors de la femme, par conséquent entre le désir et 
l’accomplissement. Il n’est ni désire ni le plaisir mais entre les deux. Ni l’avenir 
ni le présent, mais entre les deux (DS 262).
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The hymen figures in multiple instances throughout the play, and while it is used most 
specifically, and literally, to mean “marriage,” the characters still balance a plurality of 
significations that the word holds.  It is the reason why Antiochus, in the first scene, will either 
flee or linger: “Sur son hymen j’attends qu’elle s’explique” (I, 3, 127).165 It is the “point” in 
which Titus’ and Bérénice’s five-year dilatory relationship will hopefully culminate: “Il est donc 
vrai, Madame? Et selon ce discours/ L’hymen va succéder à vos longues amours” (I, 4, 149-
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 “The hymen, the consummation of differends, the continuity and confusion of the coitus, merges with what it 
seems to be derived from: the hymen as a protective screen, the jewel box of virginity, vaginal partition, the fine, 
invisible veil which, in front of the hystera, stands between the inside and the outside of the woman, 
consequently between desire and desire’s fulfillment. It is neither desire nor pleasure, but between the two.  
Neither future nor present, but between the two” (Trans. Barbara Johnson 223) 
165




 The hymen, and the law preventing mixed marriages, stands as a symbolic law of Roman 
order.  Paulin points out that even Caligula and Nero “Foulèrent à leurs pieds toutes les lois de 
Rome,/ Ont craint cette loi seule, et n’ont point à nos yeux/ Allumé le flambeau d’un hymen 
odieux” (II, 2, 400-403).167  In a sense, the horrific excesses of these tyrants, stopping just short 
of overstepping this arbitrary line, amplifies the law’s importance.  As Mitchell Greenberg notes, 
“…there is a rhetorical difference between empire as something quintessentially Roman, and 
furthermore, quintessentially Roman precisely because ‘kings’ have been historically eliminated 
from the Roman political sphere, as well as queens” (CS 83).  Titus himself notes that he has 
been raised on an ideology against royalty: “…N’est-tu pas dans ces lieux/ Où la haine des Rois 
avec le lait sucée,/ Par crainte, ou par amour, ne peut être efface?” (IV, iv, 1014-5).  This 
prejudice against royalty seems to be ingrained in Roman upbringing, and thus any infusion of 
another type of culture, such as a tradition of royal power that Bérénice represents (as opposed to 
Roman imperial power) could potentially dilute and taint the integrity of Roman culture that 
requires this supplement to subtend itself.  Paulin, Titus’ advisor says, approvingly, once Titus 
affirms that he will send Bérénice away:  
Je n’attendais pas moins de cet amour de gloire 
Qui partout après vous attacha la victoire.  
La Judée asservie, et ses remparts fumants,  
De cette noble ardeur éternels monuments  
[…] 
Et qu’un héros vainqueur de tant de nations 
Saurait bien, tôt ou tard, vaincre ses passions (II, 2, 491-494 ; 497-498)
168
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 “Is it thus true, Madame ? And according to this talk/ Your marriage will cap off your lengthy romance.” 
167
 Dashed the laws of Rome to the ground/ yet feared this law alone, and would never, in front of the Roman 
people/ light the ceremonial flame of such an abhorrent marriage 
168
 I expected nothing less than this glory to come from your love/ Glory that would forever link you to victory/ 
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At the same time, Paulin’s speech underscores the supplementary nature of such a decision.  If 
Titus were truly “un héros vainqueur” and if his military exploits were enough to secure his 
status as sovereign, why would he need this additional (seemingly arbitrary) gesture of sending 
away Bérénice? 
The membranous quality of the hymen, in its veiled indecidability (visible, and yet 
obscuring), will be key to this close analysis of ambiguous eroticism and competing temporal 
economies in Bérénice. The word “voile” itself straddles connotations of both sexual economies 
at stake in the play: the absolutely otherized, exoticized Orientalism as well as the intimacy of 
the “voile d’amitié” that Antiochus refers to repeatedly in order to indicate the neutral (and 
neutered) cover of friendship that he uses to be close to both Bérénice and Titus.  In his opening 
monologue, he says, “Je me suis tu cinq ans. Et jusques à ce jour/ D'un voile d'amitié j'ai couvert 
mon amour” (I, 1, 25-26).169 And it is this veiling that makes the dynamics of substitution, 
sublimation, and circulation between the three possible in the first place.
170
   
In the ambiguity of the word “hymen”, which marks both inside and outside, the hymen 
poses both a temporal and spatial confusion.  And it is a betweenness that is not innocent; in fact 
it is the evidence of (non) violence, of pending rupture (insofar as the hymen is torn in the 
marital union).  Derrida writes:  
C’est l’hymen que le désire rêve de percer de crever dans une violence qui est (à 
la fois ou entre) l’amour et le meurtre. Si l’un ou l’autre avait lieu, il n’y aurait 
pas d’hymen. Mais non plus simplement dans le non-lieu. Avec tout 
                                                                                                                                                             
Judea in chains, its ramparts in ruins/ serve as monuments to your noble strength/ […] and a conquering hero of 
so many nations/ Should know, sooner or later, how to master his passions.  
169
 I have been silenced for five years, and up to this day/ I have concealed my love under a veil of friendship” 
170
 The name Bérénice, deriving from the Greek Βερενίκη (Berenike) has also been Latinized as Veronike, or 
Veronica.  Saint Veronica, sharing not only a homeland (Judée) and a name with Bérénice, is inextricably linked 
miracle of the veil. According to legend, Veronica offered her veil as a sweat-cloth to Jesus during his suffering on 
the Via Dolorosa.  As Jesus wiped his face with the veil, the exact image of his face remained on the cloth.  And the 
cloth itself, thus marked with the image of Jesus’ face, was purported to possess healing qualities.  
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l’indécidabilité de son sens, l’hymen n’a lieu que quand il y a consumation sans 
violence, ou violence sans coup, ou coup sans marque, marque sans marque 
(marge), etc., quand le voile est déchiré sans l’être ” (DS, 262)171 
It seems that Bérénice offers the tragic version of the same--the bloodless rupture, or the 
“consummation sans violence, où violence sans coup.” Bérénice herself must depart, in a kind of 
rupture, before the actual rupture/link of the hymen as marriage can take place.  Sedgwick has 
joked about Austin’s text on performativity: “The marriage ceremony is, indeed, so central to the 
origins of “performativity” (given the strange, disavowed but unattenuated persistence of the 
exemplary in this work) that a more accurate name for How to Do Things with Words might 
have been How to say (or write) “I do” hundreds of times without winding up any more married 
than you started out” (TF 70). The hymen, in this play, is more like an un-marriage ceremony, a 
study in the performatives necessary to unravel ties and the sovereign failure for that unraveling 
to ever be fully enacted.  
 What is strange about the hymen is that it stands as both pli  and accomplissement.  The 
hymen, as broken-off marriage stands as the prosthetic affirmation of Titus’ glory and place as 
sovereign—his ability to sacrifice his desiring, mortal body to the law of the State. The hymen as 
crowning years of love is the apotheosis of a long relation between the two.  For Antiochus, the 
hymen puts a definitive end to years of yearning for Bérénice and watching Titus from afar. At 
the same time, paradoxically, the hymen also promises its own unraveling/ erasing qualities.  
Later in the play, even after Titus has already told Bérénice she must leave, he is so stricken by 
the sight of her tears that he promises her, “Par un heureux hymen je tarisse vos larmes” (V, 6, 
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 “It’s the hymen that desire dreams of piercing, of bursting, in an act of violence that is (at the same time or 
somewhere between) love and murder.  If one or the other did take place, there would be no hymen.  But neither 
would there simply be a hymen in (case events go)  no place. With all the undecidability of its meaning, the 
hymen only takes place when it doesn’t take place, when nothing really  happens, when there is an all-consuming 
consummation without violence, or violence without blows, or a blow without marks, a mark without a mark (a 




 hoping to hold out the hymen as the possibility of erasure, or circling back to the 
prelapsarian moment when the ambiguous, dilatory eroticism could be sustained.   
Obviously not all of these approaches to the hymen can co-exist with each other, and yet  
what the play performs so beautifully is the multiply enfolded meanings in the word itself—that 
it could be both rupture and jouissance, economic payback and token of sovereign glory. In all of 
the hymen’s meanings, from mundane to sublime, what is staged is not the sovereign decision of 
repudiation, but rather the tragedy of indecidability. 
 
IV. The Impossible Threesome and the Veil of Friendship 
 
This indecidability comes to the fore because Titus is in a position where he must decide. 
Since Titus’ father’s death and the subsequent ascension to the imperial throne, Titus has been in 
mourning for eight days, but he still refuses to make a pronouncement in regards to his marriage 
to Bérénice. Given this waiting period and ambiguous silence from Titus, we actually enter the 
story from Antiochus’ perspective.  Antiochus wants to see Bérénice intending only to confess 
his love to her, and then leave immediately after, saying “Sur son hymen j'attends qu'elle 
s'explique.”173 His friend and confident Arsace is surprised by Antiochus’ desire to flee. Arsace 
says:  
Je suis surpris sans doute, et c'est avec justice. 
Quoi depuis si longtemps la Reine Bérénice 
Vous arrache, Seigneur, du sein de vos États, 
Depuis trois ans dans Rome elle arrête vos pas, 
Et lorsque cette reine assurant sa conquête 
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 “With a happy marriage I will silence your tears.”  
173
 “I wait for her to explain her hymen/marriage”. 
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Vous attend pour témoin de cette illustre fête, 
Quand l’amoreux Titus devenant son époux, 
Lui prépare un éclat qui rejaillit sur vous... (I, 3, 79-86)
174
 
In a sense, Arsace points to the dilatory time that Antiochus has spent, lingering in Rome away 
from his own kingdom.  At the same time, it is this specific “dilated” temporality that allows the 
dynamic between the three of them to flourish in a strange way; Bérénice and Titus can’t simply 
be together, and Antiochus, as the superfluous third, can’t simply depart. She needs Antiochus to 
be the “témoin” to her union, and Antiochus’ necessary presence at the marriage erupts in an 
“éclat qui rejaillit sur vous” (glory that will gush forth on you); the erotic connotations of which 
cannot be ignored.   
One might ask why Antiochus, Roi de Comagène, would ignore his own kingdom for so 
long (and we might compare his situation here to that of Polixenes in The Winter’s Tale). And 
his long-enduring love for Bérénice seems to be one component of that.  But another bond may 
be his friendship, rivalry, and admiration for Titus, magnetic affects that leave him lingering in 
Rome.  Antiochus recounts how he was shoved aside in favor of Titus although whereas 
Antiochus was initially the main contender for Bérénice’s hand,  
Madame, il vous souvient que mon coeur en ces lieux 
Reçut le premier trait qui partit de vos yeux 
J'aimai, j'obtins l'aveu d'Agrippa votre frère. 
Il vous parla pour moi. Peut-être sans colère 
Alliez-vous de mon coeur recevoir le tribut (I, 4, 189-193)
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 I am shocked, doubtlessly, and with reason 
For so long, the Queen Bérénice  
Has grabbed you from the heart of your own State 
For three years, in Rome, she has held you transfixed 
And just as she is ready to secure her conquest 
And waits for you, as witness, to this glorious ceremony 
When the love-struck Titus will become her husband 
He will offer a burst of glory that will spill forth onto you 
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Antiochus participates in the “traditionally” homosocial pathways of exchange, and one that is 
particularly specific to her country, by asking Bérénice’s brother for her hand.  In a sense, 
mapping such a romantic alliance (asking permission, requiring a familial go-between, receiving 
the bride, etc.) posits a certain kind of normative temporality to that desire, one that would 
progress by certain steps and finally come to fruition with Bérénice’s receipt of Antiochus’ 
“tribut.” Titus’ arrival marks a swerve from the previously standing system by which women 
were given and received, but more importantly, sets into motion a different type of affective 
temporality.  Antiochus reminisces:  
Titus, pour mon malheur, vint, vous vit, et vous plut. 
Il parut devant vous dans tout l’éclat d’un homme 
Qui porte entre ses mains la vengeance de Rome. 
La Judée en pâlit. Le triste Antiochus 
Se compta le premier au nombre des vaincus (I, 4, 194-198)
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What is interesting here, however, is that Antiochus is neither resentful, nor bitter.  Titus is 
presented in terms of glorious, virile masculinity, underscored by the plurality of vibrating “v” in 
the first line, and in the phrase “dans tout l’éclat d’un homme”. And in the repetition of the “v”, 
marking the first entrance of Titus into this triad, the spectacle of virility transforms, in the 
following line, into the dilatory openness of “ou” vowels (“parut,” “vous,” “tout”).  Although 
Titus bears the virile “v” of “vengeance” between his hands, it is the doubled sense of “entre” 
that also opens and flags the possibility for the ambiguity, transforming the preposition into 
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 Madame, it might be recalled that my heart 
Was pierced by the first arrow that sprang from your eyes 
I loved, I obtained the promise from Agrippa your brother 
He spoke to you on my behalf.  Perhaps without anger 
You were going to accept my heart’s tribute 
176
 Titus, to my dismay, arrived, saw you, and pleased you 
He, who brought Rome’s vengeance to rain down… 
Judea paled in fear.  The woeful Antiochus 
Counted himself among the first of Titus’ vanquished.  
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Derrida’s playfully open term. Is vengeance death to the Judean rebels, or does the virile “v” 
portend “la petite” mort for Antiochus? Struck by the magnificence of this vision, “La Judée en 
pâlit,” taking the synecdochal country, also coincidentally gendered feminine, to condense both 
the country’s colonized submission with Bérénice’s romantic ravishement/seduction. So far, this 
narrative seems to be adhere to the stereotype of an exoticized feminine other falling prey to the 
virile spectacle of the masculine dominating country. However, what is most intriguing about 
this tale is that Antiochus inserts himself into the story of seduction: “Le triste Antiochus,” 
shares the alexandrine line with “La Judée en pâlit,”the two halves completing the unified line, 
and he puts himself “au nombre des vaincus,” merging with strange equivalences (via the 
doubled “v” of “vaincus” and “vengeance”) the scene of seduction, vainquishment and 
domination.  
 As Antiochus narrates his experience watching Titus seduce Bérénice, his memories are 
less about his own emotions than his mixed (jealous) admiration and triangulated desire 
observing Titus. And it is indeed his affection for Titus that tempers what would have been 
jealous anger: “Inutiles périls ! Quelle était mon erreur !/ La valeur de Titus surpassait ma 
fureur./Il faut qu'à sa vertu mon estime réponde ” (I, 4, 217-219).177  A dynamic of simple rivalry 
is transformed into an odd triangulation through this tempering, moderating the excesses of 
Titus’ glory and Antiochus’ sadness with esteem, or affection for Titus.   
 ANTIOCHUS: Chéri de l’Univers, enfin aimé de vous 
 Il semblait à lui seul appeler tous les coups 
 Tandis que sans espoir, haï, lassé de vivre 
 Son malheureux Rival ne semblait que le suivre 
 […] 
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 Fruitless perils! How I was wrong 
Titus’ glory exceeded my anger 
My esteem for him had to equal his virtue/courage 
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 Il dompta les Mutins, reste pâle et sanglant 
 Des flammes, de la faim, des fureurs intestines 
 Et laissa leurs Remparts cachés sous leurs ruines (I, 4, 217-218 ; 230-233)
178
 
His whole narrative is mostly about Titus and Titus’ exploits.  After he upholds Titus’ “vertu,” 
Antiochus places himself in the position of “suivre” which has the doubled connotation of 
coming in second place, trailing behind, but also closely following and observing. And this 
mixed vision of jealous admiration is highlighted in the narrative, where he takes on Bérénice’s 
perspective and vision, imagining how bold, brave and glorious Titus must appear in her eyes as 
he quelled the Judean uprising.
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  In fact, the majority of his speech that is supposed to be the 
moment of declaring his true feelings for Bérénice actually centers on Titus’ actions; very little 
of it expresses Bérénice’s own qualities.  
 Eve Sedgwick, of course, has drawn upon René Girard to suggest that there are powerful 
homo-social and even homo-erotic dynamics that undergird the triangle of rivalry:  
… in any erotic rivalry, the bond that links the two rivals is as intense and potent as 
the bond that links either of the rivals to the beloved:  that the bonds of ‘rivalry’ and 
‘love,’ differently as they are experienced, are equally powerful and in many senses 
equivalent (BM, 21). 
One of Sedgwick’s main points is that any erotic triangle hinges on the necessary presentation of 
symmetry between the three main players, a symmetry that covers over imbalanced power 
relations (between male-male or between male-female dynamics).  And the key that reveals such 
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 Treasured by the universe, or at least loved by you 
He seemed to direct everything himself 
Meanwhile, hopeless, hated, tired of living 
Titus’ unfortunate Rival only seemed to follow how 
[…] 
He dominated the rebels, pale and bloodied 
Fire, hunger and a roiling fury 
and crumpled their fortress walls beneath ruins  
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a necessary symmetry tends to be the more ambiguously gendered figure in the triad.  Sedgwick 
writes:  
An erotic triangle is likely to be experienced in terms of an explicit or implicit 
assertion of symmetry between genders and between homo- and hetero-social or –
sexual bonds […] The assertion of symmetry will be made possible by a 
suppression of effectual gender differences or by a translation of them into 
factitiously comparable spatial and/or temporal rhetorical figures; the ‘comparable’ 
figures will bear the mark of their asymmetrical origins but not in a way that will 
permit them to be retranslated into an intelligible version of their original condition 
[…] The figure of a person who can be ‘halfway between’ male and female will 
recur as an important topos for the fiction of gender symmetry, but in a form that 
finally reveals the tendentiousness of the assertion of symmetry (BM, 47-48).  
Fittingly, then, Antiochus’ vision of a conquering, virile Titus not only aligns his vision and 
admiration with that of Bérénice, but also underscores his necessary position as neutral, or the 
“halfway between,” the “entre” that enables such triangulation. His jealous anger was tempered, 
but he himself becomes a figure of tempering, muting and neutrality that allows this triadic 
dynamic to persist for five years. The assertion of symmetry (lover/beloved, male/female) is 
almost overly stated, and this neutrality is enacted, even performed, as a symbolic castration 
when Antiochus is ordered by Bérénice to silence his love:  “Votre bouche à la mienne ordonna 
de se taire” (I, 4, 200). Antiochus’ position as a necessary third, then, underscores his capacity as 
neutre (which, we recall, in French means both neutral and neutered), deprived of voice and 
speech, which has been sacrificed toward the (futile) goal of eventually winning Bérénice’s love.  
The dilatory time of delay and silence, necessary to the composition of the triad, incites his 
desire even more to speak/fulfil his long harbored passions.  
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Just as Bérénice’s silencing of Antiochus was necessary to neutralize his love to “amitié” 
(and thus enabling the dilation of triadic dynamics) Titus also needs Antiochus to be a neutral 
(neutered) conduit of expression, both giving and receiving love, farewells, explanations and 
more. “Et je veux seulement emprunter votre voix.” (III, 1, 694) (And I only wish to borrow your 
voice). This silencing both tempers (moderates)  and temporalizes Antiochus’ desire, insofar as 
is absolutely key to Antiochus’ ability to appear under the voile d’amitié, a veil that allows an 
ambiguously indefinite circulation of emotion, replacement and substitution. If we associate such 
imposed silence with the voile, or the hymen, it is in silence’s opposite, speech, that such a 
veil/hymen can be ripped apart. 
180
 In fact, it is the interplay between silence and speaking, 
between the remaining-inarticulate and the pointing-indication that stages the pathos and the 
sexualized “violence” of this tragedy.  
And as Antiochus describes his desolation upon Bérénice’s departure, we must not forget 
that it is not only Bérénice who has left, but also Titus.  Antiochus speaks of an empty loneliness 
but it is sufficiently ambiguous if he is mourning Bérénice’s absence, or rather the absence of 
both of them—including Titus, the rival whom he used to suivre:  
Rome vous vit, Madame, arriver avec lui 
 Dans l’Orient désert quel devint mon ennui 
 Je demeurai longtemps errant dans Césarée 
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 Lyotard’s remarks on silence specfically relate the breaking of silence with a “déchirement,” underscoring the 
violent and sexual dynamics of the hymen:   
Le silence est le contraire du discours, il est la violence en même temps que la beauté ; mais il en est la condition 
puis qu’il est du côté de choses dont il y a à parler et qu’il faut exprimer.  Pas de discours, sans cette opacité à 
tenter de défaire et de restituer, cette épaisseur intarissable.  Le silence résulte du déchirement à partir duquel un 
discours et son objet se placent en vis-à-vis, et commence le travail de signifier ; et il résulte du déchirement 
incorporé à la parole, où le travail d’exprimer s’effectue. (14)   
“Silence is the opposite of discourse, simultaneously violence and beauty; but silence is the very condition of 
discourse since it is also on the side of things of which one must speak that one must express.  There can be no 
discourse without this opacity in trying to undo and restore this inexhaustible thickness.  Silence is the result of 
the ripping-apart that allows discourse and its object to stand vis-à-vis each other, and the work of signification 
to begin; it is the result of the tear, integral to language, where the work of expression occurs”(Hudek and Lydon 
8)  
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Lieux charmants, où mon cœur vous avait adorée.  
Je vous redemandais à vos tristes États, 
 Je cherchais en pleurant les traces de vos pas 
 Mais enfin succombant à ma mélancolie,  
 Mon désespoir tourna mes pas vers l’Italie. 
 Le Sort m’y réservait le dernier de ses coups.  
 Titus en m’embrassant m’amena devant vous.  
 Un voile d’amitié vous trompa l’un et l’autre ;  
Et mon amour devient le confident du vôtre (I, 4, 233-244).
181
  
In this narrative, the “vous” is, on the surface addressed to Bérénice, but there are strange 
doublings in which the “vous” might refer to the both of them.  Antiochus refers to the “vous” in 
the plural : “vous trompa l’un et l’autre” and “mon amour deviant le confident du vôtre.” While 
there may or may not be sufficient matter to argue that he is seeking both of them in the doubled 
“vous,”what is interesting is that after so much waiting, seeking, and following, upon Antiochus’ 
arrival in Italy, the first recounted action is ‘Titus en m’embrassant…”.  And the three of them 
are able to be united together, and to express their affection for one another because of this “voile 
d’amité.”  When Antiochus says, “mon amour devient le confident du vôtre,” he might be 
speaking just of Bérénice’s love, or also the love of Titus (as Titus has confided in him). 
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 Rome saw you, Madame, arrive with him 
How woeful I was, in the deserted Orient 
I lingered for a long time, wandering in Caesaria 
Beautiful places, where my heart had worshipped you 
I asked after you, always 
I sought, weeping, the traces of your footsteps 
But finally, crumbling to my melancholia 
My depair turned my footsteps towards Italy 
Fate had saved its final blows for me 
Titus, embracing me, brought me in front of you 
A veil of friendship fooled both of you 
and my love became merely a listening ear to yours 
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 After Antiochus’ confession, Bérénice’s refusal of his love also takes on a strange 
rhetoric, instead of outright rejecting him, she begins to intertwine her feelings for him with her 
feelings for Titus:  
 […] À regret je reçois vos adieux. 
 Le ciel sait, qu’au milieu des honneurs qu’il m’envoie, 
 Je n’attendais que vous pour témoin de ma joie.  
 Avec tout l’Univers j’honorais vos vertus, 
 Titus vous chérissait, vous admiriez Titus.  
 Cent fois je me suis fait une douceur extrême 
 D’entretenir Titus dans un autre lui-même (I, 4, 266-272).182 
It is strange that on the brink of what she imagines will be her wedding day, she expresses her 
wish (“je n’attendais que vous”) that he serve as witness to her happiness. However, this 
witnessing is not merely a position of a voyeuristic outsider, for as her speech continues, she 
braids together their three affections for each other (honorais, chérissait, admiriez) culminating in 
a strange substitution:  “Titus dans un autre lui-même.” These nebulous dynamics are only 
possible under the cover of the voilé d’amitié:  a veil of supposedly neutral interest that allows 
subsitutions, close admiration, embraces and more to flourish.  And after Antiochus’ departure, 
Bérénice admits, “cette prompt retraite/ me laisse, je l’avoue, une douleur secrète” (I, 5, 287-
288).
183
  It it unclear, however, why this sorrow must be “secret,” or hidden. Perhaps Bérénice is 
alluding to a more obscure source of sadness, insofar as that which has been lost, the 
ambiguously erotic three-way dynamic, is itself inarticulable.  Thus, Bérénice’s mourning is one 
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 “With great regret I accept your goodbyes 
Heaven knows, that out of the thousands of blessings I have received 
I only wanted you, as witness to my happiness. 
I, along with the whole universe, was awed by your virtues 
Titus adored you, you admired Titus 
A hundred times I have given myself the pleasure 
of imagining, in you, a second Titus.”  
183
 “This hasty departure/ I confess, wounds me with a secret pain” 
 189 




 Not only does Bérénice imagine Titus in Antiochus’ place, but before Antiochus can 
leave, Titus actually asks Antiochus to stand in for him.  Titus begins by asserting the strength of 
their three-way bond : “Elle ne voit dans Rome et n’écoute que vous. / Vous ne faites qu’un cœur 
et qu’une âme avec nous” (III, 1, 697- 698).185 Because of this unified heart and soul that Titus 
believe it is feasible to have Antiochus serve as his double. Between the Barthesian diagnosis of 
sexualized speaking and the controlled dynamics of ordered silence, speaking, and the intimacy 
of serving as a “porte-parole” becomes imbricated with an eroticized economy:  
Allez, expliquez-lui mon trouble, et mon silence 
 Surtout qu’elle me laisse éviter sa présence 
 Soyez le seul témoin de ses pleurs, et des miens 
 Portez-lui mes Adieux, et recevez les siens (III, 1, 742-746)
186
  
And, in a further extension of Antiochus’ necessity as a neutral veil (of amitié), as a prize or 
reward for this conduit action, Titus promises Antiochus more land, but land that is, 
significantly between (entre) Antiochus’ kingdom and Bérénice’s:  
Pour rendre vos États plus voisins l’un de l’autre 
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 Mitchell Greenberg has also suggested that the dynamics of unmournable loss undergird this play.  However, in 
contrast to Greenberg’s analysis, I propose that it is the inarticulate erotics of the threesome, or the triad, that is 
mourned; not necessarily the body’s banishment from the stage. : “In the place of actual (represented) death we 
are given a world that, although beyond death, is nevertheless entirely inscribed within the space of an 
impossible loss, within a continuous mourning for a loss that it could only articulate only with the greatest 
difficulty. We know, of course, since Freud, that all melancholia, rather than representing the loss of a particular 
‘object,’ represents something indefinable that has been lost in the object […]Finally, rather than attempt to 
decipher the psychological state of the protagonists, we must look beyond this representation, must see this 
representation as but the allegory of a more profound loss that the play, rather like the Trauerspiel in Benjamin’s 
analysis, mourns in ways that are perhaps forever incomprehensible to itself but that nevertheless succeed (the 
proof of the tears, the only sign, and an exterior one at that, of the body’s presence) in establishing a mortiferous 
bond with its audience.” (138) 
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 In all of Rome she only sees and listens to you/  You make one heart and one soul with the three of us 
186
 “ Go on then, please explain to her my troubles and my silence 
Above all I need her to let me avoid her presence 
Be the sole witness to her tears, and to mine 
Bring her my farewells, and receive hers.  
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L’Euphrate bornera son Empire et le vôtre 
Je sais que le Sénat tout plein de votre nom,  
D’une commune voix confirmera ce don.  
Je joins la Cilicie à votre Comagène (III, 1, 764-767)
187
  
Thus, the gift of territory “entre” materializes and literalizes the role of “entre” that Antiochus 
must serve, a betweenness that is only possible under the veil, or cover, of neutral friendship. 
This neutrality, I argue, is what allows Antiochus to be “evacuated” and to take on the role of 
Titus’ voice, Titus’ stand-in, reporting Bérénice’s farewells, etc.  This evacuation can be thought 
of as representing another form of “antre” – the cavernous hollow. However Antiochus is not 
merely a convenient scapegoat for the dirty work that Titus doesn’t want to do; there is a real 
dynamic and interdependency intertwining them, “entre”.  As Arsace notes: “Trois Sceptres, que 
son bras ne peut seul soutenir/ Vos deux États voisins, qui cherchent à s’unir./  L’intérêt, la 
raison, l’amitié, tout vous lie” (III, 2, 825-827). 188  
Both Titus and Bérénice rely on Antiochus’ presence to witness, speak, and substitute.  
Titus, before going into make his final declaration of love to Bérénice, requires Antiochus’ 
presence: “Venez, Prince, venez, je vous ai fait chercher./ Soyez ici témoin de toute ma 
faiblesse./ Voyez si c'est aimer avec peu de tendresse./ Jugez nous ” (V, 7, 1426- 1429).189   And 
this witnessing is also demanded by Bérénice, when she is disappointed by the fact that 
Antiochus is leaving: “Je n’attendais que vous pour témoin de ma joie.” (I, 4, 268) (I only 
wanted you, as witness to my joys). However, it’s not as if Bérénice and Titus require just any 
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 To make your countries neighbor one another 
The Euphrates will border her Empire and yours 
I know that the Senate, abuzz with your renown 
Will confirm this gift unanimously 
I join Cilesia to your Commagene. ”  
188
 His arms alone cannot hold three Sceptres/ your neighboring States that seek to unite/ Interest, reason, 
friendship—everything links you three” 
189
 Come, Prince, Come, I have brought you here/ Be the witness to my weakness/ See if this is what it means to 
love unlovingly/ judge us 
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person to witness their declarations of love (or repudiations).  Titus, when asking Antiochus to 
speak on his behalf, begs him, “Soyez le seul témoin de ses pleurs, et des miens” (III, 1, 744), a 
position of witnessing that, we recall, Bérénice hoped to place him in as well.  “Témoin” Derrida 
reminds us, derives from testis, which gives us both “testimony” but also, in its root, indicates 
both “the third’ (le tiers) as well as testes.190  There is a sense in which witnessing, or watching, 
or being made to watch becomes eroticized here, especially insofar as Antiochus serves as the 
necessary, neutralized and neutered third.  
This triadic dynamic, however, is erased with the assertion of symmetry or outright 
asymmetry: the imposition of binary lenses on the relationship. Almost all readings of the play 
either ignore Antiochus entirely or else attempt to feminize Antiochus, and thus reducing 
Bérénice a simple story about a dyad-- the repudiation of the Feminine Orient in favor of the 
Masculine Occident.  Longino says, for example 
He  [Antiochus] has allowed himself to be guided by his impossible love for 
Bérénice and his tortured fascination with Titus’s power greater than his own, so 
that he has contributed to sow destruction in the very part of the world that would 
have been his to minister and protect. Expectations for a man are greater than for 
a woman, but a man from this part of the world, it is clear, is hardly a man by 
Western standards. Not only his hopeless love for Bérénice, but his compromised 
status as a man, make of him doubly a woman, and as such a strong signifier of 
the East for the West (168).  
 In other words, by casting Antiochus as feminized and weak, Longino is easily able to sort the 
triad into another reincarnation of a duo.  
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 Derrida writes, «… nous ne tarderons pas, en effet, à buter sur ce motif du tiers dans la scène du témoignage 
possible-impossible, du témoignage possible comme impossible.  Dans son étymologie latine, le témoin (testis), 
c’est celui qui assiste en tiers (terstis).  Nous aurions à y regarder de très près pour comprendre ce que cela 
pourrait impliquer.  Testis a un homonyme en latin. On l’utilise le plus souvent au pluriel pour dire ‘testicule. » 
[…]   Testitrahus  veut dire à la fois entier et mâle, masculine. (PPT¸ 526)   
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For other scholars, the Titus- Bérénice pair is consistently held up the primary analytic. 
For example, Greenberg’s analyses of the play drop Antiochus from the equation. He reads the 
repudiation as allegorical of the problematic of the king’s two bodies, and sees the rejection of 
the feminine (allegorized in the figure of Bérénice) as the victory of the king’s body politic over 
the (desiring, lustful) body mortal.  This allegory hinges on a male-female binary, by 
underscoring the “maternal” aspect of Bérénice and Titus’s relationship as well as the feminine 
Orient to which Bérénice is tied: 
Behind Titus’ military prowess and magnanimity stands the image of Bérénice. 
She leads him away from the easy road of sensual pleasure, away from the 
monstrous sexuality that reigned at Nero’s court and down the thorny path of 
moral rectitude. She certainly appears to occupy a maternal rather than a 
passionate role in Titus’ description of her. This maternal, in the sense of 
nonsexual, and wise pedagogue leads the child-man still captive of his senses out 
of the prison of his body’s pleasure and into the light of mature, that is, 
sublimated, humanitarianism. At the same time she is presented as the 
embodiment of a conventional allegorical representation of the Orient: Bérénice is 
here garbed as Sophia, a traditional figure of Oriental wisdom whose historic 
abode was in the East (in Egypt)[…]It is precisely because of this doubling, of 
this combination of the love-object as maternal and Oriental, that Bérénice is 
doomed (Racine, 127). 
Strangely enough, it is this notion of maternal nurturing and guidance that undergirds 
Titus’ repeated notions of considering the hymen as a type of payment for Bérénice’s efforts. 
And in Titus’ eyes, payment, or the dynamic of indebted and debtor, is another binary relation.  
Being (un)able to pay off debts is still a type of decidability that closes off the openness of the 
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“entre.” He says:  
Je lui dois tout, Paulin. Récompense cruelle!  
Tout ce que je lui dois va retomber sur elle 
Pour prix de tant de gloire et de tant de vertus,  
Je lui dirai, partez, et ne me voyez plus (II, 2, 519-522) 
  
Maintenant que je puis couronner tant d'attraits, 
Maintenant que je l'aime encor plus que jamais, 
Lorsqu'un heureux hymen joignant nos destinées 
Peut payer en un jour les voeux de cinq années (II, 2, 441-444) 
And yet all of these binaries of indebted and debtor, mother and child, conquerer and conquered 
are not incorrect in their analysis.  But it is striking all the same the ways that forgetting the third 
of Antiochus or collapsing him on to the side of femininity is necessary for such a narrative 
binaristic duality to be enacted. All of these readings ignore the ways that Antiochus is, in fact 
actively instrumentalized not only by Titus, but also by Bérénice.  In terms of the play’s action, 
he literally relays messages for and speaks on the behalf of one and the other.  But more than his 
merely mechanized function in the play, Antiochus’ position as tempering third, or 
neutral/neutered middle, or even as a necessary (sexualized) witness,  impedes the possibility of 
Titus to make a clean cut or to announce a definitive decision.  It is through the ever-shifting 
dynamics of this neutralized threesome that a circular, dilatory temporality is made possible.  
 
V. Deictic Presents and the Joug of Sovereign Conjugality 
 
The primacy of the “two” in previous analyses of the play means that extra weight is put on 
the supposed necessary unity of sovereignty.  If the only options are either between the one and 
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the two, between the absolute unity and the fragmented division, then this overattention paid to 
the implications of “sharing” sovereign power itself obscures other possibilities outside the one 
and the two (such as, I would argue, the polyamorous triad or something more openly, “entre”).  
At the same time, considering the place that the hymen held in early modern political 
thought may help us understand the dilatory temporality of indecidability that Titus, Bérénice 
and Antiochus create, as a way of sidestepping and subverting the focus on the one-against-two.  
In a real historical example of a key sovereign indecision with regards to marriage, Drew Daniel 
analyzes the stakes of the so-called “French match” between the Duc d’Alençon and Queen 
Elizabeth.  While such debates surrounding the indivisibility of sovereignty took place nearly a 
century prior to Racine’s Bérénice, there are similar echoes between the two non-marriages.  
Daniel writes:  
The political/ amorous event of a royal marriage marks the creation of a new 
family which ideologically models the institution itself for the families of the 
sovereign’s royal subjects, ripples across civil society with affective disturbance 
and excitation in the form of national “moods” of celebration or anxiety, and, at 
least in the case of the marriage of two sovereigns of different nationalities, royal 
marriage forces the ligature of their corresponding states into a tentative and 
temporary alliance whose terminal reversibility trumps idealized metaphorics of 
“one flesh” in favor of a strategic pact between new kindred who remain potential 
rivals-to-be (242)  
Daniel’s point touches on the fact that sovereign marriages set the tone for certain norms and 
ideologies of sexuality, or a rhetoric underscored by Titus’ remark: “…N’est-tu pas dans ces 
lieux/ Où la haine des Rois avec le lait sucée,/ Par crainte, ou par amour, ne peut être efface?” 
(IV, iv, 1014-5).  Marriage itself held a complicated place in relation to an absolute and 
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indivisible sovereign, especially a marriage that joined together divergent nations.  Jean Bodin 
underscores the absolute nature of sovereignty, saying,  
Que dirons nous donc de celuy qui a du peuple la puissance absoluë, tant et si 
longuement qu’il vivra : En ce cas il faut distinguer :  si la puissance absoluë lui 
est donnee purement et simplement, sans qualité de magistrat, ni de commaissaire, 
ni forme de precaire, il est bien certain que celuy-là est, et se peut dire monarque 
souverain :  car le peuple s’est dessaisi et despouillé de sa puissance souveraine, 
pour ensaisiner et inverstir : et à luy, et en luy transporté tout son pouvoir, 
auctorités, prerogatives, et souveraineté : comme celuy qui a donné la possession 
et proprieté de ce qui luy appertenoit (185-186)  
One context that is frequently overlooked in scholarship of Bérénice is that Titus’ 
seduction of Bérénice was enacted partially through his military glory, stemming, perversely 
enough, from the Roman defeat of Judean rebels—her people. Arsace reminds Antiochus how he 
helped Titus crush Judea: “Un prince qui jadis témoin de vos combats/ Vous vit chercher la 
gloire et la mort sur ses pas,/ Et de qui la valeur par vos soins secondée/ Mit enfin sous le joug la 
rebelle Judée”  (I, 1, 101-104).191 Thus, if in Bodin’s theory, sovereign glory depends on 
denuding the people of their own individual power in order to invest in an overarching 
figurehead, in Bérénice such bowing down is depicted as submission under a “joug” or yoke.  
The“joug” is useful to our analysis here insofar as the term “conjugal,” or the marital unison, 
stems from the same root as the yoke—in fact, the marital term literally means, to be yoked 
together. The yoke combines multiple connotations—mastery and submission, labor and 
productivity, etc.  The displacement of the metaphor covers over the rather violent spectacle of 
imperial domination that Antiochus alludes to in his memory of Titus’s acts, to give one 
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 “A prince [Titus] formerly witness to your fighting/ Saw you seek glory and death, following close on his heels/ 
and whose valor was reinforced by your efforts/ Finally made rebellious Judea succumb to the yoke.” 
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example: “Enfin après un siege aussi cruel que lent/ Il dompta les mutins, reste pale et sanglant/ 
Des flames, de la faim, des fureurs intestines/ Et laissa leurs remparts caches sous leurs ruines” 
(I, 2, 229-232). And it is easy to forget that these are Bérénice’s people whom Antiochus is 
dominating and quelling. Thus to elevate Bérénice to the status of a companion, or conjugal 
equal, becomes complicated insofar as she is of the race and nationality of people whom he has 
submitted beneath an imperial ‘joug.” 
Significantly, for Bodin, to be yoked together means that the power of both is diluted, 
“sous le joug,” insofar as this absolute nature of the sovereign is not shareable, and it is 
specifically companionship, or marriage, that threatens the unity of such power. The only “joug” 
that is acceptable to the sovereign is a divine one, but submission to God also includes 
submission to divine and natural laws, according to Bodin: 
Mais quant aux loix divines et naturelles tous les Princes de la terre y sont 
subjects et n’est pas en leur puissance d’y contrevenir, s’ils ne veulent estre 
coulpables de leze majesté divine, faisant guerre à Dieu, sous la grandeur duquel 




The institute of marriage itself, however, straddles the secular and the divine, conflating bending 
one’s head to the “joug” of God with bending one’s head to the joug of conjugality. Yet it is 
unclear if marrying Bérénice would constitute a sexual crime “against nature,” otherwise known 
as “sodomie” insofar as it would engender a disruption of order and a diminishment of Titus’ 
sovereign grandeur—a type of treasonous vampirization of sovereign unity, by splitting the 
throne with her. In this sense, the conjugal union between Titus and Bérénice, the pending 
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 But as for the natural and divine laws, all of the Princes of the earth are subject, and it is not in their power to go 
against these laws, if they do not wish to find themselves guilty of committing lese-majesty against the divine, 
waging war against God, under whose glory all of the Monarchs of the world should submit (faire joug) and bow 
their heads to the yoke of fear and reverence”.  
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hymen, is also threatening not only because of the possible inclusion of non-Roman blood, but 
also because it complicates the unity of sovereign power, risking dilution of the absolute that is 
supposed to cohere in one single body. Of this impossible reciprocity, Paulin says:   
Et vous croiriez pouvoir, sans blesser nos regards 
Faire entrer une reine au lit de nos Césars, 
Tandis que l'Orient dans le lit de ses reines 
Voit passer un esclave au sortir de nos chaînes ? 
C'est ce que les Romains pensent de votre amour.
193
 
For Bodin, once a companion is introduced into the equation, the absolute nature of sovereignty 
is diminished, an unfortunate effect that is further exaggerated if this companion is of a former 
conquered territory. Paulin’s speech indicates that such a union would diminish both Titus’ and 
Bérénice’s sovereign status itself.   
While Titus needs the analogic (substitutive) capacities that Antiochus can yield him, the 
transfer “fails” because Antiochus cannot be a perfectly empty receptacle for Titus’ words.  As a 
sovereign himself, le roi de Comagène cannot help but infuse the declarations that they has been 
sent to convey to Bérénice with traces of his own desires and his own confessions.  The nature of 
this failed analogous relationship interests us insofar as Daniel reminds us that Schmitt “insists 
upon an optic of similitude, an aspectual seeing of one thing under the terms set by another” 
(250). Daniel cites Schmitt’s famous, “The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the 
miracle in theology.  Only by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate the manner in which 
the philosophical ideas of the state developed in the last centuries” (36).  And while Schmitt goes 
on to explain and analyze this transfer of authority from a theological instance to a post-
secularized state, he neglects to analyze the very mode of transfer itself, through the rhetorical 
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 “And you would presume that, without causing offense/ that you could bring a queen into the bed of the Caesars/ 
While, what the Orient sees is a slave [Titus] entering the bed of one of their queens? / That is what the Romans 
think of your love” 
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figure of analogy.  Daniel suggests that  
Sublunary political matters are made in the image of divinity (‘as above, so 
below’), but only if we can maintain our focus upon this double vision, suggesting 
that the critic must squint slightly to see the family resemblance across the 
centuries. Exceptional to this temporal form, marriage is thereby critically 
transformative in the work it performs upon Schmitt’s structure: instead of seeing 
one thing as “like” another thing, the simultaneity of marriage’s inclusion in both 
the sphere of theology and the sphere of politics becomes the origin point of the 
theologico-political idea’s gradual metamorphosis from coextension to metaphor 
to simile (251). 
In a sense, the sovereignty that rides on the state of exception also necessitates the rhetorical 
structure of analogy as a conduit through which the structures of belief and performativity 
inherent in the theological miracle could be translated to the secular/political sphere.  However, 
problematically, the status of marriage traditionally summons up both structures, simultaneously, 
and the looseness of analogy threatens a slippery slope from rejecting the joug of conjugality (in 
order to preserve the unity of the absolute) to rejecting a joug of divine authority and natural law.  
If Schmitt’s sovereign, as read through Hans Blumenberg, is merely the master of 
rhetoric, then the problem with sovereignty that Bérénice points to is the slipperiness of both 
rhetorical instantiation and the proliferation of a post-secular sovereignty, both condensed in the 
sovereign-forming capacities in relation to deixis.  Blumenberg latches onto the fact that Schmitt 
ignores rhetoric as itself revelatory of rhetoric’s hidden potential. Instead of criticizing Schmitt 
for using metaphor as a blanket cover for a sleight-of-hand transfer from the theologic to the 
political, Blumenberg actually touches on something more significant: that metaphor itself is not 
necessarily an ‘abuse” or a “medium,” but rather that the act of using rhetoric in and of itself is 
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worth of analysis and study:  
This understanding of rhetoric as a metaphorical practice allows Blumenberg to 
revise key terms from Schmitt’s writings— namely, the state of exception and the 
sovereign decision— in order to argue that rhetoric is a uniquely modern form of 
political life […] Schmitt can persuasively manipulate theological figures and 
make them seem to have real effects because of the general role that metaphor 
plays in the constitution of the modern age (84).  
No longer the allegorical/ analogical performer of miracles, nor the decider of the exception, the 
sovereign in this play only stands as the decider of rhetoric. The particular pathos in Bérénice, 
then, is the redoubled fallenness of the sovereign: indecisive Titus stands as both the symptom of 
this shifted, disenchanted sovereignty and the limit case that reveals the rhetorical foundations of 
such sovereignty to be “mere” rhetoric.  
The pathos of this diminished sovereign function underscores what Leo Spitzer has called 
Racine’s classical piano, in which emotion reaches the apotheosis of its expression not through 
exaggeration or stress, but paradoxically through that which is blurred, softened or dulled.  
Spitzer suggests that Racine's power and strength derives from his use of “distinguished restraint, 
of self-enclosure” akin to the dampening or “piano” pedal of the pianoforte.   Spitzer draws upon 
the tiniest slips of words, such as the use of the indefinite article, the third person reference, the 
demonstrative “ce” to suggest that “unsaid emotion takes its revenge by energising its verbal 
expression, by exercises a counterpression on the words that repress it.  So we have a piano 
strung with tension” (5).Thus, Titus’ crisis is not necessarily dramatized according to a 
spectacularly glorious action or decision, but rather it is presented in the most minimal, even 
most dampened piano terms.  His only action, or decision, is to decide on the deictic present, the 
“now” that would cleanly cleave Bérénice from Titus, marking the point of departure and 
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separation. Titus attempts to declare such a deixis, using anaphora to evoke a ritualist rhythm: 
“Maintenant que je puis couronner tant d’attraits, / Maintenant que je l’aime encor plus que 
jamais” ( II, 2, 441-442)  but ultimately he is crippled by indecision and the line, like his resolve, 
crumbles: “Je vais, Paulin… O Ciel! Puis-je le declarer?” (II, 2, 445).  Even posing that very 
question, bringing forth his doubts, troubles his sovereign status as the master of rhetoric.  
 It is his failure to announce the “now” that highlights the tragedy of the sovereign.  
If Bérénice, Antiochus and even Titus himself are all anxious about the deictic present, it’s 
because this deixis especially in relation to the sovereign declaration of “en ce moment’ or 
“aujourd’hui” represents—allegorizes—several things.  First it marks the transition from the 
dilatory, nebulous time to one that is marked, represented, and measured.  But secondly, the 
repeated deictic now stages the sovereign’s (in)ability to conjure an ontologic “now” a “real” 
present, one that actually does instantiate the law (of repudiation, of Bérénice’s excision) and 
performs Titus’ decision making.  
 
VI. The Hymen’s Deixis 
 
In its insistence on dilation in face of the demands of sovereign deixis, the hymen collapses 
temporality.  Derrida writes that the hymen confuses the temporality of desire with the 
temporality of desire’s accomplishment.  It confounds the will-have-been (the future anterior of 
marital union) with the yet-to-be (the still-untouched virginity), for the in fulfilment 
(accomplissement) of the hymen (marriage), the hymen (membrane) ceases to exist, but the 
existence of hymen confuses before and after, prior and posterior.  It is for this reason that 
Derrida links the hymen with the pli (the fold).
194
  And I would argue that this folded time is one 
                                                 
194
 “Sur la ligne introuvable de ce pli, l’hymen ne se présente jamais, il n’est jamais—au présent--, il n’a pas de sens 
propre, il ne relève plus du sens comme tel, c’est-à-dire, en dernière instance, comme sens de l’être.  Le pli (se) 
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that specifically circular, spiraling and curling back upon itself.   This inarticulate love is 
possible when le temps se love. 
The hymen, in its unreadable status of “entre”, in its undecidability, most troubles the 
nature of the present, of the givenness of the deictic “now.”  Derrida writes that:  
 L’entr’acte ou l’entre-temps de l’hymen ne donne pas le temps: ni le temps 
comme existence du concept (Hegel), ni le temps perdu ni le temps retrouvé, 
encore moins l’instant ou l’éternité. Aucun présent en vérité ne s’y présente, fût-
ce pour s’y dissimuler. Ce que l’hymen déjoue, sous l’espèce du présent (temporel 
ou éternel), c’est l’assurance de maîtrise (DS 282).195 
The hymen in its manifold figural incarnations repeats through the play, whether in the necessary 
impossibility of marriage/separation, or in the neutral status of “entre” that its undecidability 
performs.   
While time was measured ambiguously prior, as the moment of deciding on the hymen’s 
accomplishment/rupture draws nearer, the ways that the characters talk about temporality 
changes.  In the idyllic, circular, triadic eroticism, time discussed in the vague multiplicity of 
“cent fois,” a temporal (non) measure that is invoked when the characters wish to allude to the 
pleasurably undecided, dilated dynamic.   
  TITUS:  
J'ai même souhaité la place de mon père, 
Moi, Paulin, qui cent fois, si le sort moins sévère 
Eût voulu de sa vie étendre les liens, 
                                                                                                                                                             
multiplie mais (n’est) pas (un) (Dissémination 281).  
195
 The intermission or between-time of the hymen does not give time: neither the temporality as existing concept 
(Hegel) nor the lost time or the found time, and even less the instant or eternity.  No present or truth presents 
itself, be that as it may a dissimulation.  What the hymen thwarts, under the space of the present (temporal or 
eternal) is the assurance of mastery.  
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Aurais donné mes jours pour prolonger les siens. (II, 2, 431-444)
196
 
  BÉRÉNICE : 
Il craint peut-être, il craint d’épouser une reine 
Hélas ! s'il était vrai... Mais non, il a cent fois 
Rassuré mon amour contre leurs dures lois. 
Cent fois... Ah ! qu'il m'explique un silence si rude (II, 5, 640-643)
197
 
Spitzer suggests that “the use of exaggerated round numbers  looks at first glance like an 
expression of affectivity, but when one has got used to the constantly recurring thousands, 
hundreds and scores, the figures have more the effect of a dull formula, corresponding to the 
Latin sescenti  (‘six hundreds’= ‘a large number.)” (93). As such, the “cent fois” repeated have 
the “dampening” effect so prized by Spitzer. “The thousands and hundreds are obviously 
exaggerated numbers, but in as much as they are round numbers they serve to spread a mood of 
calm and lucid orderliness” (94).  So if the strength of their oft-repeated expressions of love is 
overwhelmingly powerful and ordered through such repeated multiplicity, this “softened” 
illusion of control comes to a breaking point in the necessity of choosing just one moment, in 
singularity of the deictic now.  
 As the reality of the broken-off marriage approaches (“Cet hymen et rompu,” says 
Arsace, underscoring both the legalistic sense of “called off” as well as the sexualized sense of 
“broken or split”), the characters shatter this undecided vaguely dilatory, multiplied time of 
“cent fois” to a fragmented sense of “moments.” After Bérénice has been informed that Titus 
will send her away, that the possibility of marriage/hymen is broken, she sends her friend 
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 I have wished to take the place of my father (now dead) 
Me, Paulin, who, a hundred times, if the fates were kindly 
and had wanted to extend the days of her life 
I would gladly  have given my time to extend hers.  
197
 He fears, possibly, he fears marrying a queen 
Alas! If it were true… but not, he has, a hundred times 
Reassured my love against the harsh Roman laws.  
A hundred times…. Oh! If only he would explain such a brusque silence 
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Phénice to see if Titus will come and clarify the situation himself.  As she waits, Bérénice gives 
a monologue that is mostly about her experience of time itself:  “Phénice ne vient point? 
Moments trop rigoureux,/ Que vous paraissez lents à mes rapides voeux! / Je m’agite, je cours, 
languissante, abattue,/ La force m’abandonne, et le repos me tue” (IV, 1, 953-956).198  In this 
period of waiting and unknowing, before the decision has been announced, Bérénice remarks on 
the jarring effect that these competing temporalities have on her:  the infinitedly dilated, 
pleasureaby repeated time must finally come to a “point,” or a moment of decision, and the 
struggle between these incompatible temporal economies ends up feeling “trop rigoreux.” 
Puncturing this undecidable temporality, the temporal “now” gives the illusion of 
“maîtrise,” or rather, maps the desire for mastery over this dilatory time.  Roland Racevskis has 
touched on the treatment of temporality in Bérénice.  
In its singular and plural forms combined, the word ‘moment(s)’ occurs 40 times 
in Bérénice […] the prevalence in this play of the term “moments(s)” constitutes 
evidence that Racine sought to develop the representation of intimate, individual 
experiences of time into its smallest manifestations as a way of ornamenting and 
internally fragmenting the minimalistic action of the story chosen for this play. 
What results from the multiple references to the moments of characters’ lives is a 
diversity of subjective temporalities (“Time of Tragedy” 115).  
Bérénice’s monologue does present such a minimalized time, as well as the jarring discord 
experienced from her temporality of waiting.  However, Racevskis has drawn upon the Batson 
Concordance that enumerates the lines in Racine with “moment (s),” but he forgets to note that 
the concordance ignores the collocation “en ce moment” (“now”) and simply analyzes the use of 
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 Phénice isn’t coming?  Such strenuous moments 
How slow you seem in comparison to my pressing needs 
I am agitated, I run, I languish, defeated 
Strength abandons me, but rest kills me.  
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the word “moment.” Therefore while many of Racevskis’ assertions about temporality in 
Bérénice are on the right track, they do not go far enough because they do not account for the 
necessity of the “now.” The puncturing status of the “now” forces a decision on the ambiguous 
eroticism of the triad, or the undecidable hymen.  “Now” becomes the “point” that destabilizes 
the dilation of time in the play.  
Antiochus says, “Aujourd'hui qu'il peut tout, que votre hymen s'avance” (I, 1, 43)199 in 
his monologue of imagined speech to Bérénice, linking Titus’ all-powerful sovereign capacities 
(“il peut tout”) with the impending marriage. However taking on this mantle of sovereignty is 
explicitly linked to a different kind of linear temporality, one that, as we have seen, resists the 
dilatational increase of pregnancy that would result from a “hymen odieux”.  Later, Titus 
confesses to Antiochus, “Mes transports aujourd'hui s'attendaient d'éclater./ Cependant 
aujourd'hui, Prince il faut la quitter” (III, 1, 713-714),200 and in the folded doubling of 
“aujourd’hui,” the pathos of the most joyously anticipated day turning into the most sorrowfully 
dreaded one is highlighted.   And if we are to take the notion of the repetition (la chrie) seriously, 
in the repeated invocations of “en ce moment,” “ce jour,” or “aujourd’hui,” there is not only an 
anxiety expressed over the marriage or the separation (the hymen) but also a focus on the 
conjuring power of the deictic now itself, and its very undecidability. This aujourd’hui, as deixis, 
marks a temporal threshold between the continuity of previous’ emperors’ pasts and an 
acceptable sovereign future. For Spitzer, the “close linkage of this sort imposes patterning of 
great compression” (62), and such “twinning is especially tightly drawn when the sentence forks, 
as it were, from a common verb in the ‘trunk’ clause (the rhetorical term for this is isocolon)” 
(64). Thus, the distance between the text’s forking and separation stands as a foil to Titus’ 
inability to actually split away, or to definitively announce the scission of the “aujourd’hui.”  
                                                 
199
 “Now he can do anything, since your hymen/marriage approaches” 
200
 “My passionate love waited for this day, to burst in joy/ However, this day, Prince, I must leave her” 
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When Bérénice confronts Titus after hearing that he plans to send her away, she 
acknowledges that he is following the Roman law and tradition.  However, her main argument is 
“why now?  Why today?” : “Ignoriez-vous vos Lois/ Quand je vous l’avouez pour la première 
fois?/ À quel excès d’amour m’avez-vous amenée” (IV, 5, 1065-1067)201; and “Tout l’Empire a 
vingt vois conspiré contre nous./  Il était temps encor.  Que ne me quittiez-vous ?” 202(IV, 5, 
1073-1074).  She effectively criticizes him for not having accepted earlier that they could never 
be together, and begrudges his indulgence in the amatory delay.  At the same time, she insists 
that the logic of the separation taking place that day does not make sense, underscoring the 
arbitrary nature of his decision: “Hé bien, Seigneur, hé bien, qu’en peut-il arriver ? / Voyez-vous 
les Romains prêts à se soulever ?” (IV, 5, 1137-1138).203  In other words, she insists that there is 
no “state of emergency,” actual or pending, and therefore her repudiation does not adhere to any 
kind of logic, except for one that invests in a certain kind of Roman-only future.  Such a 
separation could have taken place earlier, or even deferred for years.  They could still, for 
example, live in the dilatory temporality of the diferred, future “hymen.” In a rather 
contemporary gesture, Bérénice even argues against the institution of marriage: “Ah Seigneur!  
S’il est vrai, pourquoi nous séparer? / Je ne vous parle point d’une heureux hyménée” (IV, 5, 
1126-1127).
204
  There is not any logical, or real reason that either the separation or the marriage 
has to happen today, right now, if at all.   
Titus himself remarks on the absurdity of the necessary “present” bringing to the fore the 
violence of the hymen’s rupture with “percer”:   
Je viens percer un coeur que j’adore, qui m’aime 
Et pourquoi le percer ? Qui l’ordonne ? Moi-même.  
                                                 
201
 Did you ignore your laws, when I revealed my love for the first time? / To what degree of infatuation did your 
deception seduce me to?  
202
 The entire empire conspired against us twenty times/  There was still time.  Why did you not leave me earlier?  
203
 All right, all right, sir, what would happen then? /  Do you see the Romans rising up against you right now?  
204
 Oh sir, then if this is true, why the separation? / I am not talking about marriage 
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Car enfin Rome a-t-elle expliqué ses souhaits ?  
L’entendons-nous crier autour de ce Palais ?  
Vois-je l’État penchant au bord du précipice ?  
Ne le puis-je sauver que par ce sacrifice ?  
Tout se tait (IV, 4, 999-1005).
205
  
As he seeks to find the organizing logic behind his sorrow, he ends up tumbling into a mise-en-
abime.  The villain orchestrating this cruel separation is who?  He himself.  Who or what is 
forcing him to do this, what thumb of duress presses him on?  His ultimate conclusion is nothing, 
silence: “Tout se tait.”   
The play plots a trajectory from a nebulous temporality of “cent fois” or a circular 
repetition, to one that is broken down, measured and fragmented.  Before, the dilatory 
temporality was structured by the possibility of an end point, or hymen.  It was this possibility 
that lends itself to Bérénice waiting five years, or to Antiochus languishing in silence for three 
years.  However, once the hymen is “rompu,” then the dilation of time, in its inflational increase, 
feels overwhelming and threatening, as Bérénice mentions in her “Moments trop rigoreux” 
monologue.  In this moment of indecisive decision (or, perhaps, decisive indeceision), the clash 
of the two temporalities, circular and linear, means that Bérénice tries to grasp at some measures 
of temporality, but even the common temporal markers seem absurd and ridiculous.   
Dans un mois, dans un an, comment souffrirons-nous, 
Seigneur, que tant de Mers me séparent de vous ?  
Que le jour recommence et que le jour finisse 
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 I have pierced a heart that I love, that loves me 
And why pierce it?  Who orders it? Me myself.  
Because Rome has finally expressed its wishes?  
Do we hear mobs crying around the Palace? 
Do I see the State on the edge of a precipe  
and I can only save it by this sacrifice? 
Everything is silent.  
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Sans que Titus puisse voir Bérénice ?   
Sans que de tout le jour je puisse voir Titus ? (IV, 5, 1113-1117)
206
 
With the enjambment, another marker of textual excess or interlarding, Bérénice marks a dual 
position in affect.  As we read/hear the line originally, we hear “souffrirrons” normally, believing 
that Bérénice may hysterically build to a final complaint of her suffering: “And how (much) shall 
we suffer...” but with the “que” in the next line, she draws herself together, quietly, like the 
queen she is, and it becomes modified to mean “and how will we endure”.  It is not accidental 
that the “Seigneur” comes before “que”-- Sptizer calls seigneur “the switchpoint between 
narration and emotional outburst... on the border between the two, for it is both a social form of 
address and a discharge of contained emotion” (87).  Here, the reversion back to the language of 
title and politeness triggers the “que,” reminding both of their duty to “endure”and not to 
“suffer,” but the tragedy consists of this very restraint: as sovereigns, to “endure”.   Bérénice 
conjures images of extended time and distance (“tant de mers”), but with the ambiguous hinge 
“que” and the cold formality of “Seigneur,” she creates infinitely greater emotional distance than 
can be alluded to in markers of time and space.  It is because their sensation of temporality itself 
is shifting, moving from an ambiguous circularity (one in which “Titus sees Bérénice and 
Bérénice sees Titus”) to a temporality of acceptable sovereign progress.  It is for this reason, 
then, that their questions regarding the deictic present—“why now? Why today?” actually take 
on greater rhetorical and even political import.  
 
VII. No Eschatology (Not Now)  
Indecisive sovereigns populate many of Racine’s plays.  For example, Racine’s Iphigénie 
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 In a month, in a year how will we endure/suffer 
Sir, that so many seas separate you from me?  
That the day begins and ends 
Without Titus seeing Bérénice?  
The whole day goes by without me seeing you?  
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is largely about Agamemnon’s indecision: whether to sacrifice his daughter or not, whether to 
tell Clytemnestra or not, etc.  This indecision is highlighted in the very way Agamemnon speaks 
of himself, opening the play: “Oui, c'est Agamemnon, c'est ton Roi qui t'éveille/ Viens, reconnais 
la voix qui frappe ton oreille” (I, 1, 1).207  The “ce” of the phrase, however subtle, elicits 
enormous pathos: what king has to use the deictic “ce” to point to himself? Is the state of 
sovereignty not self-evident? The use of “ce” and the third person reference underscores that at 
this point of the play, Agamemnon is utterly confused and unsure. He names himself 
(Agamemnon) before correcting it with his sovereign title “ton Roi” but even in this divide, in 
this mis-naming, he expresses deep hesitation over his competing roles of father and sovereign.   
Similarly, such indecision is redoubled in Bérénice when Titus wants to point a finger at 
the source of his impending misery only to turn back to himself, the sovereign: “qui l’ordonne?  
Moi-même.” Racine’s depiction of indecisive kings anticipates Benjamin’s analysis that such 
indecision may be characteristic of the baroque tragic drama: “The antithesis between the power 
of the ruler and his capacity to rule led to a feature peculiar to the Trauerspiel which is, however, 
only apparently a generic feature and which can be illuminated only against the background of 
the theory of sovereignty.  This is the indecisiveness of the tyrant.  The prince, who is 
responsible for making the decision to proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at the first 
opportunity, that he is almost incapable of making a decision” (Benjamin 71).   And yet while 
Iphgénie and Bérénice both point to the tragedy of the sovereign’s indecision, Iphigénie 
nevertheless culminates in a spectacular moment of self-sacrifice (painted in almost orgasmic, 
orgiastic tones) that affirms and lays the groundwork for the future glories of the Trojan War:  
 À peine son sang coule et fait rougir la terre, 
 Les dieux font sur l’autel entendre le tonnerre, 
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 “Yes, it’s Agamemnon, it’s your King who wakes you, come, recognize the voice that strikes your ear” 
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 Les vents agitent l’aire d’heureux frémissements,  
 Et la mer leur répond par ses mugissements. 
 La rive au loin gémit blanchissante d’écume. 
 La flamme du bûcher d’elle-même s’allume.  
 Le ciel brille d’éclairs, s’entr’ouvre, et parmi nous 
 Jette une sainte horreur, qui nous rassure tous (V, 6, 1773-1780).
208
 
In comparison to Iphigénie’s sublime synthesis of death and nature, moaning and foaming and a 
lightening-streaked future opening up before the spectators, Bérénice, in contrast, ends almost 
anticlimactically.  “Adieu, servons tous trois d'exemple à l'univers/ De l'amour la plus tendre, et 
la plus malheureuse,/ Dont il puisse garder l'histoire douloureuse ” (V, 7, 1502-1504).209  All of 
their suffering, heartbreak, and loss surely had to go to some greater purpose, we would imagine.  
But the entirety of the play comes to an ambiguous close, when their sacrifice of one another is 
merely an “example.” The inscription in the proper sovereign history, eschewing the excesses of 
Antony and Julius, obeying the very same law that even Caligula and Nero bowed their heads 
under—this example marks a proscription guiding sovereign and also civic behavior. And yet 
this sadly unglorious ending to the drama seems almost fitting with Benjamin’s diagnosis of 
trauerspiel:  
The baroque knows no eschatology, and for that very reason it possesses no 
mechanism by which all earthly things are gathered in together and exalted before 
being consigned to their end.  The hereafter is emptied of everything which 
contains the slightest breath of this world, and from it the baroque extracts a 
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 “Her blood had barely begun to flow and redden the earth/ The gods shook the altar with thunder/ The winds 
whipped up the air with happy tremblings/ And the sea responded with her howls/ the far away river moaned, 
whitening with foam/ the flame of the altar alighted itself/ the sky scintillated with lightening, opened itself, and 
among us/ Gushed forth a holy terror, that reassured us all” 
209
 “Goodbye, let us all three of us serve as an example to the uinverse/ Of the most tender and sad love/ whose 
sorrowful history will be preserved” 
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profusion of things which customarily escaped the grasp of artistic formulation 
and, at is high point, brings them violently into the light of day, in order to clear 




However, this catastrophe, as emblematized in Bérénice’s departure, is one that is particularly 
softened, or to use Spitzer’s term, “dampened.” Instead of a gloriously redemptive or tragic end, 
as in Iphigénie, the play ends on the softest of piano endings.  This softness is emphasized in 
Agamben’s notion of a “white escatology,” an ending that refuses the triumphant, redemptive 
completion. To cite Agamben at length:  
It is this "white eschatology"-which does not lead the earth to a redeemed 
hereafter, but consigns it to an absolutely empty sky-that configures the baroque 
state of exception as catastrophe. And it is again this white eschatology that 
shatters the correspondence between sovereignty and transcendence, between the 
monarch and God, that defined the Schmittian theologico-political. While in 
Schmitt "the sovereign is identified with God and occupies a position in the state 
exactly analogous to that attributed in the world to the God of the Cartesian 
system" (Schmitt 1922) 43/46), in Benjamin the sovereign is "confined to the 
world of creation; he is the lord of creatures, but he remains a creature" (Benjamin 
1928) 264/85). This drastic redefinition of the sovereign function implies a 
different situation of the state of exception. It no longer appears as the threshold 
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 Agamben clarifies that this translation is slightly faulty, but the error is actually closer to what Benjamin intended 
to say: “An unfortunate emendation in the text of the Gesammelte Schriften has prevented all the implications of 
this shift from being assessed. Where Benjamin's text read, Es gibt eine barocke Eschatologie, ‘there is a baroque 
eschatology,’ the editors, with a singular disregard for all philological care, have corrected it to read: Es gibt 
keine ... , ‘there is no baroque eschatology’ (Benjamin 1928, 246/66). And yet the passage that follows is 
logically and syntactically consistent with the original reading: ‘and for that very reason [there is] a mechanism 
that gathers and exalts all earthly creatures before consigning them to the end [dem Ende].’ The baroque knows 
an eskhaton, an end of time; but, as Benjamin immediately makes clear, this eskhaton is empty. It knows neither 
redemption nor a hereafter and remains immanent to this world” 
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that guarantees the articulation between an inside and an outside, or between 
anomie and the juridical context, by virtue of a law that is in force in its 
suspension: it is, rather, a zone of absolute indeterminacy between anomie and 
law, in which the sphere of creatures and the juridical order are caught up in a 
single catastrophe (State, 57)  
Schmitt’s sovereign is able to both declare and decide on the state of emergency and the 
exception, just like the miracle in theology, the very rhetoric and language of the miracle, the 
ability to deictically point and say “this is,” and then have that moment become exceptional.   
In contrast, Titus needs to pathetically repeat (over and over again) the necessity of 
deciding on Bérénice’s fate and sending her away: “Si le Peuple demain ne voit partir la Reine, / 
Demain elle entendra ce Peuple furieux/ me venir demander son depart à ses yeux” (III, 1, 732-
733).
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 His redoubled declaration of “demain” attempts to sound resolute, but the supposedly 
sovereign phrase ends up timidly retreating behind the excuse of “ce Peuple furieux.”  And later 
he points out that if he allows Bérénice to stay, he would be breaking the very laws that he 
himself is responsible for upholding: “Maintiendrai-je des Lois que je ne puis garder?” (IV, 5, 
1146).
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  At the same time, he is absolutely unable to decide whether to break the law for 
personal gain, to make an exception for himself, or to stick to one declaration.  Bérénice points 
out that he is making this sacrifice in order to uphold laws—but laws that he himself is capable 
of changing: “Quoi, pour d’injustes Lois que vous pouvez changer/ En d’éternels chagrins vous-




Derrida notes that even the possibility of taking a decision hinges upon the fact that there 
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 “If the people do not see the Queen leave tomorrow/ Tomorrow she will hear the furious people/ Demanding me, 
in front of her eyes, to force her to leave” 
212
 “Shall I maintain laws that I myself cannot obey?” 
213
 “What, in the name of unfair laws that you yourself could change/ You would throw yourself into eternal woe?/ 
Rome has its rights, Sir. Do you not have yours?” 
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is no clear, “rational” consequence of the law, and therefore in the fractional moment between 
the sovereign’s logical “programmable” decision (for the good of the state, to keep chaos at bay) 
and not-deciding, there is a movement from the realm of the impossibly illogical to the 
absolutely necessary.  However, this movement always presupposes a flicker of indecision, a 
moment prior to the decision being taken.  Just Agamben analyzed the creaturely nature of 
Benjamin’s fallen sovereign, Derrida suggests that the mark of this unexalted state resides in the 
sovereign’s own relationship to decision-making: 
Toute décision (par essence une décision est exceptionnelle et souveraine) devant 
échapper à l’ordre du possible, du déjà possible et programmable pour le sujet 
supposé de la décision, toute décision passive ou d’une décision de l’autre alors la 
différence entre la décision décidante et la décision indécise devient elle-même 
indécidable, et alors la décision supposée, la décision exceptionnellement 
souveraine ressemble, comme une goutte d’eau, à une indécision, à une non-
volonté, à une non-liberté, à une non-intention, à une in-conscience et à une 
irrationalité, etc. ; et alors le supposé sujet souverain commence, par une 
invincible attraction, à ressembler à la bête qu’il est supposé s’assujettir (et l’on 
sait désormais, nous l’avons souvent vérifié et encore la dernière fois, qu’à la 
place de la bête on peut mettre, dans cette même hiérachie, l’esclave, la femme, 
l’enfant) (Bête 60).214 
Titus’ indecision reduces him to a mere shadow of his former glorious self, the one that was 
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 “Because every decision (by its essence every decision is exceptional and sovereign) must escape the order of the 
possible, of what is already possible, of what is already possible and programmable for the supposed subject of 
the decision, because every decision worthy of the name must be this exceptional scandal of a passive decision 
or decision of the other, the difference between the deciding decision and the undecided decision itself becomes 
undecidable, and then the supposed decision, the exceptionally sovereign decision looks, like two peas in a pod, 
just like an indecision, an unwilling, a nonliberty, a nonintention, an unconsciousness and an irrationality, etcand 
then the supposed sovereign subject begins, by an invincible attraction, to look like the beast that he is supposed 
to subject to himself (and we already know, having often—last time too- verified it, that in place of th beast one 
can put, in the same hierarchy, the slave, the woman, the child ” (33). 
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heralded by “ces flambeaux, ce bûcher, cette nuit enflammée,/ Ces aigles ces faisceaux, ce 
people, cette armée,/ cette foule de rois, ces consuls, ce Sénat/ Qui tous de mon amant 
empruntaient leur éclat” (I, 5, 303-306).  All of these prostheses of glory reveal the 
supplementary relation between and sovereign and the state that Derrida, inspired by Hobbes’ 
Leviathan, underscores. Sovereignty as an institution serves as a prosthetic for the State, which 
needs supplements and prostheses in order to proliferate itself:  
L’État est donc une sorte de robot, de monstre animal qui, dans la figure de 
l’homme ou d’homme dans la figure du monstre animal, est plus fort, etc. que 
l’homme naturel. C’est comme une prothèse gigantesque destinée à amplifier, en 
l’objectivant hors de l’ homme naturel, le pouvoir du vivant, de l’homme vivant 
qu’elle protège, qu’elle sert, mais comme une machine morte, voire une machine 
de mort, une machine qui n’est que le masque du vivant, comme une machine de 
mort peut servir le vivant. Mais cette machine étatique et prothétique, disons 
prothétatique, cette prothétatique doit à la fois prolonger, mimer, imiter, 
reproduire même jusque dans le détail le vivant qui la produit (Bête, 53)
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Thus, in a sense, the precarity of Titus’ sovereignty is further underscored by the arbitrariness 
with which it is reproduced—through the valuation of certain kinds of (Roman) lives and 
supplement of a xenophobic exclusion—all in the vein of promoting and prolonging the Roman-
only heritage. And yet sovereignty is figured here as a “machine” which is both pro-statist and 
prosthetic, that Derrida merges together in a portmanteau hybrid of “prothétatique.” The 
temporality of this prosthetic pro-State is one that is both ephemeral and eternal:  as a machine, it 
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 “So the state is a sort of robot, an animal monster, which, in the figure of man, or of man in the figure of the 
animal monster, is stronger, etc. than natural man.  Like a gigantic prosthesis designed to amplify, by 
objectifying it outside natural man, to amplify the power of the living, the living man that it protects, that it 
serves, but like a dead machine, or even a machine of death, a machine which is only the mask of the living, like 
a machine of death can serve the living. But this state and prosthetic machine, let’s say prosthstatic, this 
prosthstate must also extend, mime, imitate, even reproduce down to the details the living creature that produces 
it”(53).  
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is of course eternal, but as a prosthetic in the service of life (preserving the quality of life, of 
precarious lives) it trades in fear and uses fear of life’s fleetingness to extend and subtend itself.  
The duration of a proper sovereignty, following the trajectory of history that Paulin has laid out, 
is one that depends upon this duality of the necessity of (infinite) sovereign continuity as well as 
the specter of life’s fragility (that the sovereign alone can control and protect). Thus, the 
prothétatique nature of the sovereign resides, itself, in a monstrous temporality that wavers 
between, and in this wavering covers over, the threat of death and the threat of a biopolitically 
controlled life/future.  
 The baroque sans eschatology, since it has "no mechanism by which it gathers all earthly 
things in together and exalts them before consigning them to their end" (Benjamin 66), places the 
tragedy in an ephemeral-eternal temporality akin to Derrida’s prothétatique.   Whereas the 
eschatological mechanism could formerly be counted on as a meaning-making cap to the tragic 
present, the numbing quality of the prothétatique  state indicates an incessant sovereignty that 
will—and must—continue on, but since the sovereignty prolongates its reign of power through 
the prosthetic and machinic, there is almost no glorious end point.  Graham Hammill points out 
that the attention shifts from a belief in a victorious theologic temporality to an investment in the 
“atemporal” quality of rhetoric, tying together rhetoric’s role in both spectacularization (the 
secular substitute of the glorious eschatological display) as well as Derrida’s prosthesis.  
Hammill says of this foregrounding of rhetoric:   
In Blumenberg’s account, the modern age is inscribed through a kind of translatio 
imperii in which the subject’s capacity to make history is understood and often 
denied through the archive of metaphors that the modern age inherits. The 
emphasis here should go to imperii or force as much as it should to translatio. The 
rhetorical subject’s capacity to translate herself into a new history is accompanied 
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by the force of theological metaphors that restrain and impel this translation at 
almost the same time. 
Given this sense of a (non) end, then, the play’s own ending dramatizes the ways that propulsion 
through history occurs rhetorically, passed down not through grand sacrifice or sovereign 
declarations, but rather, passively through “example:  “Adieu, servons tous trois d'exemple à 
l'univers / De l'amour la plus tendre, et la plus malheureuse,/ Dont il puisse garder l'histoire 
douloureuse,” (V, 8, 1502-1504), says Bérénice. Example, of is course, related to a type of 
opening or clearing. To add another layer to the dilatory opening, John Lyons reminds us that 
“Exemplum, in medieval Latin, meant ‘a clearing in the woods.” This sense of the term, often 
forgotten, sheds light on many characteristics of the rhetorical figure, example […] the clearing, 
the exemplum, posits and inside and an outside— in fact, the clearing creates an outside by its 
existence” (3). At the same time, exemplum’s clear status, the marked exclusion and inclusion, is 
able to sort the acceptable from the unacceptable.  The play stages the shift from a dilatory 
ambiguity, of possible/ pending exclusion, of possible hymen/marital union, to the clearly 
pedagogic and ascertainable clearing of the exemplum, one that is properly inscribed in a history 
to be imitated, by the universe to come.   
And yet it is Bérénice and not Titus who utters these lines, setting a poor example indeed 
for sovereign decision and leadership.  At the same time, their history is singularly inimitable.  
Lyons points out that one characteristic of example it its rarity: “One face of this concept is the 
notion that certain individuals act in a way far above or far below average acheievement. The 
‘hero’ is someone who is stronger, smarter, or more devoted than most people […] Examples 
and the category or paradigm from which they are selected […] can therefore be considered in 
terms of abundance and lack, or of frequency and infrequency of occurrence”( 32). So if one of 
the palliatives to the story, according to Bérénice’s logic, is that they will serve as an example, 
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the problem becomes, an example of what? And to whom?  Immediately after, Bérénice says: 
“Tout est prêt. On m'attend. Ne suivez point mes pas” (V, 8, 1505), offering yet another 
ambiguity in the doubled meanings of “suivre” and “pas.” Although the phrase indicates that she 
does not wish to be physically followed, “suivre” is, of course, the verb that one would use in a 
figurative sense, to “follow” an example.  At the same time, we might also imagine in the word 
“pas” not only the idea of “steps” or “path,” but also “pas” in its negative sense.  And thus the 
second meaning haunting one of her final lines is also not to follow (the example of) her 
negation, or decisive repudiation.   Is she erasing the gesture of her own capping “example”?  
Does she mean to tell Antiochus and Titus not to split from each other?  There is a decisiveness 
in this final line, but also a doubled ambiguity that reverses, or cycles back onto the beginning. 
If Parker suggests that Renaissance dilation differs from différance insofar as dilation is 
“finally caught within the horizon of a telos or ending” (204), this is an ending that is dampened, 
in a Spitzerian piano: to serve as an “example” is neither glorious, nor clearly beneficial or 
necessary.  And yet it is in the smallness of such telos that renders the wrenching difficulties of 
the drama all the more poignant.  The excesses of waiting, of laboring over speech, of confessing 
love—all of it is reduced to a mere point, or an example, exerting what Spitzer would analyze as 
an equal-and-opposite counterpressure against the spiraling amplification of emotion.  The 
measure of that emotion’s sorrow is, then, in the very force it takes to condense and minimize it 
to nothing more than a brief mark in the book of history, a small example to be noted. If Racine 
attempted to “faire quelque chose de rien,” the rhetorical effect of the “exemple” is to “faire rien 
de quelque chose.”  
Perhaps what makes the tragedy draw out such an excess of tears (to “pleurer comme un 
ignorant,” as Villars did) is in fact touching on the types of desires, intimacies and relationship 
that can only be mourned as a “douleur secrète.” Titus’ “langue embarassée” seems to denote 
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both his inability to speak as well as language’s (la langue) inability to be adequate to any type of 
expression that he might need.  In this sense, it is a tragedy both of the loss of the beloved(s), but 
also of the inability to speak of the dynamics of such a love, whether it be strangely triangulated 
and polyamorous, full of substitutions, fantasies and voyeuristic “witnessing.” The “langue 
embarassée” may also point to the impossibility of speaking of the loss of the pleasurably-
renewed, circular temporality in favor of the properly progressive sovereign time.   It is fitting 
that Bérénice’s annoucement of their exemplarity is one that is future-oriented, forward-thinking; 
but at the same time, it seems to proleptically imagine their emotions and sorrows as being neatly 
condensed into a few lines of history to come: just as Paulin devotes an alexandrine or two to 
Antony and Cleopatra, this repudiation will become another small example in a long list.  And 
perhaps poignantly enough, the line in Suetonius’ history is precisely nothing but a tiny fragment 





This project has outlined the stakes for considering inarticulate erotics through the 
paradigm of velocity.  In Andromaque, Bérénice and Polyeucte, certain deviant desires 
challenged developing notions of temporal norms and governance in the seventeenth century, 
displaying and marking this divergence through unexpected tempos. In the previous chapters, I 
illustrated that this chrononormativity conditioned and structured expectations of gender and 
sexuality, and vice versa.  For example, while waiting can appear as cruel maternal disinterest 
(Andromaque) or as impotent sovereignty (Titus), this denigration of their non-behavior ignores 
the possibility that chronobiopolitics can act as a sieve. So what comes to the fore are the clear-
cut failures and successes according to temporal norms: a mother should act according to a 
certain speed, otherwise she is heartless.   
Making tangible this invisible chronobiopolitical sieve that shapes gendered ideologies 
and expectations was the first prong of my analysis. The second was to consider that waiting 
itself, while not “criminelle,” is not neutral either. The particular temporalities associated with 
waiting (or rushing, or incessantly repeating) can also be experienced as erotic. In other words, 
Titus’s inbility to send away Bérénice is not necessarily a sovereign failing or a lack of 
masculine valor.  Rather, integral to their relationship, and what he has enjoyed the most, is the 
fixed-stasis of a perpetually renewing temporality (“Depuis cinq ans entiers chaque jour je la 
vois/ et crois toujours la voir pour la premiere fois”) (I, 2, 545-546).  Even within the couplet, the 
“ou” sounds (“jour”, “tou/ jours”, “pour”), and the “ois” (“vois,” “crois,” “voir,” “fois”) keep 
bubbling up again and again in pleasurable recursive eddies. Relying too closely on values of 
“metric” clock time and the concomitant values of progress and teleology means that other forms 
of affective attachments that amount to “nothing” go unnoticed.  Such blinders obscure, for 
example, the eroticism experienced in waiting for five years, remaining silenced, that ultimately 
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comes to absolutely naught, as in Antiochus’ case.    
In my study of these non-normative desires that lie outside the available field of 
expression, rhetoric and figure have come up repeatedly. Whether in Andromaque’s catachrestic  
attachment to Hector’s ashes or in Polyeucte and Néarque’s rushed metaleptic intimacy, a 
plethora of rhetoric and figures have animated my analysis of inarticulate erotics on the stage. As 
I mentioned in Chapter 1, both metaphor and catachresis, for example, were considered, in the 
early modern imaginary, to enact a type of velocity.  Writers such as Dumarsais and Fontanier 
imagined that the translatio creates “movement” and displacement of one word to a “new 
home.” And while there is a likeness and kinship between these  imagined movements and 
displacements of metaphor on the one hand and Andromaque’s catachrestic stillness and Titus’ 
spiraling dilation on the other, the explicit link between trope and these velocities still remains to 
be discussed. One could still ask the question, why rhetoric at all? If my archive hinges on the 
theater genre and the spectacularity of this emerging chrononormativity, does rhetoric even have 
a place in this study?  
 
My preliminary answer to this question, and a direction that I hope to follow in future 
research takes a cue from Timothy Murray’s Theatrical Legitimations.  His analysis of the force 
and function of rhetoric in the theater centers on Abbe d’Aubignac’s La Pratique du théâtre.  In 
this treatise, d’Aubignac writes: “En un mot, si la Poësie est l’Empire de Figures, le Theatre en 
est le Thrône : c’est le lieu où par les agitations apparentes de celuy qui parle et qui se plaint, 
elles font passer dans l’ame de ceux qui le regardent, et qui l’écoutent des sentimens qu’il n’a 
point” (347-348).  In the early modern period, rhetoric occupied an odd place.  Critics seemed 
uncertain whether to malign the dangers of rhetoric’s seductive (mere) ornamentation or to 
applaud rhetoric for its powers of representation, eloquence and delight.  As Jacqueline 
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Lichtenstein notes, rhetorical ornament was aligned with cosmetic makeup—a seductive 
falseness that dazzles in the reader/spectator in such a way that the spectator forgets to seek the 
truth beneath the gloss. And this seductive ornamentation was one that was specifically presented 
in gendered and sexual terms:  
The innumerable critics of rhetoric, in fact, have generally condemned such 
Asiatic stylistic figures in a vocabulary borrowed from the lexicon of the 
prostituted body, from the indecent attire and the profligate sexuality of women, 
as if every manifestation of an excessive taste for images could only be thought 
through the aesthetic-moral category of perversity, of a culpable seduction that 
originates in a certain femininity…. Coloring , when applied to painting—the 
preeminent and essential cosmetic art, consisting of both "staining" (teindre ) and 
"feigning" (feindre )…The seductive artifice of the coloring praised by the 
colorists partook of the courtesan's and prostitute's allures. Here, love is not very 
different from art; in both cases, cosmetic illusion must be seen as a promise of 
illicit pleasures (79-80) 
This nature of coloration, then, does seem fitting to an analysis of “illicit pleasures” of non-
normative erotics.  This critique of rhetoric’s ornamentational and cosmetic qualities could 
arguably also pertain to the theater, a genre in which the practice of feigning and dazzling was at 
stake.   
However, this is exactly the opposite reason for why d’Aubignac proposes that theater is 
the “throne” of rhetoric’s empire. Murray writes,  
The fabric of rhetorical theatricality consists of ruses, disguises, and illusions that 
heighten the agitated and violent imaginative experience of spectacle.  The effect 
of this kind of rhetoric is to dis-place the representation of theatrical imagery from 
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the stage to the parterre.  Underlying the ornamental unity and illusionary 
wholeness of the dramatic image, then, is the force of rhetoric. It obliges the 
theatregoer, who is otherwise comfortable with either the passive observation or 
absorptive contemplation of a colorful ‘object’ (le vrai), to recognize the 
incompletion or invisibility of the dramatic image (le semblable) (186).  
Rather than the figures penetrating the spectators’ “souls” directly, figures operate through a 
jarring inadequacy. Thus, paying attention to the rhetorical twists and gaps on stage is key. 
Skillful use of rhetoric marks both the conventions of fine humanist training as well as the 
incompletions that incite the spectators’ desire to fill the gaps with imagination. 
If rhetoric straddles a dual capacity to both conceal and to evoke, then perhaps it seems 
almost natural that certain desires characterized by deviance and insignificance might employ 
this doubled obfuscation and presentation to their advantage. We recall that François proposed 
that “the 'secret' of the 'open secret' need not mean hidden or unstated, but simply unavailable, 
untouchable, nonposessable, implying a relation to the beloved that neither appropriates nor 
denies[…]  This chasteness also refers to the open secret's perfect economy of means: for both its 
revelation and concealment, it uses no more than already available channels of communication” 
(81).  For inarticulate erotics, using the available channels of communication means, in this case, 
hijacking such available discursive practices, and being attuned to the possibilities of this 
“hijacking” move has been the third prong of my analysis. So as I discussed in chapter 3, for 
example, Titus’s inability to decide “looks like” sovereign impotence; it could also, however, be 
a gesture of staving off the end point of departure. Resting on a puncturing “now,” a temporal 
finality, would bring the previously open circulation of triangulated desire and substituitive 
longings between himself, Antiochus, and Bérénice to a close.  
Rhetoric allows a shifting between the dazzling plenitude of the “cosmetic” and the 
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forceful incompletion of the dramatic image that generates a type of motion and emotion in the 
spectator.  Murray cites d’Aubignac, who describes how figures “Laissant toûjours le Spectateur 
dans l’attente de quelque nouveauté [les couleurs] échauffent son desir, et l’entretiennent dans 
une agréable impatience” (297).  Thus, rhetoric itself creates its own temporality, a temporality 
of pleasurable waiting and the incitement of desire. Or, as Murray puts it in a more 
psychoanlytically inflected sense: “Obscuring the pleasure and pain of the dramatic object with 
the spectators’ own experiences of unfulfilled desires, such a doubling of desire casts 
d’Aubignac’s theatrical colors in a psychologically energetic light. The spectators... re-act to the 
coloration of their own libidinal mechanisms of representation through condensation, 
displacement, negation and substitution” (187).  
 Although “colore” and “disegno” have traditionally been the key dividing lines 
animating the debate about the use of figure, I would contend however, that instead of analyzing 
the rhetoric debates according to the stakes of representational qualities (le vrai vs le semblable) 
of the image, rhetoric in the theater allows for a multiplicity of temporalities to emerge.  By this I 
do not only mean the diegetic temporality on stage, but also the ways that figures (and their 
incompletenesses) generate an acute sense of what Sacks calls “personal” time in the 
spectators—the temporality of anticipation, desire, disappointment as well as the experience of a 
split temporality. My introduction addressed the ways that “velocity” pertains to this study in 
relation to this period where bodies were increasingly chorerographed to a chrono-normative, 
centralized temporality.  While much of my argumentation about rhetoric’s role in generating 
velocities in the face of inarticulate erotics hinged on intradiegetic velocity—the stalling, 
dilations, and rushings that Racine’s and Corneille’s characters orchestrate through figure and 
trope—I would, in a further study, be curious to think about a larger relationship to the parterre 
and the cultivation of such divergent, splintered time internal to spectators and readers. 
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Ultimately, however, rhetoric has allowed me, throughout this project, to consider 
inarticulate erotics in a different way.  Rather than viewing inarticulacy as a failure, or 
considering non-normative erotics to be marginalized, hidden, or unknowable, by taking 
rhetorical expression seriously, I was able to focus on types of desires that may not even seem to 
be sexual or erotic—Andromaque’s attachment to ash, for example, or Polyeucte’s repetition and 
harmonic attunement with Néarque. Rhetoric allowed me a way to let emerge these sexualities in 
a way that navigated the binary between the “agnostic” and the “anticipatory” that Coviello 
delineated.  In its inadequacies, figure is always somewhat agnostic, inviting the spectator/reader 
to interpret, substitute and seek. But in its ornamental quality, figure can also be mistaken for 
“anticipatory”—marking euphemisms, analogies and metaphors that pre-date a type of futural 
gay identity.  The beauty of rhetoric, here, is that it can inhabit both and neither category.  
Whether marking movement as metaphor’s “change in respect to location” (Parker 36), allowing 
for intradiegetic rushing, or inciting a spectator’s temporal desire, figure functions in a 
spectacular and failed way that manages to yoke together velocity with inarticulate erotics.  Thus 
in the face of the emerging chrononormativity of the seventeenth century, rhetoric becomes both 
a symptom of Absolutism’s increasing control over the discursive and the proper (les 
bienséances) while at the same time standing to intervene in temporal and affective dimensions 
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